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Abstract
This project is a comparative case study of five Community Development
Corporations (CDCs) that emerged in the seven central neighborhoods of Inner
North/Northeast Portland, Oregon in the late 1980s. Of the five organizations that
began at that time, only two exist currently. Analyzing how and why these
organizations rose and fell, merged and failed, struggled and survived in a compressed
time frame and geographic area will elucidate the different paths that each
organization chose in a neighborhood that changed from derelict to gentrified.
Drawing on the overlapping bodies of literature that cover low-income and affordable
housing development, CDC structure and evolution, and neighborhood revitalization,
this study will highlight issues of local government participation in the expansion of
CDCs and a changing community context. The choices that organizations made, or
were compelled to make, in response to these particularly local conditions contribute
either to their fortitude or their demise. This case study is intended to fill in gaps in the
existing CDC and gentrification literature and to contribute an understanding of
survival strategies for CDCs in an intensely competitive environment.
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CHAPTER 1.
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Since the 1960s, Community Development Corporations (CDCs) have
endeavored to challenge neighborhood blight, advocate for local residents, and since
1972, when President Nixon declared a moratorium on the construction of new public
housing units, compensate for the federal government’s diminishing role in the
production and management of low-income and affordable housing. Often grass roots,
CDCs are non-profit organizations that sponsor community organizing, housing and
economic development programs as vehicles for neighborhood improvement. Lowincome rental and for-sale housing development, economic development, community
organizing, job training, home buying and education programs are some of the
activities that CDCs engage in. However, of the programs, only housing development
is a geographically fixed activity, so that it has the most lasting effect on a
neighborhood. CDCs are generally supported by grants from local governments and
philanthropic foundations, with their most visible assets in the community being units
of low-income housing.
During the 1990s, the role of CDCs in urban redevelopment projects reached
its pinnacle. Well-funded and thriving on the energy of renewed interest in urban life,
CDCs nationwide were able to develop successful affordable housing and economic
revitalization strategies in blighted urban neighborhoods (and more rarely in suburban
and rural areas). The combination of federal legislation, specifically the National
Affordable Housing Act of 1990 (NAHA) that mandated CDC participation in the
1

expenditure of Community Development Block Grant (CDBG), and Home Investment
Partnerships (HOME) funding (the main source of federal dollars for economic and
housing development projects at that time), as well as the rise of philanthropic
foundations (the Enterprise Foundation created by The Rouse Company and the Local
Incentives Support Corporation [LISC] created by the Ford Foundation were the
largest partners) bolstered CDC development savvy and participation in revitalizing
urban neighborhoods. With the federal government providing funding and
philanthropic foundations providing technical assistance and leveraging additional
funds, CDCs around the US embarked on ambitious development projects that focused
on the creation of affordable housing units, job creation, and neighborhood
stabilization. However, by the middle and end of the 1990’s, many organizations,
especially newer ones, faced economic, organizational, and political challenges that
forced them to rethink how they operated. The economic challenges included
decreased federal and foundation funding, greater competition from the private sector
for development projects due to an easing of credit restrictions, and booming housing
markets (Walker, 2002: 24). The organizational challenges included staffing,
leadership, and asset management, and political challenges included waning support
and changing neighborhoods, especially those that were affected by gentrification
(Walker, 2002: 4; Hoereth, 1998: 9).
The City of Portland, Oregon has a strong group of CDCs that emerged in the
late 1980s and early 1990s; these operations work in different neighborhoods
throughout the city and the surrounding suburbs. In 1990, the seven central
2

neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland (see map, Appendix I) were poor,
home to Portland’s largest concentration of African Americans, and blighted. These
neighborhoods have seen a particularly dramatic ebb and flow of CDCs, neighborhood
gentrification, and changes in racial composition since that time. The five
organizations noted in this study have made significant contributions to neighborhood
organizing, housing and economic development programs that in turn helped to lay the
groundwork for private investment that ultimately changed the physical, social, and
economic composition of that area. Of the original five, though, only two
organizations currently exist. Analyzing how and why these organizations rose and
fell, merged and failed, struggled and survived in an environment of increased
financial accountability and competition between organizations, decreased federal
funding, and gentrifying and racially changing neighborhoods is the purpose of this
dissertation. Both qualitative and quantitative data will be utilized to understand the
Portland-specificity of the phenomena and how the experiences of these CDCs can
augment the current models of growth, change, and decline, both at the organizational
and strategic levels. Specific questions that arise from this broad inquiry include: How
did local policy makers and project funders guide the growth and development of the
organizations? What was the role of the changing neighborhood, especially with
regard to racial composition? In order to answer these questions, it is important to
understand how these organizations evolved along with their relationships to local
government, local and national funders, and the neighborhoods in which they
operated, or have failed.
3

CDCs were first recognized as a viable means for community redevelopment
in the 1960s, when urban decline and blight were accelerating. Through the 1970s and
1980s, CDCs became embedded within their communities and were on the forefront of
revitalization efforts, especially as larger government-funded efforts declined in the
1980s (Walker, 2002:6). However, most early efforts had little substantive impacts on
neighborhood vitality (Rusk, 1999; Walker, 2002). As these organizations were
incorporated into the mainstream funding and redevelopment efforts in the 1990s,
many urban areas had were concurrently undergoing vast changes. Urban economies,
including Portland’s, had shifted from an industrial base to an information base. Urban
neighborhoods were becoming popular places to live, and gentrification of previously
derelict areas was happening in cities across the US.

CDC Roles
The multiple layers of explanations for the evolution of CDCs in Inner
North/Northeast Portland are derived from the intertwining of CDC purpose and
structure, federal policy changes that have supported the expansion of the roles of
CDCs, the rise of philanthropic foundation participation in the support of CDCs, the
specific neighborhood histories where these organizations operated, and the local
policy initiatives and responses to the situation in Inner North/Northeast Portland.
These factors define the particular role of each organization, a role that has changed
significantly over time.

4

CDCs perform a variety of community organizing and community
development activities. From low-income housing development (both new
construction and rehabilitation) to job training programs, neighborhood watches to
storefront improvements, CDC activities can involve the empowerment of
neighborhood residents and the attraction of outside investors (Capraro, 2004).
Housing development is an inherent part of CDC community development activities
because “it is the sphere of activity in which it seemed most likely that they could
demonstrate clear successes and thereby gain credibility and access to additional
resources, both financial and intangible” (Vidal, 1996: 162). Because housing blight is
a common occurrence in low-income neighborhoods and re/development can be an
empowering process, it is a good fit for organizations that are trying to make a
difference in their neighborhoods. It is a potential win-win situation for the
organizations (as providers of housing), the neighborhoods (as safer and more
desirable places to live), and the local government (as stewards of federal funding,
protectors of public safety, and collectors of local taxes). Because of their status as
advocates, organizers, and landlords, CDCs must balance the needs and demands of
tenants, neighbors and funders. It is this balancing act that often determines CDC
success.
Another potential dilemma that arises with a CDC focus on revitalization is the
spurring of private investment in their neighborhoods. While Rusk’s (1999) study of
CDC housing production in the 1980s showed no visible positive impact on
neighborhood housing values, but the role of CDCs and their housing production in
5

the 1990s had yet to be fully clarified. In many cases, CDC involvement encouraged
private investment in neighborhoods that had been previously redlined (Newman and
Ashton, 2004; Walker, 2002). With this outside investment, issues of blight were no
longer paramount for CDCs; those of gentrification and displacement were. The
emergent dilemma for CDCs involves new neighborhood priorities that may no longer
be the same as they had been. New neighbors may not welcome the existence and
expansion of low-income rental housing. With improved neighborhoods, CDCs were
also now in competition with private investors for developable land and vacant and
abandoned housing units, if there were any left. This competition introduced a new
challenge for CDCs, one that often put them out of business (Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas,
2003).

Evolution of Federal Funding and Policies and CDCs
CDCs primarily take advantage of supply-side, project development funding
through a public intermediary. As most CDCs take on housing development projects,
their relationship with local government becomes critical to their survival. Local
governments are the primary conduit for federal housing dollars which can, in turn,
affect access to bank loans and grants from philanthropic foundations. Each of these
relationships has evolved with federal policy changes. The most significant of these
changes include the changing of the federal tax code in 1986 and bolstered CDC use
of Community Development Block Grant Funds and HOME funds in the 1990s
(O’Regan & Quigley, 2000). Since the Nixon Administration’s moratorium on the
6

construction of new public housing projects in 1972, the federal government has
played a lesser role in the development and management of low-income and
affordable housing (Peirce and Steinbach, 1987: 57-58; Walker, 2002:6). The large
federal programs since 1972 have encouraged public-private development
partnerships, where public entities partner with non-profit or private developers. In
this scenario, the private or non-profit sector developers take on more direct
ownership, while the federal government, via the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), assumes a regulatory and funding position. Examples of these
funding policies that encouraged public-private partnerships include the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) from the Nixon Administration, the Urban
Development Action Grant (UDAG), the cornerstone of the Carter Administration’s
Urban Policy, and HOPE VI, the Clinton Administration’s policy for the
redevelopment of public housing projects into more mixed income communities that
create more positive contributions to neighborhoods and cities (Leamann, 1994;
Schwartz, 2006). CDBG was a broad, flexible funding program that supplanted in part
the federal spending on public housing projects. CDBG funding, while fewer overall
dollars, gave local jurisdictions greater latitude in the types of development options,
rather than exclusively housing development. Although still allocated, CDBG funds
have diminished over time as more specific funding like the HOME program has
increased. UDAG (1978-1989) offered private and non-profit firms public resources to
invest heavily in a specific economic development program or geographic area. These
resources include eminent domain for site assembly, as well as funding for the
7

rebuilding of the public realm of development and gap financing for the buildings
themselves (Schwartz, 2006). HOPE VI (1992-present) offers local housing
authorities, in partnership with private and non-profit developers, flexible funding that
can be used to leverage additional funds to replace blighted public housing projects
with mixed income communities (Dreier & Atlas, 1996).
Concurrent with the earlier federal funding program shifts was the legislation
that sought to ameliorate decades of “redlining” and disinvestment in African
American and other low-income neighborhoods. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act
(HMDA – 1975) and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA-1977) were
requirements for banks to make loans in neighborhoods where they held deposits and
to provide documentation of such actions to the public. If banks did not comply with
these regulations, the government would not allow them to open new branches (Frater
interview: 2). These laws spurred bank lending, albeit begrudgingly in the beginning,
in areas previously disinvested. Banks, though, did welcome CDCs and their public
sector partners to facilitate risk sharing and to reduce exposure in the development of
projects “in marginal neighborhoods where property values and resident incomes
cannot support debt” (Vidal, 1996: 157). However, enforcement of these lending laws
was somewhat lax; it was not until 1989 that the “federal government initiated any
action on the basis of a CRA evaluation” (Squires, 1992).
The hallmark of the Reagan Administration’s efforts to engage the private
sector in the development of low-income housing was the Low-Income Housing Tax
Credit (LIHTC), created by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The purpose of the LIHTC
8

was to spur the private sector to participate in low-income housing production by
creating incentive (tax credits on federal liabilities for ten years) for capital investment
(Oregon Department of Housing and Community Services: 1). The Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) allots each state a certain dollar value of tax credits based on the per
capita income of the state (McNamara interview: 15; Oregon Department of Housing
and Community Services: 1). The state governments distribute the credits to projects,
often on a competitive basis (Oregon Department of Housing and Community
Services: 3). Housing developers apply for and are awarded the credits based on
certain project criteria. The credits are in turn syndicated by entities like Enterprise
Social Investment Corporation (ESIC), a subsidiary of The Enterprise Foundation, and
sold to investors who use the credits to offset personal income taxes; the proceeds of
these sales provide the basis for project equity. This equity is used to fill the gap
between loan amounts and actual project costs. As this is a free market based program,
the value of the credits can fluctuate. When the economy is growing, and private
investors need tax credits to offset income, the value of the credits increases to a ratio
greater than 1:1. When the economy slows down and recedes, the value of the credits
declines to less than 1:1, because fewer people need them to offset income. The
overhauling of the tax system in 1986 caused a temporary hiccup in the production of
low-income housing as developers scrambled to realign development projects with the
new criteria and funding requirements. The use of the LIHTC also opened the door for
more non-profit participation for use in mid-size developments.

9

The National Affordable Housing Act (NAHA), or Cranston Gonzales Act was
passed in 1990. This act included a new type of affordable housing development
funding, the HOME program, and represented a significant policy shift that would
ensure the role of CDCs in local community development efforts by designating that
15% of all CDBG and/or HOME funds would be set aside for “experienced
Community Housing Development Organizations (CHDOs)” (HUD, 1997). For the
purposes of its funding, HUD clearly defined that a CHDO was to be a community
based organization for the purposes of its funding. The criteria for defining community
based include: one-third of its governing board's membership for residents of lowincome neighborhoods, other low-income community residents, or elected
representatives of low-income neighborhood organizations as evidenced by the
organization’s by-laws, charter, or Articles of Incorporation (HUD, 1997). The
inclusion of CDCs in the allocation of such funds institutionalized their participation
in neighborhood revitalization efforts.
During the 1990s, new federal public housing policy included the initiation of
the HOPE VI program that would dominate HUD’s housing efforts for the next
several years. With a number of public housing projects having deteriorated to a point
where they were considered hazards to the residents and neighbors, HUD sought to
tear down a number of high-rise projects and replace those units with smaller scale
developments. HOPE VI is the program designed to repurpose dangerous and
outmoded public housing projects into well-designed, mixed income neighborhoods
and developments and to divest Housing Authorities of the sole responsibility for
10

housing the poorest of the poor (Schwartz, 2006). Housing Authorities accomplished
this by working in partnership with local non-profits to take advantage of multiple
sources of project funding. Some of the most notorious projects included the Robert
Taylor Homes and Cabrini Green in Chicago and the former Pruitt-Igoe site in St
Louis. In Portland, the redevelopment of Columbia Villa into New Columbia and Iris
Court into Humboldt Gardens are examples of such endeavors.
In an effort to preserve existing affordable housing units, HUD created the
Low Income Housing Preservation Resident and Homeownership Act (LIHPRHA) in
1992 to preserve apartment complexes that had been developed in the 1970s with 20
year subsidized mortgages. As the subsidies were about to expire, many owners were
looking to sell the apartment complexes; HUD created “steps an owner of a property
must take in order to sell it or end HUD's affordability restrictions, provided incentives
to owners to stay in HUD's programs, and gave advantages to tenants and nonprofits
in purchasing buildings should the owner choose to sell” (Shelterforce Online, 1997).
Each apartment complex or Single Asset Entity (SAE) was an independent corporation
with its own governing board, and the sponsoring CDC was merely a fiscal agent that
did not even realize a fee from their role in management of the units. Had the
sponsoring CDC been able to incorporate the income from these complexes into their
portfolios, much of it from stable HUD sources, their balance sheets would have had
very different numbers.25

25

Unit based Section 8 vouchers ensured that the housing units would have a stable cash flow, albeit
with additional paperwork and inspections. This fact made the complexes very attractive investments
with stable populations. Most of the LIHPRHA apartments had Section 8 vouchers attached to the units,
rather than the tenants. The income from these vouchers was based on HUD’s determination of a Fair
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Philanthropic Foundations and CDCs
As CDCs grew in number and sophistication in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
so, too, did the funding and foundation support systems that sponsored them. Prior to
the late 1980s, CDC funding was inconsistent; however, with the Ford Foundation’s
expansion of the Local Incentives Support Corporation (LISC) to the West coast in
1984 and the advent of the Enterprise Foundation in 1982, a nationwide “community
development infrastructure” was established to disseminate both funding and technical
assistance to community organizations (Hoereth, 1998: 15; www.LISC.org). The LISC
and Enterprise networks were responsible for the allocation of money from the
National Community Development Initiative (NCDI), a consortium of public and
private funders that “played a key role in catalyzing CDC gains over the 1990s”
(Walker, 2002:1). This infrastructure grew in size and complexity with the
introduction of local intermediaries who would offer additional opportunities to
leverage the NCDI funds (Walker, 2002: 60).
In the late 1980s, the Oregon Community Foundation (OCF), a clearinghouse
for small local philanthropic foundations, had been involved in “building
neighborhood associates, neighborhood spirit, and community economic
development” through a grant from the Mott Foundation, but the political pressure to
deal with (mostly) crime issues in Inner North/Northeast Portland called for a more
focused, albeit community based, solution (Sohl interview: 3). While CDCs had

Market Rent (FMR). Under the Section 8 program, tenants pay no more than 30% of their income for
rent and utilities, and HUD pays the difference between that amount and the FMR.
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“flowered” on the East Coast, Portland was slow to nurture the model, in part due to
the fact that urban disinvestment levels and fiscal crises were not as dire in Portland as
they were in other, often older cities (Hoereth, 1998: 1). In the late 1980s, though, the
Ford Foundation had begun to establish local partnerships (via LISC) and to “partner
with community foundations” (McNamara interview: 4). In 1989, the OCF won a
planning grant from the Ford Foundation to complete “an assessment of community
development needs in Portland.” The results of this assessment included the
recommendation that OCF “create a local intermediary that would support CDCs at all
maturity levels” (Hoereth, 1998:21). As a result of local political pressure (brought to
a head by Dee Lane’s “Blueprint for a Slum” expose in The Oregonian) and the
$500,000 commitment from the Ford Foundation, OCF created the Neighborhood
Partnership Fund (NPF) in 1990 “to develop a support infrastructure for CDCs by
channeling resources from foundations, corporations and government to local CDCs”
(Hoereth, 1998: 1).
This funding was part of a broader national effort by philanthropic foundations
to revitalize blighted urban areas. In conjunction with the federal focus on funding
CDCs for housing development, increased support from philanthropic foundations
catalyzed CDC growth and maturation (Glickman & Servon, 1998; Silver, 2004).
Several large corporate foundations banded together to form the National Community
Development Initiative (NCDI), a $62.5 million fund created in 1991 by a consortium
of seven foundations and the Prudential Insurance Company that contributed
significantly to the growth and direction of the national CDC industry (Gittell and
13

Wilder, 1999; Andrews interview: 2).26 With its funds disseminated through LISC and
the Enterprise Foundation, NCDI filled part of the void created when federal support
for any kind of housing production had been severely curtailed by the Reagan
administration and shifted the focus to smaller, community based efforts. With the
limitations in federal funding, state and local entities had to be more creative in their
approaches to the development of subsidized housing. In this era of “strategic
initiatives” rather than blanket programs, cities were encouraged to “leverage private
investment,” such as foundation grants (Wollner, Provo, and Schablisky, 2003: 21).
While reflective of differing perspectives, both the Ford and Enterprise Foundations
sought to empower CDCs and increase their housing production through technical
assistance, direct funding, and the syndication of tax credits (from the 1986 Tax
Reform Act) to provide project equity (Peirce and Steinbach, 1987).27
Born out of James Rouse’s commitment to low-income housing and supply
side economics, The Enterprise Foundation (Enterprise), now Enterprise Community
Partners, focused on housing production activities and sought to bridge the gap
between public investment and private enterprise. Since its creation in 1982,
Enterprise has given organizations core-operating support and assisted with the
production of units of low and moderate income housing through technical assistance,
tax credit syndication, lobbying efforts, and direct funding throughout the country.
26

These funders included the Annie E. Casey Foundation, the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, the
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the Ford Foundation (Allen & Luckett Interview:
13).
27
LISC was born out of the Ford Foundation’s Gray Areas Project in 1979 and acts as a “bank” for
local CDCs that worked to leverage additional funds and demand accountability from groups.
Enterprise reflected a more nuts and bolts, hands-on approach (and dollars) to development with its
Rehab Work Group that offered tips to groups on ways to get the most housing units for dollars
invested (Peirce and Steinbach, 1987: 75-81).
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With its counterpart, LISC, Enterprise has a presence in many major cities in the US,
as well as rural areas. One of the main goals of this organization is to strengthen the
potential of public private partnerships, an idea that has been encouraged by federal
policies and led to the growth of CDCs as housing developers.
When NPF began in 1990, Ed McNamara, who had been the Executive
Director of REACH CDC, was hired to run the entity and to build a local CDC
industry, in many ways based on his successes at REACH.28 It was the goal of NPF’s
“programs to ensure that all of Portland’s low-income neighborhoods are served by
effective CDCs” (NPF, 1994: 1). As part of industry creation, McNamara set out to
empower not only individual organizations, but also to create a technical assistance
and policy advisory group (McNamara interview: 5).29 In order to coalesce the
organizational part of the industry, McNamara established a hierarchy for groups from
emerging to mature CDCs, and set up a series of training sessions for the board and
staff of the emerging ones. At the time, there were many fledgling organizations that
were interested in expanding their influence in their neighborhoods. The organizations
included not only neighborhood associations, but also cultural and church based
groups as well. These organizations applied through a competitive funding process
and, if accepted, would commit to 6 months of weekend training sessions that would
culminate with the organizations having a mission statement, by-laws, a business plan
with which to operate more effectively, and a better understanding of housing
development and finance (Hoereth, 1998: 21; McNamara interview: 7). Once the
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In 1990, REACH was considered one of the two viable CDCs in Portland. It continues to play a
significant role in Portland’s CDC community.
29
See p. 18 for a discussion of the timing of the creation of NPF.
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groups completed the training sessions, they were given a small grant for operating
expenses to move forward (McNamara interview: 7). The mature organizations were
required to complete a “pretty extensive self-assessment” that included an examination
of processes and systems by both board and staff to ensure that each group was seeing
the organization in the same way (Hoereth, 1998: 23; McNamara interview: 8).
There was some controversy surrounding the choice of groups, and the
apparent “heavy-handedness” with which these opportunities were created and
administered. Especially controversial was the necessity for a geographic target for the
organizations. Housing Our Families did not make it into the first round of trainings
because McNamara did not consider it a community organization. Kay Sohl argued
that it was a “community of women,” but McNamara adhered to his geographically
oriented definition of a CDC (Sohl interview: 4). As a result of their initial exclusion,
the women of HOF chose the Boise and Eliot but continued to insist on establishing
their own kind of identity within these parameters (Schleiger interview: 3).
The result of the NPF training sessions was a group of seventeen organizations
(16 were eventually funded), including the five that are the subject of this dissertation,
that were evolving concurrently (Hoereth, 1998: 8).30 Each organization realized
operating support from NPF, with additional support from other local foundations like
the Meyer Memorial Trust, the Collins Foundation, the Herbert Templeton
Foundation, and the Ralph Smith Foundation (Hoereth, 1998: 17). By 1994, though,
30

The 16 organizations were: Franciscan Enterprise, Hacienda CDC, Inner Westside CDC, Housing
Our Families, REACH, Portland Habitat for Humanity, Sabin CDC, ROSE CDC, Portsmouth CRC
(later Peninsula CDC), Northeast CDC (NECDC), Network Behavioral Healthcare, Central City
Concern, Northwest Housing Alternatives, Human Solutions, Low Income Housing for Native
Americans of Portland, Oregon, and Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives (PCRI).
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NPF was working with 10 CDCs and sought to focus on these groups, as opposed to
encouraging even more new groups, and create funding alliances, so that it was not the
sole source of support (NPF, 1994: 5). NPF staff expected that the higher levels of
funding to “emerging” organizations would decrease over time, as organizations built
additional funding sources (NPF, 1994: 9, 12). This expectation would prove to be the
basis for a series of misunderstandings between NPF and the CDCs that led to
dramatic changes in the industry.
Another key institution that was created in conjunction with the growth of
Portland’s CDC industry is the Housing Development Center (HDC). Originally
created by NPF to offer the fledgling organizations technical assistance for project
development and construction management services, HDC is a non-profit technical
assistance consultant group that played a key role in expanding “the internal capacity
(of the CDCS) to manage single and multi-family housing development” and the role
of neighborhood construction contractors in the development process (White and
Swanson, 1993; Hoereth, 1998: 20). As the industry has evolved and development
projects are scarcer, HDC shifted its focus to asset management strategies by
supporting the efforts of CDCs to share information and develop effective property
management policies. This group formalized into the Property and Asset Management
Working Group (PAMWG), as CDCs shifted into a more mature stage of
development. Its purpose is to address “the multiple and often conflicting expectations
for affordable housing” in order to stabilize and sustain CDC housing portfolios
(PAMWG, 2007).
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As the CDC industry began to grow, the Enterprise Foundation established a
Portland office in 1995, a part of its larger effort to enhance local partnerships around
the country. When Enterprise opened its Portland office under the auspices of Rey
Ramsey, who was later President of the Enterprise Foundation, its responsibilities
included the management of the NPF development fund and the management of the
NPF Development Capital Revolving Loan Fund, as well as being the local conduit
for significant funding through NCDI (Hoereth, 1998: 19). However, this funding
source diminished towards the close of the decade, just as Portland’s CDC industry
had begun to mature, and Enterprise’s development role had shifted from
“revitalization strategies to an affordable housing strategy” (Hoereth, 1998: 20). The
“CDC industry was changing (quickly), and these issues on the ground were different
than when CDCs started” (Andrews interview: 3). Keeping pace with changing
organizational needs was one of the greatest challenges for philanthropic foundations.

Local Policy and Funding
Portland, Oregon is a relatively young city whose economy relies on a
combination of hi tech, transportation and distribution of goods, metal fabrication and
equipment manufacturing, medical and service industries. Surrounded by a regional
Urban Growth Boundary, Portland has a compact downtown area surrounded by
distinctive neighborhoods. It is a fairly homogeneous city whose minority populations
in 2000 combined to equal less than 22% of the overall population
(http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en). Portland is also the
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largest city in the US that retains the commission form of city government. In many
ways, it is the form of city government that facilitates city council’s ability to focus on
particular issues. In the commission form of government, adopted by voters in 1913 as
part of a wave of structural change in response to corruption that was endemic in the
ward systems of older cities, the mayor and commissioners have both legislative and
executive powers (City Club of Portland, 2007). In addition to legislating policy and
setting the city’s budget, the mayor and commissioners are each responsible for the
oversight of particular aspects of Portland’s essential services: transportation,
planning, housing, water, fire and police, parks and recreation, to name a few.
The Albina neighborhoods had been in the focus of intermittent local and
federal revitalization efforts since relatively small-scale riots of the 1960s. The
outcomes of each of these efforts were lackluster, due to uneven levels of participation
and plan implementation, so that when conditions in the neighborhoods deteriorated
because of the advent of crack cocaine and incursion of gangs in the late 1980s and the
Albina Community Plan was initiated, the planning process glibly stressed
“revitalization through a plan that is based on the shared objectives of those concerned
with this part of Portland” (Bureau of Planning, 1989: 1). The document spelled out
new zoning overlays, design standards, transportation connections, and a vision for a
renewed Albina (Bureau of Planning, 1992). The community meetings included
hundreds of residents and business owners, and the outcomes promoted revitalization
but failed to address root issues that surrounded race and poverty (McLennan
interview: 13; Long interview: 15). While some community groups feared that
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gentrification was very possible in the Albina neighborhoods, many residents could
not fathom that this was even possible (McLennan interview: 12; Rudman interview:
11; Schleiger interview: 7). Given this disparity of views and competing interests,
though, the plans focus on revitalization tried to accommodate a broad range of views
and was as much a community-organizing tool as planning document (McLennan
interview: 12). This effort was complicated by “the hope of many in the community,
as well as the Planning Bureau, that the plan may be completed in a shorter period of
time (than the 3 years allotted) ” (Bureau of Planning, 1989: 2). Critical to plan
implementation was the role of neighborhood CDCs, because of their local roots and
perceived effectiveness for addressing neighborhood problems.
At this point, though, BHCD had a working relationship with a limited number
of CDCs, although several were in nascent stages, and had been unable to spend their
federal development funding allocation within its three-year time limitation (Hoereth,
1998: 4; McLennan interview: 1). With the clock running out, BHCD worked with
NPF to foster as many organizations as possible in order to spend the federal funding
(McLennan interview: 2). The combination of political will to address the issues,
readily involved neighbors, and fledgling organizations was critical to the
development of organizations that had the exuberance to take on the dilemmas of
poverty and disinvestment in such a short period of time.
Just after the passage of the Albina Community Plan and as NPF’s training
sessions were getting off the ground in 1992, Gretchen Kafoury was elected City
Commissioner on a housing platform. A former County Commissioner, Kafoury
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became a tireless advocate of affordable housing during her time in office. With
Portland’s government structure that allowed “politicians to forge allegiances to issues
rather than neighborhoods,” Kafoury was able to capitalize on her passion and to
channel funds into the Bureau of Housing and Community Development and focus on
Inner North/Northeast Portland (Hoereth, 1998: 15). This resulted in the political will
necessary to jump start revitalization efforts outlined in the Albina Community Plan
and set them in motion (Baker, 1992). Kafoury’s two most significant
accomplishments while in office were housing related: the creation of Portland
Community Reinvestment Initiatives (PCRI) to acquire the housing portfolio from the
bankrupt Dominion Capital and the establishment of the Housing Investment Fund
created from general fund moneys to develop affordable housing (Kafoury, 1995).31
City Council adopted the ordinance that created The Housing Investment Fund in
1994; the purpose of the Fund was to “assure the development of 50,000 new housing
units by 2015”, and it was administered by the newly formed Livable Cities Housing
Council whose members included public, private, and non-profit developers (Hunter,
1995; Livable Cities Housing Council, 1995). It was a one time $30 million set aside
to offset a loss of federal funding at a critical time in the City’s growth spurt of the
1990s and encouraged the growth of several of the small, recently established CDCs
(Hoereth, 1998:16; Kafoury, 1994).
The Portland Development Commission (PDC) was also a key player in the
evolution of CDCs. While BHCD administered the funds for the operating support of
the organizations, PDC administered the funds for project development that included
31

The creation of PCRI is detailed in Ch. 8.
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low interest loans, federal CDBG and HOME funds, and the Housing Investment
Fund. PDC’s main purpose was the administration of Portland’s Urban Renewal
Areas. Two critical points are associated with this situation: 1.) PDC was charged with
improving the City’s neighborhoods and tax base, so that the role of affordable
housing was somewhat tangential to its purpose, and 2.) the scale of the programs that
most of the CDCs undertook was much smaller than the scale of other PDC projects
and did not fit easily within the agency (Krause interview: 12; Lokan interview: 1).

The Merger of Public and Philanthropic Policies
Towards the middle of the 1990s, some CDCs relied on NPF and BHCD for
more than 80% of their total operating costs (Hoereth, 1998: 21). This reliance
developed into the appearance of entitlement by CDCs; organizations felt that because
NPF had been instrumental in their creation, it should be instrumental in their
operating support (Andrews interview: 5). However, both NPF and BHCD were
experiencing a decline in funding from their respective primary sources and had the
expectation that the CDCs formed in the early 1990s would be more self-sufficient by
this point, and that it was time to “fish or cut bait” (Walker, 2002: 52; McLennan
interview: 3). NPF revised its goals to fund no more than 10 CDCs at once (NPF,
1994). It was time to streamline funding and to encourage greater efficiency from the
organizations. In addition, The Enterprise Foundation’s main source of funding,
NCDI, was becoming uncertain (and in some cases requiring local matches – an
additional way to leverage additional dollars), and “it became clear… that the
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organizations were the means to an end, not the end” and it was necessary to shrink
the number of organizations involved (Andrews interview: 8).
The creation of the Portland Neighborhood Development Support
Collaborative (PNDSC) in 1997 was a first step in streamlining the industry.32 NPF
and BHCD formalized what had been an unofficial partnership with the creation of
PNDSC. This “rationalization” of procedures was a reflection of national trends, as
larger philanthropic foundations sought to “strategically allocate funds ... to increase
the quality and effectiveness of asset and property management and to encourage an
economy of scale by increasing the number of units that each CDC managed through
the merger of CDCs” (Farnum, 2003: 8; Walker, 2002:41). PNDSC’s stated purpose
was “the reconciliation of individual Collaborative member’s (sic) funding priorities
and policies” (NPF, BHCD, and Enterprise, 1996: 2). PNDSC encompassed both
BHCD’s nonprofit operating support and NPF’s core operating support (Hoereth: 16;
NPF, BHCD, and Enterprise, 1996: 4). In doing so, CDCs had one source of funding,
one set of associated reporting requirements, albeit a more political and more
constrained source of funding (NPF, BHCD, and Enterprise, 1996: 4). With reduced
funding and more direct competition between organizations, it was inevitable that
there would be attrition within the CDC industry.
At this time, too, BHCD began to steer its funding towards housing (and often
larger multi-family housing projects) for very low income and formerly homeless
individuals; this both preceded and evolved from the City of Portland’s 10 Year Plan
to End Homelessness in 2004 (Kafoury, 1997, 1998). The implications of this funding
32

See Chapter 9 for details on further industry rationalization.
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priority shift were two-fold for CDCs. The fact that rental income from the units
would be less as incomes were lower or non-existent changed how project financing
was done: it became more complicated and relied on more sources. As CDCs were
housing people of lesser means in neighborhoods of greater means, there was a greater
economic gap between the tenants of CDC owned housing and their neighbors – and
greater potential for cries of NIMBY (Stewart interview: 17).
The close relationship between BHCD, NPF, and the Enterprise Foundation
created a very tight circle in which Portland’s CDCs operated. It was this closeness
that focused CDC activities on housing and focused them geographically. Several
CDC Executive Directors were surprised with the calls for accountability, as the
federal and philanthropic funding began to dry up (Dursch interview: 13). In many
cases, the organizations had not matured enough to be self sufficient, and, while
PNDSC staff may have expected industry attrition, the Executive Directors were
expecting more time to establish themselves (Farnum, 2003: 9).

Neighborhood History
The geographic context for this study is the seven neighborhoods of Inner
North/Northeast Portland that compose the bulk of the Albina District (see Appendix
I).33 Originally a small city across the river from the City of Portland, Albina was
consolidated with the City of Portland in 1891 but retained its thriving commercial
district at the intersections of N. Vancouver and N. Williams Avenues and N. Knott St
(Comprehensive Planning Workshop, 1990).
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The individual neighborhoods are Boise, Eliot, Humboldt, King, Sabin, Vernon, and Piedmont.
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Portland’s black population has always been relatively small. Early black
residents tended to live near Union Station, as it was the main source of employment
(McElderry, 2001). As industrial jobs, often associated with the development of Swan
Island, became more attainable, the black population shifted into the Lower Eliot
neighborhood at the southern end of the City of Albina. The black population
expanded northward, into the Boise and King Neighborhoods, so that much of Albina
became the heart of Portland’s small African American community. Until the 1940s,
the state of Oregon had a primarily resource based economy. With the advent of
World War II, entrepreneur Henry Kaiser located one of his major shipyards on Swan
Island and created a company town, Vanport, just outside the city limits of Portland.
Because he feared that workers would not stay without adequate housing, he
“circumvented the Housing Authority of Portland” and constructed housing in
Vanport using federal funds, (McElderry, 2001). Kaiser deliberately recruited workers
from places as far away as Texas and Arkansas to work in his shipyards - he needed a
large workforce and took advantage of the “depression-scarred unskilled workers” of
the South, the majority of whom were black (Soskin, 2000). As a result of this influx,
Portland’s black population increased substantially, much of it located across the river
in Vancouver, Washington or in the Albina neighborhoods just south of Vanport
(McElderry, 2001). As a result of the influx of black families into Portland’s
neighborhoods, they were “redlined” according to the federal standards by major
lending institutions (Abbott, 2001; Lane, 1990a). When the Columbia River flooded
and destroyed the city of Vanport in 1948, a significant number of black families were
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displaced and forced, for the most part, to relocate into the Albina neighborhoods, due
to steering by real estate agents (Abbott, 2001; Gibson, 2007).
Portland had historically been a highly segregated city by both design and
default. In the 1920s, Oregon was home to an active Ku Klux Klan membership that
fueled racial tensions, especially as Portland’s black population grew with the advent
of Kaiser’s shipyards and integrated work force (Bevan, 2004). Subsequently,
discrimination and small size forced Portland’s black community to have a “selfcontained system of social and business life” (Gibson, 2007; Comprehensive Planning
Workshop, 1990).
While Portland’s African American population has never been more than 8%
of the overall population, and racial tensions were prevalent. Real estate steering
facilitated the segregation process; at one point, almost 80% of the population was
concentrated in the Albina neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland as a
result of these practices (McElderry, 2001). Because “housing is at the heart of racial
tensions,” this concentration of black families in a relatively small area was Portland’s
solution to maintaining a segregated city (Abbott, 2001). These segregated
neighborhoods had, in turn, suffered the greatest amount of disinvestment, as
evidenced by the fact that the greatest number of vacant and abandoned buildings was
located there (Vacant and Abandoned Building Task Force, 1988).
In the 1950s and 1960s, the Albina neighborhoods saw a series of Federal
Highway, large institutional development, and Urban Renewal projects that both
created walls around them and tore them apart from the inside. In the 1950s, the
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construction of Interstate 5 cut off the mostly black Boise and Eliot neighborhoods
from the mostly white and more affluent Overlook neighborhood. In the 1960s, the
land at the south end of Albina was cleared for the construction of the Memorial
Coliseum, and a significant number of homes were lost. In the late 1960s, under the
federal Urban Renewal Program, Emmanuel Hospital, in anticipation of the
construction of a Veteran’s Hospital, cleared 76 acres that had been the commercial
core of Albina. However, the hospital project never came to fruition, and the land lay
fallow for decades, a slap in the face to those whose homes were lost and businesses
displaced. It has only been partially occupied to date (Abbott, 2001; Gibson, 2007).
These dissections of the Albina neighborhoods further reinforced and compressed the
“mentally established boundaries” that had clearly demarcated the African American
community (McElderry, 2001).
The Community Action and Model Cities programs of the 1960s sought to
mitigate some of the ill will and mistrust of government created by the large clearance
activities of the federal government, but their most visible benefit to the
neighborhoods was the fostering of Black leadership within the communities (Gibson,
2007). The Albina Youth Opportunity School, where the Boise Neighborhood
meetings are held to this day, was created at that time and remains a pillar of the
community. With a grant from the City “to invest in housing and neighborhood
improvements,” the Albina Neighborhood Improvement Plan was responsible for the
rehabilitation of 300 homes and the creation of Unthank Park, now home to the nonprofit, Self-Enhancement Inc. Black leaders, brought together by the negative impacts
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of Urban Renewal, were also able to resist the Central Albina Plan that would have
cleared the triangle South of Fremont Street between Interstate and Martin Luther
King Blvd (Gibson, 2007).
In the 1980s, a statewide recession magnified the problems of crime and
poverty that had been brewing in Albina. Gang violence and the advent of crack
cocaine negated any previous efforts to stabilize the neighborhoods, with the growing
number of vacant and abandoned buildings fueling the decline. Homeowners in Albina
had long been denied conventional financing because of bank redlining, and the
growing number of absentee landlords, coupled with continued decline in home
values, led to an overall decline in population (Gibson, 2007).
The “redlining” of Albina continued well into the 1990s. Discriminatory
lending practices by local banks were exposed by the Portland Organizing Project’s
efforts to ensure compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). Banks
were making loans in the Albina neighborhoods at “one-sixth the rate of loans made to
residents of other parts of the city” (Lane, 1990a). The dearth of lending in racially
mixed neighborhoods, while by no means unique to Portland, contributed to declining
property values, and lenders were subsequently unwilling to assume the sole risk and
make small loans (less than $30,000) (Brown and Bennington, 1993; Lane and
Mayes, 1990; Squires, 2002).
Despite the bleak outlook, the Albina neighborhoods were an area still small
enough, and with poverty issues manageable enough, that a community based
redevelopment effort would work. Since the large-scale efforts of the Urban Renewal
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projects had served to reinforce racial boundaries and government mistrust and to
create more strife within the neighborhoods, local officials saw the need for smaller
revitalization efforts that would encourage neighborhood input, and, hopefully,
neighborhood ownership (Abbott, 2001). CDCs were an “enchanting and intoxicating
model” for community development (Emmons interview: 4). Because of the scale of
the issues and geography to be addressed, CDCs were considered a viable means of
attaining multiple ends: economic development, affordable housing, and, ultimately,
revitalized neighborhoods, (Abbott, 2001).
In 1988, then-City Commissioner Richard Bogle led an effort through the
Vacant and Abandoned Housing Task Force to tackle the housing problems with a
three-pronged approach: increased City inspections for code compliance, funding for
rehabilitation, and the use of non-profits to revitalize the structures (Vacant and
Abandoned Buildings Task Force, 1988). Given that the largest number of vacant and
abandoned houses were located in the King neighborhood, and the surrounding
neighborhoods had abandonment rates greater than 10%, the resultant interventions
were targeted on the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland (Sweet
interview: 5).34 The Bureau of Buildings monitored these neighborhoods closely and
worked actively with Multnomah County to force landlords to bring their buildings up
to code or to have liens placed on the properties (Sweet interview: 2). These precise
interventions relied on community participation and awareness and were an integral
part of the efforts of Hope and Hard Work – a group that met weekly to share
34

28.6% of all abandoned single-family houses in the City of Portland were located in the Boise, Eliot,
King, Humboldt, Sabin, Vernon and Woodlawn neighborhoods (Vacant and Abandoned Buildings Task
Force, 1988).
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information and to establish lines of communication between neighbors, the police,
and the City bureaus (Morgan interview: 2; Pequeño interview: 3; Sweet interview: 7).
In September 1990, though, investigative reporters Dee Lane and Steve Mayes
from The Oregonian broke a story about lending fraud in North and Northeast
Portland.35 Entitled “Blueprint for a Slum,” this series of articles outlined the
fraudulent practices of Dominion Capital, a private real estate investment firm that
offered mortgages to those who could not qualify for them in areas in which very few
loans were extended. The fraudulent activities included appraisals that were inflated,
fake deeds and title reports, and questionable land contracts with hidden payments
(Lane and Mayes, 1990). The result of the investigation was an indictment of the
company’s owners, Cyril T. Worm and Geoffrey Edmonds, and more than 400
homeowners and renters left not knowing who owned their homes, ones that were
often in substandard condition. This story shed light on the need for immediate action
in the neighborhoods that had suffered from disinvestment, and whose residents were
particularly susceptible to fraudulent real estate practices because conventional means
were not available. As a result of this article, the community rallied and demanded
action. One of City Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury’s first tasks when she was
elected in 1992 was to address housing issues in Inner North/Northeast Portland
(Kafoury interview: 4).
In the 1990’s, the Portland area began to see substantial economic growth.
With that growth, housing prices citywide began to rise. As the prices in Inner
35

See Chapter 8, Case 5: Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, for a more detailed explanation
of this article.
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North/Northeast Portland had been the most lowest in the region in the early 1990s,
they had the steepest increases, as much as 50% between 1990 and 1995, and signaled
a new challenge for community groups: gentrification (Kafoury, 1995; Appendix HRMLS Data). It is the gentrification of the Albina neighborhoods that proved one of
the most challenging issues for CDCs, as it influenced organizational goals and
growth, opportunities and management.
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CHAPTER 2.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

It is the intent of this research to broaden the scholarship that addresses the
growth and development of CDCs, as much of the focus of the research to date has
been on mature or larger organizations, especially those struggling neighborhoods.
The key issues addressed are:
•

CDC Role as Neighborhood Revitalizer, Developer and Organizer

•

Organizational Capacity Building

•

Organizational Measures of Success with a focus on local policy and
neighborhood contexts

Drawing on both academic and practitioner- oriented literature, this study seeks to
deepen our understanding of the evolution of organizations as many of the support
systems and contexts have changed in the past 20 years.
CDC Role as Neighborhood Revitalizer, Developer and Organizer. What
defines a Community Development Corporation (CDC)? A CDC is a locally based
organization, usually geographically defined, that “maintains close ties to one or more
low-income neighborhoods and works to improve the physical, social and economic
conditions in their service areas” (Cowan,et al,1999: 325). Lubove (1996: 117)
describes CDCs as an “all-purpose neighborhood advocate with development
capacity” that are answerable neither to voters nor to shareholders, so that they have
the “capacity to innovate, experiment, subsidize or penalize”. CDCs are formed and
controlled by community stakeholders and their mission is to revitalize “poor or at32

risk communities, including many communities of color” (Vidal, 1996: 149; Peirce
and Steinbach, 1987). Smock (2004) has cited CDCs’ “asset-based” approach to
rebuild their communities. The risk with this approach is that the organization often
separates itself from its initial mission and a dependence on government funding to
sustain itself (Smock, 2004).
CDCs are broad enterprises, but “housing was a favored CDC area of work. It
was visible and faster for produce and less complex than commercial or industrial
development. But it was also a form of “strategic intervention with desirable ripple
effects” (Lubove, 1996:172). Boards of directors that can either be appointed or
elected by a membership generally lead CDCs; often, the organizations have small
staffs that perform multiple tasks. During the 1980s, many neighborhoods banded
together to form CDCs to address specific problems, such as a drug house in the
neighborhood or poor school performance, and to reverse the decline of urban
neighborhoods, a result of decreased federal funding for urban areas (Keating, et al,
1996: 60). These organizations have taken on an entrepreneurial character, and, with
continued reductions in federal funding during the latter 1990s, nearly 2,000
organizations served and continue to serve both urban and rural communities
throughout the country by century’s end (Gittell and Wilder, 1999: 342). With the idea
of entrepreneurship came the idea of community control, smaller scale intervention,
and a more incremental approach to the persistent problems of neighborhood blight.
CDCs, though, have evolved into sophisticated operations that develop and manage
housing, provide tenant services, and organize local communities so that they walk a
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thin line between advocate and political organizer, and preservationist and
neighborhood developer. Bratt (1997) has noted that organizing and development can
be complementary activities that have been shown to be successful through the mid1990s. She acknowledges the potential conflict but argues that the potentially
contradictory position of CDC as landlord/organizer is one that does not have to be
adversarial, if proper safeguards are put into place. One of the drawbacks to separating
the community planning/organizing aspects of an organization from the development
aspects is that participants do not see planning ideas through to fruition and fully
realize the social, political, and economic implications of their initial ideas.
Within these characterizations of CDCs and their approaches to community
development, though, lies a great deal of latitude (Bratt, 1997). The approach that
organizations take towards building partnerships with public and private funding
sources and defining themselves as advocates, developers, or both depends on whether
the organization takes a grass roots approach and draws much of its strength from its
neighborhood base or takes a more business-like approach and draws its strength from
its expertise in obtaining funding dollars and producing housing. Balancing these
approaches and appropriate timing is critical to CDC survival.
Organizational Capacity Building. As key players in the “neighborhood-movement
alternative,” CDCs fill a growing gap in the local and national leadership response to
problems of urban blight and disinvestment (Keating, et al, 1996: 60). “With the
demise of deep-subsidy federal production programs, developing affordable housing
in poor inner-city communities has become financially unattractive to most for-profit
34

developers” (Vidal, 1996:153). In the 1990s, policy makers and funders displayed a
“tacit acceptance of federal devolution and ascendancy” of CDCs as the main
providers of low income and affordable housing (Gittell and Wilder, 1999). CDCs,
depending on local needs, develop, preserve, and endeavor to “bring back to life”
neighborhoods where private investment can and will not (Peirce and Steinbach,
1987). With the support of federal and local policy makers and funders, CDCs “have
the ability to operate in complex environments where others cannot and a willingness
to do projects that others will not because the projects are too small or too risky”
(Vidal, 1996: 153). Their impacts occurred (and continue to occur) in the realm of
housing and a number of other project based activities – this focus had its detractors
who feared a more “technocratic approach” that would undermine true community
development and empowerment (Peirce and Steinbach, 1987:32).
In assuming these multi-faceted roles, organizations grew in both size and
complexity, and scholars and funders sought to clarify what constituted a sustainable
path. From organizations that succeeded and failed, they developed a series of best
practices that served as a model for organizational development. The cornerstone of
this inquiry was to define organizational capacity - “what do CDCs ‘do’ and how do
they do it?” (Glickman and Servon, 1998: 497). “Capacity extends beyond housing
production;” it is “built from within and without … and involves the development of
physical and financial assets of community organizations and the neighborhoods they
serve” (Glickman and Servon, 1998: 502). Because of the great variety of CDCs and
their individual endeavors, Glickman and Servon do not specifically define capacity
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building, but they identify five components (resource, organizational, programmatic,
networking and political capacities) that they feel are essential for organizations to
thrive.
Figure 2-1
Diagram of Interaction of Components of CDC Capacity
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POLITICAL
CAPACITY

ORGANIZATIONAL
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CAPACITY

Source: Glickman and Servon, 1998: 505

Glickman and Servon’s diagram (Figure 2-1) that shows interdependencies
between the components and the major and minor relationships that demonstrate the
multiple allegiances that CDCs must concurrently nurture. Organizational flexibility is
key to maintaining equilibrium between social, political, and economic capital. For
example, dependence on a sole source of funding can disproportionately enlarge
programmatic and organizational capacities at the cost of networking and political
capacities.
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Resource capacity is defined as the ability to acquire resources from grants,
loans and other mechanisms. This includes not only the ability of an organization to
attract the funds, but also to manage and maintain them. Organizational capacity refers
to the day-to-day operations of the organization, its effectiveness at raising and
maintaining funding, its staff skills and tasks accomplished. Programmatic capacity
addresses the number and type of services that an organization offers, whether it is
affordable rental housing, after school childcare, youth programs, or educational
programs. Network capacity refers to the organization’s ability to work with
institutions both inside and outside of its service area, from neighborhood businesses
to other CDCs to philanthropic foundations. Political capacity is an organization’s
ability “to credibly represent its residents and to advocate effectively on their behalf in
a larger political arena” (Glickman and Servon, 1998: 504).
These core competencies, and the balance thereof, establish a framework for
organizational growth and expansion, or success. It is essential to maintain a balance
among these components of capacity, as an imbalance can undermine an
organization’s intentions and overall stability and to maintain the connections between
clients, neighborhood, funders, and policy makers – the very definition of social
capital36. In addition, each of these components is subject to external influences, and,
when this occurs, the impact “reverberates to other components” (Glickman and
Servon, 1998: 532; Gittell and Wilder, 1999: 343).
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Definition of social capital: The stock of active connections among people: the trust, mutual
understanding, and shared values and behaviors that bind members of human networks and
communities and make cooperative action possible (Cohen and Prusack, 2001: 4).
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Programmatic capacity is the ability for organizations to prioritize and
complete activities efficiently which leads to credibility with both funders and their
respective neighborhoods (Twelvetrees, 1996: 114). Having tangible outcomes to
which neighbors, politicians, and bankers can point allows CDCs access to greater
funding opportunities as they establish a track record. While these successes are
generally in the development realm, at least initially, they give hope that larger social
problems can be solved (Vidal, 1996). The flip side of this idea of success and
efficiency is that if an organization either fails to complete a project in a timely
manner or fails to manage an apartment complex well once it has been completed, the
CDC is vulnerable to criticism as well.
For CDCs that engaged in organizing and advocacy efforts, the creation of
political capital “ensured legitimacy and accountability in the eyes of community
residents and local policy makers and funders” (Gittell and Wilder, 1999: 344). This
political capital, closely related to networking ability and the garnering of resources, is
particularly important in the case of Portland, because of the strength of the
neighborhood associations’ voices in city government (Chaskin, 2003: 171). The
political capital that CDCs create is a constantly evolving attribute – and can either
support or impede development efforts. While Stoecker (1997) has called for the
separation of organizing and development activities (and to redefine CDCs as we
generally understand them) to make more effective, and perhaps confrontational,
advocacy organizations, these activities can reinforce the effectiveness of each other.
Bratt argues that dividing CDCs into separate advocacy and development entities
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would undermine many of the efforts that the organizations have made, and that the
contradictions between capital and community are outweighed by the organizational
contributions to the communities in which they operate (Bratt, 1997).
CDCs have multiple levels of constituency – those for whom they advocate
and those on whom they rely for political and economic support. Tenants and
neighborhood residents are a primary source of networking or social capital, while
funders and policy makers are a source of financial capital that is closely associated
with political capital. CDCs also rely on local governments and philanthropic
organizations for “financial, technical, and political resources” (Vidal, 1992: 129). In
fact, CDCs rely on local funders for “more than one half of their unearned income”
(Vidal, 1992: 126). With this degree of reliance on local intermediaries, it is not
surprising that there is tension between the intermediaries and the CDCs. “CDCs
believe they are autonomous organizations that serve locally identified needs and as
such should not be dictated to by intermediaries and funders. Yet intermediaries and
funders have their own interests to consider, and it is reasonable for them to set
conditions for receipt of their funding” (Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas, 2003a: 35). When the
organizations were dependent on government sources of funding, they tended to be
more conciliatory, rather than advocacy oriented (Kirkland, 2008). CDC reliance on a
limited number of funders can upset the balance of components of capacity, as the
organizations yield to pressure to make changes to their modes of operation (Rohe,
Bratt, & Biswas, 2003a: 34).
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Consistently, authors point to the need for board and staff to have a level of
technical expertise needed to carry out complex development deals, while maintaining
an advocacy position. Bratt (1989) describes an ethical dilemma that can occur when
CDC staff become immersed in the complexities of project development and neglect
the neighborhood - this can lead to a loss of political capital, especially when the
demographics of the neighborhood are changing. The other side to this dilemma is that
staff need to have a basic skill set to manage projects, complete program reports
required by lenders and funders, to be able to interact with “the folks downtown,” and
to manage other employees when necessary (Twelvetrees, 1996: 128). The balancing
of advocacy and project development work is key to maintaining community
connections (Bratt, 1996). How can an organization that is intentionally a grass roots
effort take on development projects that require a substantial level of expertise? Each
organization has had to adapt its principles, its target area and market, and its
relationship to the surrounding neighborhood to ensure its survival. In doing so, CDC
activities have the potential to “induce other market actors to invest in residential and
commercial real estate” (Galster, Levy, Sawyer, Temkin, and Walker 2005: 8). At the
same time, the organizations risk “becoming out of touch with community residents”
(Bratt, 1996: 182). With accumulated development success, organizations can reach an
appropriate scale “to be a landlord.” This status can both distance a CDC from its
constituents as the board and staff become more skill-based and distance the
organization from its constituents by creating a power relationship (landlord-tenant)
that is not necessarily about community building (Bratt, 1996). The realities of
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property management require a different set of skills than those required for property
development. This potentially adversarial landlord-tenant relationship is one that is
created by the fact that CDCs need to meet the “double bottom line” (Bratt, 1996:
182).
Coupled with the creation of political capital are the networking skills of the
individual organizations. Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas (2003b) point to the need for
support groups (policy makers, funders, technical assistance providers) to assign a
value to these skills. However, the benefits of networking can be undermined by the
competition for scarce funding resources when there is a saturation of small
geographic areas by a number of CDCs with similar missions, capacities, and
outlooks. Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas’ research cites neighborhood saturation of CDCs as
one of the main reasons for mergers; the case study they use is that of the merger of
Housing Our Families and Franciscan Enterprises to form Albina CDC. The need for
mergers is stimulated by the duplication of activities and overhead. Prompted by
funders and local policy makers, mergers of CDC organizations and assets are long
and painful processes.37
Organizational Measures of Success with a focus on local policy and neighborhood
contexts. The factors that influence the likelihood of success can be divided into two
broad categories: contextual factors and organizational factors (Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas,
2003). In the 1990s, capacity and success were terms that often overlapped. The
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In the case of Albina CDC, the merger did not solve the original structural and operational problems,
and ultimately led to the demise of the merged organization in 2006; the failed process changed City
policy with respect to organizational funding and regulation.
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components of capacity that Glickman and Servon use roughly correlate to Gittell and
Wilder’s (1999) Critical Factors that Influence Success (See Appendix F: Literature
Points for Comparison). These factors include funding (Resource Capacity),
organizational size (Programmatic Capacity), mission, organizational competency
(Organizational Capacity), and political capital (Political Capacity). This transition
from an understanding of capacity to defining success has engendered much debate.
Models of CDC success and failure, and growth, change, and decline have been the
subjects of much research. Defining success for CDCs is tricky because the original
intent of the organization is often muddied by its ongoing activities, and the conditions
under which it operates. The organizational factors that outline success include board
and staff capacity, leadership stability, and the ability to prioritize and complete
activities efficiently. Funding is included as an organizational factor because, in this
case, the authors refer to an organization’s ability to garner and sustain both core
operating support and project financing, attributes that could also be described as
organizational competency (Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a; Gittell and Wilder, 1999:
344). Authors place different emphases on the characteristics and roles of a CDC: as a
neighborhood benefactor or as an individual development organization, or both.
Within this context, organizational failure and neighborhood success can go hand in
hand (Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a).
Twelvetrees (1996: 9) characterizes a successful CDC as an organization that
can not only survive, but also meet its own goals, with three main points:
1. The undercapitalization of projects is widespread and is one of the
greatest challenges for CDCs.
42

2. Economic self-sufficiency is unrealistic.
3. Small scale impacts are important, as they often lead to larger impacts
These points de-emphasize the role of local policy and funding apparatuses, but do
probe the issues that are important to smaller CDCs, especially in their early years.
Most of the research concerning success and/or failure, though, is devoted to
“mature” CDCs. Mature CDCs have more measurable benchmarks (housing
production, organizational size, grant funded dollars, etc) than emerging ones (Gittell
and Wilder, 1999; Vidal, 1992; Frisch and Servon, 2006). “Mature” is often conflated
with “larger,” as organizations that have attained “scale” are considered mature.
Attaining scale refers to the growth process that an organization has undergone over a
period of time. It includes the development of a substantial housing portfolio,
programmatic and administrative efficiencies, and financial self-sufficiency (Walsh
and Zdenek, 2007).
The issue of organizational scale, meaning the balance of the size of the
organization, breadth of activities, and number of housing units produced, emerges as
a key consideration in current research. Vidal (1996: 155) has noted that the idea of
attaining “scale,” where enough units, generally between 800 and 1,000, have been
produced, and tenant and outreach programs pay for themselves, can be a measure of
success. However, because of the changes in funding sources, amounts, and
allocations, organizational success is not assured (McLennan interview: 20-21).
Vidal’s concern (1996) with the rates of expansion of CDCs underscores the
perpetuation of living “from grant to grant” that creates tenuous working conditions
for staff and uncertainty for neighborhoods. Walsh and Zdenek (2007), citing the
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collapse of several very large organizations, allow that “large and small community
development groups can both play essential roles in the production of affordable
housing by playing to their strengths.” For nascent and emerging CDCs, starting with
housing reduces the difficulty of raising needed financing and increases the likelihood
that early activities will be successful (Vidal, 1996: 155). Once the CDC’s ability to
succeed with housing development is established, attention shifts to getting CDC
production to scale. However, whether an organization can effectively manage the
units that it already has developed or concurrently relies too much on the developer
fees to create more units has always been a stumbling point in attaining scale (Rohe,
Bratt, and Biswas, 2003b). In “an era of shrinking resources,” the question of
organizational size is now under scrutiny, as the role of both large and small CDCs in
the production of affordable housing is essential. Larger organizations have the
technical expertise, while smaller organizations have a more intimate knowledge of
the neighborhoods where they operate, and the transition between the two
organizational scales requires careful planning, resource allocation, and time (Walsh
and Zdenek, 2007).
Vidal (1996) notes that success for mature CDCs is a product of organizational
size, prioritization of activities, programmatic and project experience, leadership
stability, and clarity of strategies. Gittell and Wilder (1999), on the other hand,
prioritize mission, organizational competency, political capital, and funding as a
means for success that are measured by (mature) CDC contributions to residents’
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access to financial resources, physical resources, human resources, economic
opportunities, and political power and influence.
A number of local intermediaries have mounted capacity-building programs
that seek to make CDCs better managed and technically stronger (Vidal, 1996:155).
This push to increase capacity implies a predetermined goal of revitalization, whereby
CDC investment will be augmented by private investment.38 It increases the role of
housing development within organizations and puts pressure on the organizations to
comply with funder priorities in order to maintain these financial relationships. This
leads to an emphasis on professionalism and efficiency, generally quantified by bricks
and mortar programs, as a measurement of success (Leavitt, 2003). Cowan, Rohe, and
Baku (2000) base their entire assessment of factors that influence the performance of
CDCs on effectiveness and efficiency, with the caveat that CDCs do not have
adequate resources in many cases to halt neighborhood decline. This notion reinforces
Rusk’s (1999) metaphor that most foundation support helps poor people run up a
down escalator; some programs function so well that they succeed in getting people to
the top, but most will fall short and return to the bottom of the escalator. CDC
redevelopment, especially housing focused redevelopment, does not address the root
issues of poverty.
Gittell and Wilder (1999: 345) define overall CDC success as the improvement
of community residents’ access to financial resources, physical resources, human
resources, economic opportunities, and political power; they see more “successful
38

This strategy of leveraging private investment with public funds has become more commonplace as
both federal and philanthropic funding opportunities have decreased.
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organizations (as those that) tend to limit their activities that are of high priority for
community residents and are most likely to produce tangible results in a relatively
short time frame.” This definition of success implies that community success and
organizational success can be different, as the community vision changes. When inner
city housing markets heated up in the 1990s, creating and maintaining such a vision
became much more challenging. Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas (2003a) also note that some
CDCs cease to exist because they put themselves out of business by attracting private
investment into their neighborhoods, thereby making themselves obsolete. The greater
community has been revitalized, but not without risk, as the future of CDC produced
rental apartments may be left in limbo with the sponsoring organization’s demise.
Organizations often have little, if any, control over the contextual factors that
influence their growth and success. These factors include the external political, policy,
and community forces that affect the livelihood of CDCs. The overlap in the different
authors’ perceptions of contextual factors points to the importance of resources and
funding, political capital, and networking between CDCs as external forces that CDCs
must address in order to maintain equilibrium.
The role of resources and funding as contributors to CDC success or failure is
not as straightforward as it initially sounds. Because resources always fall short of
community needs, there is an inherent need for both project-based and ongoing
operating funding (Vidal, 1996; Twelvetrees, 1996). In addition, a variety of
organizational funding sources, rather than specific project based sources, ensure a
more stable cash flow. In some cases, organizations are pressured to take on certain
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development projects that are either a particular eyesore in the neighborhood or to take
advantage of a particular type of funding (Rohe and Bratt, 2003). This political
pressure can compromise an organization’s ability to sustain itself by causing it to
grow too quickly with an emphasis on one particular aspect of the organization or to
neglect other issues and programs. When coupled with the potentially differing
agendas of funders, the likelihood of flexibility in financial allocations (one that could
potentially benefit both organizations and neighborhoods) is minimized (Rohe, Bratt,
& Biswas, 2003).
“Evaluations must not only study CDCs, they must also study the communities
in which CDCs work” (Frisch and Servon, 2006: 101). The symbiotic relationship
between organization and community is defined by the organizations need for social
capital in its capacity building. Central to this relationship, too, is the evolution of the
organizations themselves – how do they change with the transformation of the
surrounding neighborhoods?
An elucidation of the role of CDCs in the life cycle of the neighborhoods is
necessary to understand how the neighborhoods changed socially and economically –
how did these organizations contribute to the changes that surrounded them? Hoover
and Vernon’s (1959) Neighborhood Lifecycle Theory describes the economic stages
from inception, to decline, to redevelopment and ascendancy. Based on his multi-city
research, Rusk dismissed the ability of CDCs to have any direct impact on stemming
neighborhood decline, and very much doubted organizations’ ability to affect
neighborhood-scale positive change in a redevelopment stage (Rusk, 1999).
47

Zielenbach (2000) has noted, subsequently, that community organizations cannot
single handedly revitalize neighborhoods because they do not have access to the
money required, but that, in a neighborhood with strong stability, they can contribute
to a more positive outcome.
The mechanics of how a CDC and its neighborhood interact depend on a
number of unique factors. Vidal (1996) noted that clearly defined neighborhoods
develop more CDCs because of the underlying political support for those
neighborhood structures. In addition, Chaskin (2003: 169) states that the relationship
between the neighborhood organization and the local CDC needs to be mutually
beneficial; CDCs are dependent, at least initially, on their neighborhood organizations
for political support, especially if a neighborhood association is involved in a larger
political arena (Johnson, 2004). These relationships between CDC and neighborhood
organization can be complicated ones, as organizations that are borne out of a local
advocacy effort can have goals that are not sustainable as neighborhoods change.
The emphasis on geographic boundaries constitutes an orderly approach to
community development, one that emphasizes the physical development of a
neighborhood, rather than advocacy – a central debate in CDC scholarship. This
conflict between the development and advocacy sides of an organization is further
complicated if neighborhoods experience revitalization or gentrification (Leavitt,
2003). In their role as housing developers, CDCs fill part of the development vacuum
in neighborhoods suffering from disinvestment, as CDC activities include the
renovation and development of housing and an encouragement of local economic
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development. Smith (1996), in his explication of gentrification on a local level,
describes a disinvested neighborhood as one where the private sector does not
perceive enough of a rent-gap to make an investment.39 When conditions are ripe,
owners and developers invest to create either owner occupied, rental or for sale
properties. Of these types of gentrifiers, CDCs were a hybrid of the owner-occupier
and landlord developers: ones who intended to stay in the neighborhood but had more
access to capital, at least while other private developers did not. Brown-Saracino’s
(2010) description of the “social preservationist” gentrifier could be applied to CDCs.
The organizations contribute to the stock of affordable housing, celebrate long time
residents, and assist with investment in local businesses. However, since these groups
are often composed of outsiders, especially as the organizations grow and become
more sophisticated, local residents can get suspicious.
CDC activities also get caught up in class issues within a neighborhood,
especially as it is gentrifying. By providing and maintaining housing whose
affordability is mandated by its funding sources, and creating jobs and educational
opportunities for low-income individuals where few had existed prior to their
intervention, CDCs have played a critical role in lessening the displacement of
residents associated with gentrification, so that it is a positive experience for lowincome residents of those neighborhoods (Lees, Slater, and Wyly, 2009). However, in
neighborhoods where most of the housing was previously affordable to low-income
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The rent-gap occurs when property values have been devalued to a point where they will be eligible
for redevelopment with a satisfactory return for private developers (Smith, 1996). As CDCs have a
more complex “bottom line” to meet, they see lower property values in relationship to lower rents,
rather than greater profits.
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residents, the emergence of designated affordable housing, as opposed to de facto
affordable housing, created a new set of class divisions. This can lead to a severing of
critical community ties, “marginalization, isolation, (and) alienation” (Kirkland, 2008:
20; Freeman and Branconi, 2004). Zukin has noted that gentrification is typified by
shifts in taste and amenities that are embodied in local restaurants and retail offerings
– cultural shifts that represent the new, rather than the old neighborhood. When taken
in conjunction with the cultural shifts produced by gentrification noted by Zukin, the
divisions can produce a stark disregard for “those that came before” (Brown-Saracino,
2009:5; Zukin, 1987).
A CDCs role in a gentrifying or gentrified neighborhood is one of an even
more delicate balancing act. In many gentrifying areas, neighborhood associations are
often composed of wealthier homeowners, while CDCs represent their more
impoverished rental populations. The political distance between these two groups can
be huge – and further magnifies the need for CDCs to emphasize their broader
organizing activities to minimize the “us v. them” mentality (Van Meter, 2004). The
role of a CDC in this scenario must change from developer to community builder in
order to alleviate some of the conflicts associated with the gentrification process.
There are four key internal and external factors that affect this ability: 1.) community
cohesiveness, 2.) community collaborations, 3.) community building and organizing
and 4.) an articulated response to gentrification (Hill and Pozzo, 2005). However,
addressing all four successfully on a scale that actually has an impact is the true test of
a CDCs leadership within its neighborhood.
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This role as gentrification mediator will demand that CDCs search for more
than just development dollars to sustain themselves and branch out with new
advocacy, education, and training programs that will not only benefit the community
at large, but also serve to mitigate a combative mentality. This argument reinforces
Bratt’s (1997) case that the housing and organizing activities need to be maintained
under one umbrella, in spite of the fact that “public support for community
development corporations as community developers as opposed to affordable-housing
developers seems harder and harder to come by” (Van Meter, 2004).

Relevance of the Literature to this Research
CDCs have been well analyzed in the literature; however, a case study of the
CDCs in the Albina neighborhoods is an opportunity to study the evolution of CDCs
in a small geographic area that also changed dramatically in 20 years, two conditions
that represent an amalgamation of the organizational development and neighborhood
change literatures. The CDC literature that parses out organizational development
establishes an overlap between factors that contribute to success and to capacity
building. For the purposes of this study, do these factors apply here? If so, how? If not,
why not? What are the CDC contributions to neighborhood change? Are there
additional factors that have not yet been addressed that need to be taken into account?
These questions form the theoretical basis for the inquiry and guide the case study
research to seek out why this is a unique case.
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CDC relationships to neighborhood change could be described as symbiotic.
While organizations lay the groundwork for potential change, whether that change
actually occurs is beyond the control of the organization. However, if a neighborhood
does change, it will most certainly affect how a CDC operates. This pivotal notion
leads to the theoretical question: how do organizations adjust to the changes that
surround them, and what does it mean to the character of the organizations – their
missions, their board and staff compositions, and their organizational priorities?
Understanding how the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland either adapted to or
resisted both the neighborhood changes (intensive competition from private
developers, new neighbors, increased development costs) and funding changes (a
contraction of both public and philanthropic dollars, a shift in federal policies) lends a
new dimension to the understanding of organizational development. Each organization
has followed a specific path, or trajectory, in its evolution. These trajectories are the
compilation of both internal and external factors and conditions that are described in
the literature. Accordingly, some of these paths have allowed for greater resiliency in
the face of increased competition, higher development and operational costs, shifts in
funding and financing, and a different kind of neighborhood leadership role. The
factors that this research considers key to understanding this changing role are the
social, economic, and physical resources that the organizations begin with, the speed
at which the organizations developed properties and were able to manage them, the

52

role of local public and philanthropic funders, and how the organization reacted to or
enhanced the relationships between their new and old neighbors.40
As gentrification set into the Albina neighborhoods, its CDCs that had been
nurtured in an environment of neighborhood decline encountered unknown territory.
There were no models for CDCs to continue their work in improved neighborhoods.
Studying CDCs through the lens of gentrification is a relatively recent trend, as the
literature on gentrification has expanded significantly in the last few years. This body
of the literature, though, does not currently include significant analysis of the role of
CDCs in gentrifying and gentrified neighborhoods, and this research endeavors to fill
some of this gap. The gentrification literature in its current state describes phases of
the phenomenon, structural and agent related causes, and the outcomes that reinforce
the perpetuation of the trend.
Lastly, the timing of the evolution of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast
Portland is compressed. As Vidal (1996) stated, too, the CDCs in West Coast cities are
a relatively recent occurrence when compared to older East Coast and Midwestern
cities. Because of this, Portland’s CDCs experienced accelerated growth as funding
and development opportunities and institutional support converged in the early 1990s.
This context of accelerated organizational growth that was geographically constrained
forms the framework that has guided the research. Analyzing the evolution of the
Albina CDCs, in their compressed temporal and geographic landscape, will illuminate
the rapidly changing role of CDCs in a gentrifying neighborhood. Where, how and for
40

These factors are a synthesis of Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas’ internal and external factors, Gittell and
Wilder’s factors that influence success, and Glickman and Servon’s components of capacity. See
Appendix F for a matrix that details these corollaries.
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whom the organizations can be most effective are questions posited in a way that
considers what happens when you get the revitalization that you have been aspiring to
and how do you respond to it.

Research Questions
Understanding the evolutionary process that leads to the final research
questions is critical to understanding the questions themselves. Initially, the evolution
of five CDCs in a small geographic area and the role of race it that evolution were the
central tenets of the investigation; however, after completion of several interviews in
August and September 2007, it became apparent that these questions were embedded
in the larger questions about the impact of neighborhood gentrification on the
evolution of the organizations.41 Gentrification was the one topic that all interviewees
brought up independently, and without prompting. Because gentrification is a
phenomenon that encompasses both race and class, I chose to address this larger issue
directly. How neighborhood change contributed to organizational evolution (and vice
versa) became a central theme in subsequent discussions at neighborhood,
organizational, and policy levels. The “how” and “why” questions of these interactions
are contained within the individual case study sections. The fact that the neighborhood
context shift played this role reinforces not only the choice of the case study format,
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The interviews completed at that point included public officials, philanthropic organization staff,
long-time neighborhood residents, and CDC board and staff.
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but also the use of both qualitative and quantitative data to reinforce these
relationships.
Therefore, this study utilizes both the gentrification and organizational
development literatures and seeks to elucidate the localized relationship between the
two. Understanding the changing roles of CDCs as their neighborhoods changed
around them is a key point for the organizations as they develop strategic plans for
addressing future neighborhood changes. Specifically, this study involves two
overarching questions and their respective sub questions:
1. How did the Albina CDCs evolve?
A. What were the roots of these organizations?
B. Do/did the organizations have distinctive organizational development
trajectories?
2. What was the Albina CDCs’ individual and collective contribution to
social and economic changes within their neighborhoods? As
neighborhood revitalization became apparent, how did the
organizations respond to it?
1. How did the Albina CDCs evolve?
This question considers the organizational development factors that defined
each CDC, the internal and external factors that contributed to the organization’s
growth and change over time. Implicit in this question is, “why did the organizations
evolve in the way that they did?” Establishing a number of critical factors that are
consistent across each organization allows for a comparison that will establish a
trajectory for each organization. Based on the literature that describes capacity and
success, the resulting overlapping factors of organizational competency, development
capacity, neighborhood relationships, and funding capacity are most relevant to this
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study. Parsing out the different factors and comparing them across organizations will
determine whether they have distinctive or similar trajectories (Appendix E).
A. What were the roots of these organizations?
The genesis of an organization influences its mission and focus. Whether an
organization springs from a geographic or cultural basis, it is rooted in a purpose that
may or may not evolve over time. As CDCs encompass both social and physical
geographies, grassroots CDCs emerge organically from their environs, while other
development organizations target a specific problem within a community. As
discussed in the Literature Review, the term “community development corporation”
encompasses organizations that act as umbrellas for a variety of community
development efforts, from housing development to job training and economic
development activities. However, the term begs the question of whether an
organization’s roots were a factor in its longevity. This question, that emerged from
the history of the organizations, asks whether it mattered to the organization’s survival
if it was a grassroots, community based organization – was this a positive attribute or
detrimental to the organization over the long term? In addition, did organizations
distance themselves from their origins, in some cases their grassroots origins, as they
evolved and became more of a business that had to meet a bottom line, rather than a
community group whose purpose was to advance the interests of the community?
B. Do/did the organizations have distinctive organizational development
trajectories?
Assessing the growth patterns of the organizations, as defined by the factors of
capacity and success, will lend itself to an understanding of the organizations’
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expansion and contraction – their trajectories over time. While each organization has a
unique history, there are many accomplishments that were similar. How each
organization leveraged these accomplishments into additional opportunities may have
been the key to its ability to adapt to changing funding and development opportunities,
as well as neighborhood pressures.
2. What was the Albina CDCs’ individual and collective contribution to social and
economic changes within their neighborhoods? As neighborhood revitalization
became apparent, how did the organizations respond to it?
Yin (2003) points to the necessity of understanding the context for a case study
as part of the analysis of the case itself. Understanding the contributions that the
organizations made to revitalization, and the subsequent impact that this revitalization
had on each organization could be answered by first assessing the number of housing
units developed. This redevelopment had the potential to attract subsequent public and
private investment and to alter the internal and external perceptions of the
neighborhoods themselves. This change in perception potentially had the power to
alter the development landscape by attracting outside investment. Understanding the
point at which neighborhood revitalization became gentrification, the point at which
the private sector and market forces catalyzed the pace of incremental improvement
that had begun with small housing and economic development projects, is critical to
future organizational planning efforts. The accompanying demographic shift is not
simply a perception: it defines who “belongs” in the neighborhoods.
These two questions have both policy and theoretical bases. These questions
open up a series of topics related to the first main question and consider organizational
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roots, the timing of the growth of the CDC industry in Portland and its relationship to
the booming housing market of the late 1990s and early 2000s, and what the evolution
of these organizations says about Portland in general, given Portland’s particular
institutions. The policy aspects of the question have philanthropic, local and federal
implications, while the theoretical aspects include the broader social and economic
implications of neighborhood revitalization, its intent and outcomes.
Establishing a relationship between the CDC trajectory and the neighborhood
trajectory by overlaying the two concepts on a graph will illuminate the CDC role in
the neighborhood, and whether, at any one point in time, it is one of leadership or
support.

Propositions
The evolution of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland was a highly structured
and tightly controlled phenomenon (Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas, 2003). Given the
compressed timeframe of the emergence of these organizations, there was little
opportunity for organic evolution. Taken in its context, the neighborhoods had spent
40 years in a state of decline, while their revitalization occurred in a timeframe of less
than 15 years. The hasty organizational development of CDCs ensured that the
missions of the organizations would not permanently coincide with the goals of the
neighborhoods within which they worked, while the catalyzing of the neighborhood
revitalization process, be it intentional or a product of larger economic forces, would
prove to be divisive on several different levels.
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With neighborhood revitalization, it is necessary to separate out the social and
physical aspects because while neighborhoods are fixed assets, their populations are
not. The physical changes (derelict housing reclamation, street improvements,
commercial redevelopment, infill housing) that have occurred in the neighborhoods of
Inner North/Northeast Portland are striking. The social changes are equally striking:
the racial and economic profiles of the populations between 1990 and 2000 are
dramatically different, and while, as McElderry (2001: 137) noted, the mental
boundaries of Portland’s black neighborhoods have not changed since the 1930s. The
fact that the populations of these neighborhoods are whiter, wealthier, and more
educated has transformed the social geography of the neighborhoods. From the
neighborhood lifecycle literature, the concept of neighborhood decline and
revitalization can be conceptualized as a trough (Figure 2-2). At the same time, CDC
organizational growth and change can be viewed along a somewhat more linear
trajectory; if one were to overlay these two models, it is inevitable that these lines
cross. That point would occur, theoretically, when the organization has exceeded its
useful life both for the neighborhood in terms of the organizations’ relevance to the
vitality of the neighborhood. This point will vary by organization and by
neighborhood: in some cases it occurs where revitalization becomes gentrification and
where neighborhood priorities are no longer aligned with organizational priorities, and
in other cases it occurs when the organization has exhausted its funding opportunities
and its internal social capital and can no longer contribute positively to neighborhood
vitality. Whether the organizations began inside or outside of the neighborhood milieu,
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they ended up outside of the lines that defined neighborhood improvement, thus
changing the nature and relevance of the relationship of the organization with the
neighborhood. Per the model (Figure 2-2), each organization has a particular trajectory
relative to the neighborhood changes based on when and where it began relative to the
condition of the neighborhood. This trajectory is based on the initial resources, and
organizational development that is both the result of the organization’s approach to
success and to obstacles. These obstacles can be viewed as either dramatic or
cumulative events, and sometimes a combination of the two; a dramatic obstacle being
Figure 2-2
Conceptual Model of Relationships between Neighborhood
Lifecycle and CDC Change
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a singular internal or external event that has a substantial, and often stinging, effect of
the organization, while cumulative obstacles include trends resulting from externalities
over which the organization has no apparent control, and trends that result from
organizational culture (Guajardo, 2009c). By matching up different patterns between
the organizations, explanations for different project and funding choices, leadership
changes, and neighborhood relationships could be developed. This, in turn, could lead
to explanations of the changing relationships between organizations.
Two additional theoretical propositions grew out of the development of this
model:
1. Neighborhood conditions and politics and funding sources are the critical
factors affecting CDC trajectory. If the neighborhood conditions dominate the
organization’s work, then it is a community-based organization that shares the
goals of new and long-term neighborhood residents. If the politics and funding
dominate the organizations’ work, then it is not necessarily a communitybased organization and its goals and priorities are more allied with the agendas
of its funding sources.
2. Per Rusk’s (1999) assertion, CDCs did little to stem the downward trajectory
of their neighborhoods, and, while the organizations’ work may have initially
bolstered gentrification, the organizations were helpless to mitigate the effects
of gentrification once it took hold of their neighborhoods
Each of these propositions addresses the multiple contexts in which CDCs operate. It
is the fact that these organizations are beholden to disparate entities that they cannot
focus and expedite their redevelopment and organizing efforts.
The analytical structure of the neighborhood lifecycle and gentrification
literatures provides us with a framework for the analysis of the Albina CDCs. Hoover
and Vernon (1959) describe four essential stages of neighborhood inception,
maturation, decline and revitalization that are commensurate with the socio-economic
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phases of development. Downs (1981) echoes this sentiment and describes a
“continuum” along which neighborhoods can change. From these perspectives, the
neighborhood lifecycle can be conceptualized as a harmonic wave, with a single
period of that wave representing the full cycle of inception, decline, and revitalization.
Similarly, Clay’s (1979) four stages of gentrification describe the different
periods of gentrification, their contributing social and economic factors, as well as
their key agents. Each of these stages represented a unique timeframe in which certain
agents acted in certain ways, due to their understanding of risk and opportunity. With
this approach in mind, I set up a timeline, one that will allow the parsing out of
particular events unique to each organization. By placing the organizational and
contextual highlights side by side, one can begin to understand the relationships
between organizations and their funding and neighborhood contexts that evolved.
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CHAPTER 3.
RESEARCH METHODS

This dissertation is a comparative case study of the five North/Northeast
Portland, Oregon community development corporations to understand how the
organizations evolved, and in some cases collapsed, in the context of a gentrifying
neighborhood. Yin (2003:13) notes that a case study investigates a contemporary
phenomenon within its real life context, and the boundaries between phenomena and
context are not clearly evident. The case study approach lends itself naturally to the
investigation of community based organizations within a changing community
because it allows the researcher to parse out the unit of analysis from its context and
then to reintegrate into the context to explain not only the “what” question, but also
the “why” questions. In this case, my purpose is to explain the evolution of the
individual organizations and their roles in and reactions to the changes in the
surrounding neighborhoods – each of which is “highly pertinent” to the other (Yin,
2003: 13).

Research Design42
Yin (2003:21) has noted that case study research design has five key
components: 1.) a study’s questions; 2.) its propositions; 3.) its units of analysis; 4.)
the logic linking the data to the propositions; and 5.) the criteria for interpreting the
findings. With this framework, I will define the structure and approach of the study,
42
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address specific data collection elements and issues, and lay out the logic that links the
findings to questions addressed in the literature.
It should also be noted that for the multiple case study design, Yin (2003: 48)
has acknowledged that there is no methodological difference between a single and
multiple-case studies but care should be taken to collect consistent data, and both the
phenomena and its context should be addressed. The challenges with this are discussed
below.
Units of analysis. Case study research presents a particular set of definitional
challenges. The first challenge is to define what the case is, the second is to define it in
its social, political and economic context. In doing so, one creates boundaries for the
study, and a framework that enables the author to draw reliable conclusions and relate
them to a particular theory. In this research, the primary unit of analysis is the
individual CDC. The units of analysis were conceived of at two levels: the micro level
of the individual organizations and the macro level of the emerging CDC industry
because the organizations individually were quite small, but collectively their
influence on their surrounding neighborhoods was significant, at least for a period of
time. I chose to examine 5 organizations whose target areas were within the core of
the Albina Neighborhoods for several reasons. The central census tracts of the King
neighborhood had suffered extreme disinvestment; in fact, the King neighborhood had
the highest rate of vacant and abandoned housing in the City of Portland (Vacant and
Abandoned Buildings Task Force, 1988). The five organizations, Northeast CDC
(NECDC), Franciscan Enterprise, Housing Our Families (HOF), Sabin CDC and
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Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives (PCRI) each represented a unique
contribution to neighborhood revitalization in terms of mission, background, and
resources (See Appendix E). Each organization had participated in the Neighborhood
Partnership Fund’s CDC training sessions (part of the political and social context), had
a lifespan of at least five years and was responsible for the development of at least 60
units of housing. There were three other organizations whose work was focused in the
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland that were not considered for
analysis; these three organizations were Genesis, Peninsula CDC, and Habitat for
Humanity’s Portland office. Genesis only existed for three years and developed a very
small number of housing units. Peninsula CDC formed after the initial group of CDCs
had begun to establish themselves and was focused more in the N. Portland
neighborhoods of Portsmouth and St Johns, on the periphery of the area of interest for
this study. Habitat for Humanity is a unique organization. While the Portland chapter
was initiated in the early 1990s, its board members attended the early NPF training
sessions, and it completed a number of projects in the Albina neighborhoods, its
funding and development structure is radically different from the organizations
analyzed in this study. Prior to 2008, Habitat for Humanity relied on funding solely
from private donations, its revolving loan fund, and the largesse of its parent
organization, Habitat for Humanity International based in Americus, Georgia. As a
result, it did not have to rely on public funds and was not subject to the increasing
competition for those funds after the mid 1990s (Schleiger, 2010). In addition, Habitat
relies primarily on volunteer labor to construct its houses – so that its development
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costs do not reflect the market costs of building a unit of housing. In addition, the
Habitat model is focused on building homes for low-income families and not the
broader community development model that the five organizations ascribed to.
Linking the data collected to the propositions is potentially an overwhelming
task. Yin notes that “investigators start case studies without the foggiest notion about
how the data is to be analyzed” and search for “tools … hoping that familiarity with
these devices will produce the needed analytic result” (Yin, 2003: 109-110). The first
step in overcoming the inherent inertia created by wallowing in one’s data is to take
command of the data and to develop a specific strategy for analyzing the case studies.
This could be viewed as conflicting with the approach of allowing the questions and
analytical procedures to emerge from the data collected, an approach consistent with
“Issue Evolution” (Stake, 2005: 448). In order to resolve this apparent contradiction,
and to keep the dissertation process moving forward, I returned to and expanded on
the original research questions in an effort to employ Yin’s recommended strategies of
pattern matching, explanation building, and cross-case analysis (Yin, 2003: 109).
These strategies served to reinforce the triangulation of data to ensure validity and
vertical and horizontal consistency within the individual case studies and the larger
case study.
Per the conceptual model shown in Figure 2-2, each organization has a
particular trajectory relative to the neighborhood changes based on when and where it
began relative to the condition of the neighborhood. This trajectory is based on the
initial resources, and organizational development that is both the result of the
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organization’s approach to success and to obstacles. These obstacles can be viewed as
either dramatic or cumulative events, and sometimes a combination of the two; a
dramatic obstacle being a singular internal or external event that has a substantial, and
often stinging, effect of the organization, while cumulative obstacles include trends
resulting from externalities over which the organization has no apparent control, and
those that result from organizational culture. By matching up different patterns
between the organizations, explanations for different project and funding choices,
leadership changes, and neighborhood relationships could be developed. This, in turn,
could lead to explanations of the changing relationships between organizations.
Yin states that “to explain a phenomenon is to stipulate a presumed set of
causal links about it… These links may be complex and difficult to measure in any
precise manner” (Yin, 2003: 120). On the other hand, Stake asserts that the goal with
the comparative case study is not necessarily a causal explanation of events, but rather
to perceive these events as “multiply sequenced, multiply contextual and coincidental,
more than causal” (Stake, 2005: 449). What each is saying, though, is that determining
causality is not always possible, but an understanding of the relationships and trends
is.
Methods of Data Collection and Analysis. This study used a combination of
quantitative and qualitative data that will help to define the organizational trajectories.
(See Table 3-1). 43 Case study research often incorporates multiple types of data
whose strengths and weaknesses are intended to limit the inherent bias of the author
43

I would like to thank Andree Tremoulet for suggesting the use of a chart to clarify this part of my
research design.

67

(Yin, 2003:86). The types of quantitative data collected and analyzed include
demographic information from the 1990 and 2000 Censuses, real estate value
information from 1992-2006, and organizational financial data from 1994-2006. Since
the time frame for the study encompasses 2 census data cycles, that part of the
quantitative data examines the neighborhood demographic trends, while the RMLS
data articulates the real estate trends noted in the neighborhoods and compares them to
the Metro area.
Table 3-1
Summary of Research Units of Analysis, Data Sources, and Analytic Approaches
Organization
Principal Data
Principal Data Sources–
Analytic Approaches
NECDC

Franciscan
Enterprise
Housing Our
Families

Sources Quantitative
IRS 990 Forms,
CDC Non-Profit
Housing Atlas,
portlandmaps.com
IRS 990 Forms,
CDC Non-Profit
Housing Atlas,
portlanmaps.com
IRS 990 Forms,
CDC Non-Profit
Housing Atlas,
portlandmaps.com

Sabin CDC

IRS 990 Forms,
CDC Non-Profit
Housing Atlas,
portlanmaps.com

PCRI

IRS 990 Forms,
CDC Non-Profit
Housing Atlas,
portlanmaps.com

Qualitative

Interviews: Former Board
Members. Newspaper
Articles, Kafoury Papers,
Oregonian Articles
Interviews: Former Board
Member, Executive
Director and Staff.
Oregonian Articles
Interviews: Former Board
Members, Executive
Directors and Staff,
Annual Reports and
Audits, 1993-1997,
Author’s personal papers,
Oregonian Articles
Interviews: Former
Executive Directors and
Staff. Annual Reports
1992-1998, Meisenhelter
Papers, Oregonian Articles
Interviews: Former Board
Member, Current
Executive Director and
former Staff, Annual
Reports 1999-2006,
Oregonian Articles

Graphing of financial and
development information,
Interview Summaries,
Explanation Building.
Graphing of financial and
development information,
Interview Summaries,
Explanation Building.
Graphing of financial and
development information,
Interview Summaries,
Explanation Building.

Interviews: Long Time and
More Recent Residents,
Abbot & Gibson, Personal

Interview Summaries,
Charts for census data,
graphs of RMLS data

Graphing of financial and
development information,
Interview Summaries,
Explanation Building.
Graphing of financial and
development information,
Interview Summaries,
Explanation Building.

Context
Each
Neighborhood

Census Data, RMLS
Data
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Local Public
Policy and
Funding

Federal Public
Policy and
Funding
Philanthropic
Foundations

observations
Interviews: BHCD and
PDC Staff, Public Official
Interviews, HCDC
Members Interviews, City
Council Member
Kafoury’s Papers, City of
Portland Audit of City
Housing Programs
HUD Policy Papers,
Schwartz, Abt &
Associates Report on
Nehemiah Grant Success
Interviews with past and
current staff of the
Enterprise Foundation and
the Oregon Community
Foundation, and Annual
Reports, Ford Foundation
Report on CDC Growth,

Interview Summaries,
triangulation with Kafoury
papers and other interviews,
City Housing Audit

Interview summaries,
triangulation with annual
reports, Summary of CDC
growth report

The Census Data encompassed eight census tracts at the heart of the Albina
neighborhoods. These tracts, 22.01, 24.01, 33.01, 33.02, 34.01, 34.02, 36.01, and
37.02, were chosen because of their rough alignment with the Boise, Eliot, King,
Sabin, and Woodlawn neighborhoods, the main geographic target areas of the CDCs
studied (Appendix I: 345). These tracts were some of the poorest and racially diverse
tracts in the City of Portland in 1990 and had changed significantly by 2000. The
categories of census data initially included Race, Household Income, Housing Tenure,
Median Property Values, and Educational Attainment in order to gain a snapshot of
both the population and the housing in the area. Later, I added the category of Age,
after many of my interviews yielded information regarding the displacement of older
homeowners whose relocation either by chance or by choice was a notable turning
point in the gentrification of the neighborhoods.
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The collection of real estate data occurred in two distinct stages and served two
purposes: to develop a database of the number and type of housing units developed by
CDCs and to track the change in neighborhood home prices over time. The first stage
was to verify the data from The Community Development Corporations/Non-Profit
Housing Atlas.44 This data was divided into the respective CDCs that developed the
units to get a tally of units for each organization and to chart when these units were
developed, an indicator of organizational growth and increasing complexity. Each
address was verified to ensure the quality of the data, and organizational Annual
Reports augmented the list, as its ending date was 1996. This list was cross-referenced
with the list of properties that Multnomah County transferred to non-profit
organizations from 1991-2006, and the State of Oregon’s list of Affordable Housing
development projects that received tax credit funding between 1994 and 2006. Efforts
to cross-reference this data with information from Portland Development Commission,
which administered much of the federally funded housing work, proved futile.45
Once the data were determined to be complete, an investigation into the sales
of homes both to low-income and market rate buyers began. Sales of CDC-owned
homes on the open market were an indication of precarious organizational fiscal
health, as the increased value of the homes could provide cash flow for the CDC for a
year or two. When this stage was complete, the data was mapped: the final product
was a map that showed the location and number of CDC developed housing units with
44
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In its City Housing Program audit, the Office of the City Auditor noted that PDC’s housing data was
very difficult to obtain; even when it was obtained, the data was unclear and unorganized (Office of the
City Auditor, 2002).
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the overall neighborhood home prices to determine whether the CDC housing
development had a lasting effect on the neighborhood housing prices (Appendix I:
347-348).
The organizational financial data was available via three primary avenues:
annual reports, organizational audits and federal 990 Forms, available online from
www.Guidestar.org. Annual reports, when available, were accurate accountings of
housing units developed, grants won and allocated, organizational cash flow, and
organizational debt. The audits were a more detailed accounting of development
activities and asset valuations. The 990 Forms provided a wealth of information that
not only verified information from the Annual Reports and audits, but also listed staff
numbers and salaries, as well as the addresses of properties bought and sold. Not all
data was available through Guidestar, and additional requests to the IRS for the
missing 990 Forms turned up empty, as they do not retain records for more than 7
years. Hence, the information available from the 990 Forms overlapped for a limited
number of years, and since each organization filled them out slightly differently, a true
“apples to apples” comparison is not possible; this is a common hazard of using
secondary data (data that is collected by someone else for a purpose other than the
author’s). With this in mind, though, the Form 990s and the available Annual Reports
were each excellent validations of the other and contributed to the robustness of the
financial information.
The qualitative data collected can be divided into 2 parts: 1.) Public
documents, newspaper articles, and reports, and 2.) Information gleaned from
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interviews with key stakeholders. These two types of sources were often used to verify
one another and provided an opportunity for more detailed probing in the interview
process.
The public documents include former City Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury’s
public papers from the City Archives. These documents were collected during the
summer of 2007. Documents include memoranda regarding housing policy, notes
from meetings, and most interestingly, the exchange of letters between Bureau of
Buildings Director Margaret Mahoney and NECDC Executive Director Jaki Walker
that outline the uncomfortable confrontations that Walker initiated with City Officials.
The newspaper articles were the result of keyword searches within the Lexus
Nexus search engine at the Portland State University Library. Several searches were
conducted for each organization. Keywords included the name of the organization in
different formats, the names of the key Albina neighborhoods, and the names of key
stakeholders. The bulk of the articles were from the Oregonian newspaper; however,
the Skanner, Willamette Week, and Portland Business Journal also contributed several
key articles. This was probably the most straightforward part of the data collection
phase. For each organization, summaries were created, so that a timeline of key events
could be developed (see Appendix J). This timeline served as a basis for much of the
cross-case analysis.
Reports include government generated material and reports to philanthropic
groups. For example, the Abt Associates report on the effectiveness of the Nehemiah
Grant was key in explaining NECDC’s performance on a national scale in producing
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the number of houses that it committed to, while Joseph Hoereth’s report to the Ford
Foundation on the building of community development capacity in Portland gave
tremendous insight into the role of the philanthropic organizations and their
expectations in the growth of Portland’s CDC industry. Local reports include the City
of Portland’s Vacant and Abandoned Housing Task Forces’ draft report on the number
and neighborhood location of these units, as well as proposed solutions to the
problems, a report by the City Auditor’s Office of City Housing Program
Accomplishments 1996-2000, and, most importantly, Marlene Farnum’s report to the
Neighborhood Partnership Fund on the Lessons learned from the merger process that
created Albina CDC.
The bulk of the information for this study, though, was gleaned from the 49
interviews with key stakeholders that took place between August 2007 and July
2010.46 These stakeholders included CDC board and staff, public officials, funders,
neighborhood residents, both recent and long time. Initially, my intent was to
interview a current or former staff member, a current or former executive director, and
a current or former board member of each CDC. This was not possible for all of the
organizations. Given the length of time since the demise of NECDC, I was only able
to contact two former board members and one former temporary staff member. Public
officials were very forthcoming, and I was able to interview several former BHCD and
PDC staff and directors, former City Commissioners Erik Sten and Gretchen Kafoury,
as well as a number of consultants who had played instrumental roles in the evolution
of N/NE Portland’s CDCs. Interviewing neighborhood residents proved a little more
46
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difficult; however, I was able to attend several neighborhood association meetings and
gentrification reconciliation sessions in 2008 to understand what the issues people
were facing as both new and old neighborhood residents in a tense and changing
environment.
For each interview, a list of questions was developed to serve as a framework
for the interview. Certain baseline information (length of involvement with a certain
organization, length of neighborhood residency) was requested to provide some
consistency. Each interviewee was asked, if they felt that there was someone in
particular that I should talk to; this process of “snowballing” led to some people that I
was not originally aware of and broadened the information about each organization.
The interview questions varied, depending on whether the interviewee was a
current or former staff member, board member, funder, public official, neighborhood
resident, or consultant; examples of these questions can be found in Appendix C. The
purpose of this variation was to glean a broad base of information about the
organizations and their relationships to each other and the neighborhoods in which
they operated. The intent of these open-ended interviews was to allow respondents to
explain their roles in and their attitudes towards the evolution of the organizations
because the interview process is “inextricably and unavoidably historically, politically,
and contextually bound” (Fontana and Frey: 2005, 695). It is an active process that is
intended to shed light on personal involvement. Two strategies for interviewing
include “empathetic” and “structured” interviewing (Fontana and Frey: 2005, 701).
The strategy in this research was a hybrid of the two: while a specific list of questions
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was adhered to during the process, I relied on my knowledge of the organizations and
the stakeholders to delve further into their stories. In doing so, I ascribed to an
approach that has been attributed more to women: that women tend to try to remove as
many barriers between themselves and their interviewees, to think about both what the
interview accomplishes, and how it is accomplished, a strategy that ultimately allowed
me to go back and easily ask follow-up questions (Fontana and Frey, 2005: 697).
After completing each interview and reviewing the transcript, I created a
summary of points. Each summary was then included in a summary of points
associated with a particular organization. From these summaries emerged the salient
issues that would become the basis for the analysis of each organization. The focus on
organizational housing production was both evident and reinforced by the people
interviewed. This focus could be viewed as a flaw in my logic, but the overwhelming
amount of money that each organization spent on housing development, relative to
their other programs, and its broader neighborhood impacts also reinforces this choice
of housing development as a point of entry into describing organizations as a whole.
Personal observation was also a key part of the data collected for this research.
I have had the opportunity to consult professionally in my role as a housing designer
with each of the organizations investigated and sat on the board of directors of
Housing Our Families for three years. During the 1990s, I was an architectural and
construction consultant to both PCRI and Sabin CDC.47 Jaki Walker and I had
discussed my designing a number of homes for NECDC, but its demise occurred
47

I was offered a full time position as Construction Manager at Sabin CDC in 1998, but turned it down
because I did not feel that there was enough housing development work on the horizon to maintain the
position for more than a year or so.
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before our contract could be signed. Because of my work with these organizations, I
saw first-hand the steep learning curves that the staff of these organizations
encountered as they learned about project finance and subsequent property
management.
When Franciscan Enterprise embarked on the design and construction of a
multi-family housing project on N. Mississippi, a colleague and I volunteered to
complete the initial architectural drawings. I had the most intimate relationship with
Housing Our Families; besides sitting on the Board of Directors for three years, I was
a volunteer for certain projects throughout the 1990s and consulted on the renovation
of its offices when the organization became Albina CDC in 2001. My role in the
organization was that of technical expert in both design and project development. This
role continued as I maintained a role on the Board of Directors of several Single Asset
Entities (SAEs). As HOF, and then Albina CDC, increasingly neglected these Boards,
I felt particularly awkward as I spoke up and called for accountability. When Albina
CDC began to negotiate with PCRI for the transfer of property, the rest of the Board
looked to me and to one other Board member for explanations of complex financial
dealings when it came to audits and HUD requirements, and I felt that much of the
weight of decision-making rested on my shoulders. As a result, my view of the
efficacy of a organization’s Board of Directors whose members represented a broad
spectrum of the community was critical.
Because of my involvement with several different organizations, my personal
files contained a wealth of information that included board meeting minutes,
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neighborhood meeting minutes, audits, balance sheets, news letters, annual reports,
correspondence and a number of photographs of the Boise and Eliot neighborhoods
from those years. This information was instrumental in describing HOF and other
defunct organizations. As a result of knowing many of the Board and Staff of other
organizations, too, I was the recipient of their personal files as well.
My relationships with each organization both facilitated and complicated this
research. My research was facilitated by the fact that many doors were open to me;
people were willing to speak with me in part because they knew me from my time
working with the different organizations. Because of this, I was able to interview 49
people relatively easily. However, I did encounter dilemmas associated with an
insider’s role: when I heard information that I had understood differently, I tended to
discount much of the rest of what a respondent said. I was particularly conscious of
body language that was incongruous with the answers that respondents were giving.
When the respondents’ information was consistent with what I had understood to be
true, I relied on these responses more than I should have, at least initially, and needed
to take particular care in triangulating the information to develop a more balanced
view of the organization as a whole.
As Yin (2003: 98) impresses upon us the importance of using multiple sources
to develop converging lines of inquiry, the validation and verification of information
in this research project utilized a variety of sources. Triangulation from multiple
sources, both qualitative and quantitative, was an important part of the interview
summation process in order to ensure the quality and validity of the interviews. The
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choice of organizational board members, executive directors, and staff was intentional
in order to accomplish a mini-triangulation within each organization that could then be
verified from outside sources as well. This convergence of data from different sources
is diagrammed in Figure 3-1:

(Adapted from Yin, 2003: 100)

In some cases, interviewees made statements that represented a particular viewpoint
and were found to contradict other interviewees’ statements and information gleaned
from newspapers and other sources. Statements of this nature needed to be verified by
at least one other source; if the statements could not be corroborated, they were
discarded.
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Limitations of Research Design and Methodology
The limitations of this project became more apparent once the data collection
phase of the research began; they are noted as researcher bias, the length of time
between this investigation and the occurrence of the events in question, the
inconsistency of some of the quantitative data, and the availability of interviewees.
Researcher bias is an inherent issue in qualitative research. Because of my
relationships with key stakeholders, I was granted access to both people and
information that I would not have had otherwise; the converse is that I have
preconceived notions of the evolution of the organizations and neighborhood changes
that no doubt influenced my choice of topic, choice of interviewees, questions used in
interviews. I tried to overcome some of these biases by triangulating information from
different sources.
The time between the commencement of this investigation and the inception of
the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland was almost 20 years. This time lapse
placed the onus on interviewees to remember specific interactions and events; hence,
information was spotty at times, especially for the organizations that no longer exist
and whose records were not readily accessible. The time lapse also affected access to
public documents: very few of the philanthropic groups had maintained their records,
the IRS had destroyed their information after 7 years, and many individuals had
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discarded their personal files.48 This time lapse, most importantly, led to a truncated
view of organizational finances.
Archival material, too, had been culled over time. The information from the
City’s Archives was poorly organized (at least for my research purposes), most likely
due the source material’s original filing system; hence, there were incomplete memos
and letters, and certain reports were only available in draft form. In addition, access to
the documents at the Portland City Archives was limited: city staff retrieved records
from the archives specific to the topic of research, so that the documents that I could
actually view were previously culled. This led to both a streamlining of the research
process, but also a potential limitation of access to appropriate information.
During the interview phase of this research, I discovered a great number of
people who were very forthcoming; however, my attempts to interview a significant
number of neighborhood residents were met with non-responsiveness. In order to
compensate, somewhat for this dearth of residents, I utilized the information gleaned
in the Boise Voices Oral History Project (Yanke, 2009) and the gentrification
reconciliation meetings sponsored by the Office of Neighborhood Involvement’s
Restorative Listening Project that took place in North Portland in 2006 and 2007. One
group that I did not contact was previous neighborhood residents who had been
displaced. This population, I surmised, has been dispersed further east and further
north. I attempted to contact the Albina Ministerial Alliance (AMA) in order to talk to
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files for HOF and Albina CDC from 1994-2005, no other organizational files were directly available.
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pastors who could put me in touch with parishioners who had been displaced. The
AMA was in a state of transition, and this effort was not fruitful.
While these limitations were significant, they were not insurmountable.
Information from the interviews, for the most part, was consistent and verifiable with
other interview sources, so that it became the backbone of this study. In a sense, the
study became more community based, rather than a quantitative and archival data
study.
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CHAPTER 4.
CASE STUDY 1: NORTHEAST COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION

Northeast Community Development Corporation (NECDC) was founded in 1984 by a
group of black community leaders to promote economic development and job
opportunities by sponsoring pre-apprenticeship carpentry training programs for teens.
The houses that it renovated and then rented or sold to low-income families were a
byproduct of the original intent (McLennan interview: 3; Talton interview: 2). Local
activists Ron Herndon, Carl Talton, and Edna Robertson each brought unique
experiences to addressing the social and economic needs of Portland’s black
community. Herndon was the vocal chairman of Portland’s Black United Front, a key
member of the N/NE Economic Development Alliance, the Executive Director of
Albina Head Start, and president of the National Head Start Association (Spicer,
1994b). Talton was more of a well-connected businessman. A former lobbyist for
local utility Pacific Power and Light, Talton also served on the Portland Development
Commission and the City’s Economic Development Advisory Committee (Talton
interview: 2). Robertson brought a level of community connectivity to the
organization as the head of the Northeast Coalition of Neighborhoods and her
involvement with Bethel AME Church, the Black United Front, the NAACP, the
Urban League Senior Center, the Regional Drug Initiative, the Community Coalition
for School Integration, and the Multnomah School Advisory Committee (Spicer,
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1994a). With such broad based and well-connected leadership, NECDC’s high
visibility and rise to power were virtually assured.
NECDC’s seed money was a $50,000 grant from Nike, after the corporation
had agreed to support community efforts in NE Portland as they were searching for a
location for an outlet store. “Before its (outlet) store had sold its first pair of
sneakers,” executives from Nike had met with Herndon and other community leaders
to forge an agreement to address “economic issues in Portland’s African American
community” (Herndon, 2004). Coupled with the fact that there was no other
organized group in NE Portland that was able to take action at that time, NECDC
began to mobilize resources and volunteers to assist with its youth training programs.
While still a volunteer driven organization, NECDC won a $250,000 federal
grant in 1987 to implement its youth employment training. The result of this endeavor
was the training of 6 students in a carpentry pre-apprentice program and two renovated
houses: the students then entered an apprenticeship program run by Associated
General Contractors, and one house was sold, the other rented (Mayer, 1987). With the
success of this first step, NECDC saw an opportunity to expand its programs with the
redevelopment of an entire city block that had been destroyed by an explosion and fire
in 1986 (Mayer, 1987).49 In 1988, NECDC partnered with the Housing Authority of
Portland to construct five houses on the site; the houses would then be rented to lowincome tenants, and NECDC would be responsible for their management and possible
sales (Blackmun, 1988).
49

On New Year’s Day 1986, 5 houses on NE Beech St between NE 10th and NE 11th Avenues were
destroyed when a resident of one of the houses committed suicide by removing a gas meter in his
basement, letting the gas seep into his house, and lighting it on fire. (Blackmun,1988).
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Also in 1988, NECDC hired its first Executive Director, Don Neureuther, a
former priest from Omaha, Nebraska. Neureuther’s strengths in grant writing and
planning were a great asset for the organization, but the fact that Neureuther was white
always caused some friction on the board – because of the apparent conflict that a
white face was publicly representing a black community organization (Talton
interview: 3). Talton notes that in 1988, the organization did not have much
experience with housing development, and Neureuther “head and shoulders above the
other candidates in community development experience” (Talton, 2009). Some of
NECDC’s board leadership, though, had focused on the social and economic
empowerment of the Portland’s black community and felt that having a Director who
was white undermined the purpose of the organization (Rudman interview: 12). While
Talton feels strongly that this was not the case: he believes that Neureuther gave a
high priority to the “black community agenda” and was a good fit for the organization
at the time. City staff and neighborhood activists saw this in a different way: when
Neureuther left the organization in 1991, they felt that he had been pushed out because
he was white, in spite of his denial of that fact and board members’ public comments
(Lane, 1991; Rudman interview, p 12; Stewart interview: 4; Talton interview: 3;
Kafoury interview: 7).50 In any case, Neureuther’s relationship with the NECDC board
was symptomatic of race relations in general in Portland: an uneasy subcurrent that no
one wanted to discuss for fear of being called racist (Frater interview: 24; Stewart
interview: 2).
50

Neureuther became the Director of the Neighborhood Partnership Fund after Ed McNamara left in
1994.
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On the other hand, Neureuther was able to advocate for NECDC within the
“patriarchal” hierarchy of City Hall and bridge some of the divides that had arisen
from the different approaches to solving the social and economic problems of Inner
North/Northeast Portland (Holden interview: 5). In the late 1980s, the problems of
Inner North/Northeast Portland had begun to emerge on the downtown political radar.
Both Commissioner Dick Bogle and Mayor Bud Clark had formed Task Forces to
address the issue of vacant and abandoned housing; the Portland Development
Commission established the redevelopment of Inner North/Northeast among its
“priority goals” for 1989, and the City Council created an Economic Development
Advisory Committee (Durbin, 1988). In addition, Clark had formed the
Neighborhood Revitalization Management Panel to oversee the work of neighborhood
groups that were identifying the key problems and their potential solutions; this effort
stalled in its efforts to offer solutions and was dissolved in 1990, its responsibilities
assumed, unofficially at first, by the North/NE Economic Development Task Force, a
grass roots effort formed by Herndon and others in 1989 to “advocate a neighborhoodbased approach to renovating the area’s most troubled neighborhoods” (Carlin,
1990a). Clark’s approach to neighborhood revitalization, though, was cautious, slow,
and bureaucratic, much to the chagrin of the black community leaders. With the
stalling of progress on the Homestead Task Force, the disbanding of the Neighborhood
Revitalization Management Panel, and increased friction between black leaders and
Clark, the North/NE Economic Development Task Force “spearheaded neighborhood
involvement” in revitalization efforts and emerged as a strong coalition of neighbors,
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business people, and activists that would, along with NECDC, guide much of the
planning and redevelopment in NE Portland for the next several years (Oliver, 1990).
A more insidious development, though, was the emergence of strained
relations between Mayor Bud Clark and Portland’s black community. In October
1989, Clark had fired his liaison to the black community, Ollie Smith. As a result of
Smith’s dismissal, black community leaders, with Herndon as their chief
spokesperson, met with Clark to discuss the dismissal. In that meeting Clark said that
“he would be his own liaison to the community and that he was trying to get a suntan
to make his skin darker” in order to better communicate with black leaders (Ames,
1989). Subsequently, Clark, upon calls from Herndon and other black community
leaders, apologized, albeit half-heartedly, for what “many feel was (a) racially
offensive” remark (Oliver, 1989). From the black community’s perspective, though,
the incident was indicative of race relations in Portland, where the black community
felt, and continues to feel, that whites, and especially those in positions of power, are
not aware of the offense – that they “just don’t get it” (Talton interview: 8).
In spite of the local racial discord, and perhaps due to Clark’s “go slow
approach” to revitalizing NE Portland, NECDC sought the assistance of Congressman
Les AuCoin and Senator Mark Hatfield to assist them in applying for a HUD
Nehemiah Homeownership Opportunity Program (Nehemiah) grant. Named for the
Biblical prophet who rebuilt Jerusalem in 62 days, Nehemiah was a federal program
that lasted from 1987-1995 and consisted of three rounds of funding with a total of 54
grantees whose urban and rural areas ranged in size from 30 to over 300 units of
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housing. The model for Nehemiah was based on a project in the Brownsville
neighborhood of Brooklyn, NY that brought together several different grass roots
organizations to form the East Brooklyn Churches (EBC), the group that spearheaded
the development of 1,250 single family homes that were sold at $53,500 each to
families below the median income for the area. The extraordinary thing about the
program was that it achieved costs savings in several different ways: innovative
construction techniques, free land, interest free construction loans, and very low
overhead costs. Savings for the homebuyers included tax abatement, below market
interest rate (BMIR) loans, and interest free capital loans from the City of NY that
were re-payable when the unit was sold (Phipps et al: A-2-A-3).
HUD used the EBC model to create a broader development program based on
the successes in East Brooklyn. The federal Nehemiah program challenged grass roots
organizations to develop housing on a large scale in blighted urban neighborhoods.
This model offered federal funding of up to $15,000 per unit in the form of a second
mortgage for single family and attached housing. The expectation was that local
governments and agencies would step up and provide the land, assist in the
procurement of below market interest on construction loans, rescind building permit
fees for the developers, and provide property tax abatement and interest rate assistance
on loans for homebuyers. The application process was competitive, with local
sponsors drawing together a host of public and private partners to provide local
support. Ed McNamara remembers when Don Neureuther told him that NECDC was
going to apply for the Nehemiah grant in 1989; McNamara laughed because he could
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not believe that such a small, inexperienced group would apply for a grant that was
intended for complex, large scale redevelopment projects for high density blighted and
economically depressed urban neighborhoods (McNamara interview: 9).51 The intent
of the Nehemiah Grant was to assist in large scale “contiguous”, primarily new
construction development. NECDC’s proposal was to do scattered site single family
house development in the King, Vernon, Boise, and Humboldt neighborhoods of Inner
North/Northeast Portland and a mix of new construction and renovation projects. As a
part of their application process, the organization worked with Congressman AuCoin’s
office to augment the definition of “contiguous”, so that their application would be
considered (Glanville, 1989; McNamara interview: 9).
NECDC was one of 15 grantees in the first round of the federal Nehemiah
grants in May of 1990, and the only western city to receive one (Talton interview: 3).52
Because of the structure of the Nehemiah grant, NECDC took on a huge challenge
before they would realize any financial benefit as a result of the sale of the houses.
Predevelopment and construction costs needed to be covered. In 1990, NECDC
received a $450,000 3 year grant from the Meyer Memorial Trust to build its capacity
to implement its ambitious redevelopment effort and $250,000 each year for 3 years in
operating support from the City of Portland (City Recorder, 1990). NECDC struggled
for the next few years to put together the project basics: land, building designs, and

51

When NECDC applied for the grant, they had only completed 4 units of housing, all of them single
family house renovation projects.
52
The other cities were Baltimore, MD, Shelbyville, KY, Clairton, PA, Gary, IN, Chicago, IL, Tifton,
GA, Woonsocket, RI, Tuskegee, AL, Pittsburgh, PA, Washington, DC, Des Moines, IA, Aguadilla, PR,
Camden, NJ, and Highland Park, MI. Not all of the projects were urban, and few were of a scale that
could take advantage of cost savings in construction (Phipps, et al: ES-4).
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project financing. The original application stated that the group had hoped to be
finished with 260 units by 1993, when in fact they had barely begun construction at
that point. To complicate matters, Don Neureuther, who had had an uneasy
relationship with several board members, resigned 18 months after the group won the
grant. According to Carl Talton, it was never Neureuther’s intention to be part of the
Nehemiah’s implementation (Talton interview: 3); however, his resignation in January
1991 signaled a new chapter in NECDC’s history (Lane, 1991b).
At that point, NECDC’s board launched a national search for a new executive
director, and in April 1991, they hired Jaki Walker as their new executive director. She
came to Portland from Seattle, where she had run one of the city’s housing programs
(Lane, 1991b). Her enthusiasm for the project and the organization’s “can-do” attitude
made her a good fit for NECDC. By all accounts, Jaki Walker had a confrontational
style that lent itself to accomplishing the potentially unattainable goal of completing
the Nehemiah project. Carl Talton notes that Walker had good connections to the
community and good connections with federal officials, but lacked solid connections
with the mid-level bureaucrats and local politicians who were a critical part of the
organization’s success (Talton interview: 11). This ultimately contributed to her and
NECDC’s downfall.
Walker’s first task as Executive Director was to organize the land acquisition
for the project. As a part of the local government and agency contribution, Multnomah
County had agreed to provide 130 vacant houses or lots to NECDC (Tupper interview:
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2).53 This relinquishment of tax foreclosed properties was the precursor to the
County’s Affordable Housing Development Program the intent of which was to
transfer County owned properties to CDCs for affordable housing development
(Rubenstein, 1991). The problem for NECDC was that this program, like the broader
Nehemiah program, was not tested – and working through legal issues like clearing
titles and property liens took much more time than originally anticipated (Moore,
1991). Ultimately, construction did not begin until December of 1991, more than 2
years after NECDC received the grant, and in large part due to the property transfer
issues.
Putting together the financing for a project of this magnitude, and with many
public and private partners, was by far the most difficult and layered part of the
development process and also delayed the project, in part because of a tripling of
project administrative and construction costs from the original grant proposal. The
administrative costs increased because of the unanticipated amount of staff time spent
to procure project financing, and construction costs increased in part due to the time
lag between grant application and the initiation of construction (3 years), the use of
smaller, inexperienced contractors, and the increased level of finish demanded by
Walker to help with the marketing of the new homes.54 As a result, NECDC required a
additional funds from the City of Portland (Mahoney, 1992c). Because the $3.75
million federal contribution to the project was allocated during the buyer’s financing
53

Since Multnomah County is responsible for the collection of property taxes, it is the trustee of
delinquent properties.
54
The cost of wood products (lumber, plywood, and finish materials) increased almost 20% in the early
1990s due to the diversion of material from local markets to areas where natural disasters, such as South
Florida after Hurricane Andrew, were occurring and the 1st Iraq war.
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of their homes, a complex set of predevelopment funding and construction loans were
required to develop the project and build the houses; NECDC procured $8 million in
loans from the Oregon Housing Agency and $2 million from a consortium of 4 local
banks for this purpose (Vondersmith, 1991). In addition, the Federal Home Loan Bank
of Seattle provided a “subsidy of $195,000 to help buyers with down payments and
closing costs” for 65 of the homes (The Oregonian, 1992).
In addition to the loans from the OHA and local lenders, the City of Portland
assisted NECDC, albeit reluctantly, with a “float loan” of $2 million in 1993
(Mahoney, 1992a; Kafoury, 1993). The float loan provided below market interest on a
loan from City CDBG funds; a consortium of banks administered the loan, and should
the City require access to the funds for another project, the banks would repay the City
and provide funds to NECDC under a Master Loan agreement (City Recorder,
1994).55
Because the predevelopment phase of the Nehemiah project dragged on with
nothing in the way of housing units to show for the hundreds of thousands of dollars
spent, City Commissioner Kafoury and her staff remember Walker and the NECDC
board balking when they were asked for an accounting of their expenditures (Lane,
1991b). The uneasiness stemmed from the fact that NECDC was the most well funded
CDC in Portland but was unable to produce any housing units.56 Critics pointed to
Ron Herndon’s high profile position as NECDC board chair and outspoken leader in
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The consortium of banks included Bank of America Oregon, Bank of California, First Interstate Bank
of Oregon, Key Bank of Oregon, US Bank of Oregon, and West One Bank (City Ordinance 168410).
56
NECDC’s application estimated that “85 homes would be completed in 1990, 95 in 1991, and 75 in
1992 (NECDC, 1990: 24).
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the black community as a reason for the lack of accountability; one city staff member
lamented, “If this was anybody else, it wouldn’t have been allowed to go on this long”
(Lane, 1991b).
The contentious relationship between NECDC and City Commissioner
Gretchen Kafoury and Bureau of Buildings Director Margaret Mahoney was detailed
in a series of letters as NECDC was negotiating the terms of the float loan; a draft
letter from Mahoney points out that NECDC had failed to provide “cash flow
information and an audit” to the City, so that they could allocate additional funding to
the agency (Mahoney, 1992b). A subsequent memorandum of understanding between
NECDC, Commissioner Kafoury, and Director Mahoney explicitly outlines the City’s
expectations of NECDC and admonishes them not to automatically expect that the
resources are due them nor to send letters “questioning the motives” of anyone
(Mahoney, 1992a).
NECDC’s combative relationship with the City of Portland was magnified by
several factors: their own inexperience, the novelty of the federal program, and the
fact that new development in Inner North/Northeast Portland, especially that
sponsored by a black community organization, was a new phenomenon. The
institutions were not in place to facilitate this re-development, and each side of the
debate (local and federal governments, community organization, banks) did not have a
roadmap or precedent to follow. NECDC already had the grant in hand when they
went to negotiate for construction loans with local lenders. The lenders were still in
the process of re-educating themselves about the requirements of the Community
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Reinvestment Act (CRA) and the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) – and
were definitely lagging in Portland because the recent localized recession had further
reduced lending. There was an expectation on NECDC’s part that they would be
granted the loans because of the nature and scope of the project, but the lenders did not
have guidelines or parameters for lending construction funding without clear
permanent financing set in place or for the requirements of an untested Federal
program (Frater interview: 24-25).57 What emerged from this initial consortium of
banks lending to CDCs for larger scale development projects was the formation of the
Network of Affordable Housing (NOAH). This permanent consortium of lenders
reduced the overall risk to the individual banks, streamlined the banks’ education
process, and assisted with meeting CRA requirements (Frater interview: 14). The
creation of an institution like NOAH certainly facilitated the financing for later
projects, but increased the time required to put together NECDC’s project financing.
When the organization did start to produce units, neither the pace nor the
number of units produced met the initial expectations of either HUD or the
organization (Figure 4-1; Rollins, 1991b, 1992b). NECDC had chosen to phase the
project for a number of reasons: land availability, lending issues, and organizational
capacity. NECDC’s constructing smaller of scale urban infill projects that were phased
over a number of years was consistent with other Nehemiah project proposals; it is
perhaps a critique of HUD’s attempt to replicate the EBC model in less dense urban
areas (Phipps, Heintz, and Franke: 4-17). When NECDC ended its Nehemiah project
57

As part of construction financing, permanent loans such as homebuyer mortgages need to be in place
before the terms of construction financing can be agreed to; hence, the phasing of a project reduces the
risk for the lender and creates a revolving pool of money that a developer can access as needed.
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in 1997, after 2 extensions from HUD, it fell 90 units short of its initial projections of
250 units (Kafoury, 1996; NECDC, 1990).58

Sources: Merrick and Abel-Hamid, 1998; NECDC, 1997-2000

The organization’s learning curve, lack of continued availability of developable
property, and financing issues were to blame for this shortfall – factors that could have
been mitigated had the organization, Multnomah County, and Portland’s lending
community had the capacity to complete the project more quickly. The costs for
NECDC’s Nehemiah were scrutinized at both local and national levels. While

58

This chart includes the Nehemiah units, as well as other rental and for-sale units developed. 1997’s
unit production includes the construction of the 55 unit Gladys McCoy Apartments.
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NECDC was spending $57,000 - $81,000 per unit on the houses, the average price for
a Nehemiah house (nationwide) was $53,000 (Kiyomura, 1994).59
NECDC’s early homes, while significantly more costly than their original
proposal, were viewed as “Cadillacs” by some funders because they contained
relatively higher end finishes, appliances and light fixtures when compared with other
concurrent affordable housing projects (McNamara interview: 13); however, the
quality of the exterior materials was substantially less and has not fared well over
time. The decision not to skimp on the appliances and finishes was a conscious one. In
order to make the units more attractive to buyers, Walker felt that the inclusion of
better quality items would not only market the units better, but would also save the
homeowners money in the long run with lower maintenance and replacement costs
(Holden interview: 7). In addition, as this was NECDC’s signature project, it was
important to them to include the best quality fittings possible. While buyers liked the
appliance and finish upgrades, one of the issues that they were disappointed with was
the size and layout of the units (Phipps et al: 4-13). In contrast to some of the older
houses in the area, NECDC’s new construction houses were smaller (and located on
smaller lots in several cases) and had open floor plans to make them feel more
spacious. This contrast has plagued developers of infill housing, especially affordable
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There was no mention in the article whether the size of NECDC’s homes was comparable to national
averages – this would have a huge bearing on the overall construction costs; however, federal
guidelines stipulate that the houses should be approximately 1200 SF. NECDC’s 4 new construction
models averaged 1250 SF each, with an option for a finished attic on 1 model for an additional 216 SF
(portlandmaps.com). In their Nehemiah Grant application, Neureuther specified that the average
development cost/home would be $62, 555 (NECDC, 1990).
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infill, and since NECDC’s project was a very high profile and novel endeavor, it drew
a lot of attention to its assets and its flaws (NECDC, 1994).
One of Jaki Walker’s personal goals with the Nehemiah project was the
inclusion of neighborhood and minority contractors on the project (Phipps et al: 4-16).
Because many of these contractors were small and inexperienced, the cost of their
inclusion was higher for both the organization and the actual building process. Much
time was required to assist them with the required paperwork and scheduling
coordination that was required on a publicly funded project, and, as small contractors,
these participants were not able to take advantage of the competitive pricing afforded
to larger and more experienced firms. While this may have been more costly for the
units, the value in neighborhood economic development was unprecedented (Talton
interview: 4).
Concurrent with NECDC’s predevelopment work on the Nehemiah project,
Portland’s local architects were busy working on a competition for affordable housing
designs. The American Institute of Architects (AIA) Portland chapter sponsored the
Essential Housing Competition, a competition that stressed respecting neighborhood
context for infill housing design. NECDC was drawn to the idea of design
compatibility, and the group selected 3 different designs from the competition’s
entries as the basis for its new single family and attached housing (Perlman, 1991a,
1991b). Each of the architects donated their services to NECDC, thereby eliminating
all of the design fees associated with the project. By selecting a total 4 models (3 from
the Essential Housing Competition and 1 from a Competition participant) for 130 units
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of new construction, NECDC was also able to realize significant efficiencies in
construction through the repetition of floor plans and the bulk purchasing of items like
windows, cabinetry, and flooring (Perlman, 1991).
One of the highest profile phases of the Nehemiah development was the
Walnut Park development. 18 units of housing were located on 2 blocks of NE
Roselawn St, formerly known as “Crack Alley” and built just after the completion of
the PDC funded Walnut Park shopping center, new NE police precinct, and the
Portland Trailblazers Boys and Girls Club. Completed in 1996, this phase of the
Nehemiah development was a particular showcase for NECDC because of the award
winning designs and its proximity to other city sponsored development.
Figure 4-2
Walnut Park Nehemiah Housing

NE Roselawn St., Photo by Author
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Figure 4-3
Nehemiah Houses over Time

1995 (Bruner Award Application)

2009, Photo by Author

The most compelling reason for delays in the Nehemiah projects stems from
appraisal issues with new construction. HUD’s appraisers valued the houses
significantly below the loan amounts and were inconsistent with other projects and
sales occurring in the area at that time (Kafoury, 1992). Executive Director Jaki
Walker referred to these exceptionally low appraisals as an extension of racism, and
buyers were not able to complete their purchases. HUD manager Richard Brinck
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defended his agency’s appraisal methods as purely reliant on local comparable sales
(Kafoury had disagreed with this assessment), but Walker accused the agency of
perpetuating its practices of redlining, as HUD’s appraisers were basing their numbers
on existing homes, rather than new construction homes (Lane, 1992b). These tensions
played out in the media and resulted in Walker and her board writing letters to Senator
Mark Hatfield, and Representatives AuCoin and Wyden. City Commissioner Gretchen
Kafoury admonished Brink:
I would simply comment that redlining was not solely the work of the
banks. Your department, as well as the government that I represent,
was part of the problem. If we did not proactively engage in relining
activities, we certainly had access to the market data and other
information that showed that they were happening (Kafoury, 1992).
Ultimately HUD revised their appraisal numbers to match the construction
costs of the new homes (Lane, 1992b). While the appearance of redlining based on
economics (low neighborhood housing prices that had been a result of historical racist
practices) rather than race struck a nerve with the organization, the fact that they were
able to mobilize the political capital to compel HUD to change their original numbers
to conform to the new situation was a victory for the both NECDC and the previously
redlined neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland (Lane, 1992b).
When NECDC completed their last house in 1997, home prices in the Boise,
King, Vernon, and Humboldt neighborhoods had climbed significantly, a sign of
neighborhood improvement that was both beneficial and problematic for the
organization: beneficial in the sense that they had accomplished their task of creating

99

wealth – people who had bought Nehemiah houses were gaining equity in their homes,
and problematic in that new development opportunities were becoming scarcer.60
One of Jaki Walker’s goals with the Nehemiah program was to qualify as
many families from the immediate neighborhoods as homebuyers, with a special
emphasis on African American families (Malloy interview: 3). NECDC’s outreach
programs attempted to contact 5,000 interested parties in order to find 250 qualified
buyers (Rollins, 1991a). Their first buyers were a counselor at Woodlawn Elementary
and a young family from the neighborhood, who were sidetracked by the HUD
appraisal difficulties; however, by 1994, another 25 families had moved into their
houses, and another 30 had been qualified (Leeson, 1994; Rollins, 1992b). NECDC
also partnered with Emanuel Hospital’s Neighborhood Home Ownership Program,
whereby Emanuel employees are eligible for subsidized loans to purchase houses in
the immediate neighborhoods (Rashad, 1995). NECDC also worked with the Portland
Housing Center and sponsored many homebuyer fairs and open houses in order to
attract potential buyers; however, this was a monumental task from the beginning – to
attract potential buyers, especially first-time homebuyers, in a neighborhood whose
residents were low-income and often had poor credit histories (Malloy interview: 3).
The outreach required to find and qualify potential buyers consumed much of
NECDC’s resources at that time (NECDC, 1990; NECDC, 1997).
In 1997, NECDC had a relatively large staff (12 people) and high overhead
expenses (Figure 4-4) that exceeded their revenue. The Nehemiah grant was
completed, and other opportunities for a similar type of development were not
60

Median home prices in Portland rose 22% between January and October (Lalley, 1995).
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forthcoming. In addition, NECDC had lost its operating support funding from the City
of Portland and the Meyer Memorial Trust, so that when Channa Grace, a housing
Figure 4-4
NECDC Organizational Revenue and Expenses 1997-2000

Sources: NECDC, 1997-2000

developer with The One Company in Los Angeles, was looking for a non-profit to
partner with on a large rental housing development that she was proposing on NE
Martin Luther King Blvd between NE Skidmore and NE Going Streets, Jaki Walker
welcomed the new venture (Kafoury, 1996). She saw the opportunity for a large
developer fee that could sustain the organization and the cash flow that would be
realized by entering into the rental housing business. What she did not foresee was the
complexity of the development and the resulting conflict that it would cause with her
board. The result of this partnership was the Gladys McCoy Apartments, a 55 unit
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apartment complex with many larger family units whose target population was
families with 30-50% of MFI, per the City of Portland’s shift in policy to target more
of its funding towards housing for lower income families (Office of the City Auditor:
6). The development consisted of eight buildings along NE Martin Luther King Jr
Blvd, with small commercial spaces at the north and south corners of NE Prescott
Street. The corner spaces housed a shared space for tenants, an often-closed computer
center, a coffee shop, and the complex’s management offices. The buildings on the
south side of Prescott had ground floor residential units that faced MLK. These units
had small windows on the MLK side to maintain privacy for the residents that created
a blank wall along the street side.
Figure 4-5
Gladys McCoy Apartments

www.Googlemaps.com

One of the reasons for the minimal inclusion of commercial spaces was the
project financing. HUD would not include the costs of the commercial spaces in its
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financing package, so that the commercial development had to be a completely
separate deal with its own financing package, even though it was part of the apartment
building. As HOF staff had discovered when developing the Alberta Simmons Plaza,
adding this level of complexity to the development caused many headaches for staff,
contractors, and other funders (Cross interview: 3; Hortsch, 1999a). The result was
that the mixed-use development took longer than anticipated to complete, its
apartments were difficult to rent, and neighbors were not necessarily pleased with its
outcome. In addition, the inclusion of a minimal number of commercial spaces
encouraged more purely residential construction along MLK, an outcome that PDC
did not necessarily support (Rubenstein, 1999).
NECDC’s development of the Gladys McCoy Village rankled board member
Carl Talton; Talton was also on the board of PDC and had worked hard to focus
commercial uses along MLK. That particular section of NE MLK Blvd had been
included in the extension of the Convention Center Urban Renewal Area so that the
area would be eligible for improvements funded by Tax Increment Financing (TIF).61
In addition to sitting on NECDC’s board, Talton also sat on the board of PDC and had
played a key role in extending the Urban Renewal Area (URA) to include NE MLK,
NE Alberta, and NE Killingsworth. Talton also was a board member of the N/NE
Economic Development Alliance (The Alliance). While PDC was charged with
administering the Urban Renewal Improvements, The Alliance had played a
significant role in the re-zoning of MLK Blvd to an “EX” designation in order to take

61

For an in-depth discussion of Urban Renewal and Tax Increment Financing, see Wollner et al (2003).
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advantage of Urban Renewal development (Holden interview: 3).62 Talton felt that
NECDC’s development of the Gladys McCoy apartments undermined the efforts of
both the Alliance and PDC to create a mixed-use district that focused on employment
opportunities (Talton interview: 10).
With the completion of the Gladys McCoy and few opportunities for lowincome housing development in Inner North/Northeast Portland left, Walker and her
staff set out on a more entrepreneurial path. Geo Development was created to develop
market rate housing in the target neighborhoods to take advantage of the gentrification
that was beginning to happen there. The intention was for the profits from the market
rate housing to be plowed back into NECDC; these profits did not materialize as Geo
Development attempted to develop a piece of property in NE Portland adjacent to the
Columbia River. The development became mired down in environmental issues, and
city approvals were delayed for more than two years. Subsequently, Geo Development
became a financial burden for the organization, rather than a contributor (Rubenstein,
1999).
In part due to the work of State Senator Avel Gordly, NECDC got into the
lumber business in the late 1990s. Senator Gordly’s work with Senator Ted Ferrioli in
1998 garnered NECDC a donation of lumber from OCHO Lumber, a constituent of
Ferrioli’s for the construction of a duplex in NE Portland (Hortsch, 1999b). At the
same time, Walker had met David Kaunda, the son of Zambia’s deputy minister for
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The zoning designation Ex allows for a number of different uses, although the intent is for more
commercial and industrial uses. Residential uses are allowed, but are not intended to predominate or set
development standards for other uses in the area. For more information, see:
http://www.portlandonline.com/auditor/index.cfm?c=28197&a=53298
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minerals and mining at a World Affairs Council Meeting. As a result of this meeting,
Walker proposed a joint venture with Kaunda’s lumber company in Zambia and led
two month-long trade delegations, whose participants included Senator Gordly, to
Zambia to explore the potential of acquiring lumber and saw mills in exchange for
technology development (Rubenstein, 1999). BHCD staff back in Portland were
“incredulous” about the idea of investing in sawmills in Africa and at the amount of
money spent on the trade delegations (Rudman interview: 8; Sten interview: 10).
Walker admitted that the idea was farfetched but continued to defend the venture;
however, NECDC’s board eventually “got cold feet” and pulled out of the
negotiations, but not before the group had spent most of its nest egg from the sales of
the Nehemiah houses (Rubenstein, 1999).
Further upheaval, and poor press, occurred when both Walker and deputy
director Sondra Price moved into NECDC houses constructed for low-income
families, even though their salaries were far above the Income Requirements. Walker
defended the moves in a letter to Steve Rudman:
The employees at Nike are encouraged to purchase Nike footwear and
apparel. The employees of Ford won a Ford vehicle, and the employees
of Nordstrom wear Nordstrom’s apparel… In our case, offering
NECDC-built homes for sale to NECDC employees makes the same
statement (Rubenstein, 1999).
Walker resigned soon thereafter, and NECDC never recovered from its loss of
capital in either the Geo Development endeavor in NE Portland or the Zambia saw
mill debacle, as both its revenue and development opportunities were drying up
quickly (Figure 4-6; Figure 4-7), and its reputation as a neighborhood based
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development organization was eroded to a point where it could no longer count on
foundation and philanthropic support.
Figure 4-6
NECDC Revenue from Developer Fees and Home Sales 1993-2000

Sources: NECDC, 1997-2000

In 1999, the Enterprise Foundation’s Management and Organizational Development
Division conducted a series of audits on the CDCs that it funded. The results of this
audit showed that, because of its declining cash flow (see Figure 4-4; Figure 4-6),
NECDC “appear(ed) to be in serious financial difficulty” (The Enterprise
Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999).
Soon thereafter, the merger discussions between the 5 CDCs based in the
central neighborhoods of Inner North/NE Portland began, and NECDC quickly
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dropped out of the talks, because of its debts (Rudman interview: 7). It had reduced its
staff from 12 to 1 over a period of 2 years; its revenues and grant income were less
than 1/6 of what they had been 4 years prior; and the group was saddled with the
accrued debt of carrying costs for the last of its for sale homes (Oliver, 2000a;
NECDC, 1999). While its board chair Jess McKinley was still somewhat optimistic,
then-Housing Commissioner Erik Sten and BHCD Director Steve Rudman “pulled the
plug” (Oliver, 2000b; Rudman interview: 8).
Figure 4-7
NECDC Revenue from Grants 1993-2000

Sources: NECDC, 1997-2000

On August 31, 2000 NECDC closed its doors. It had 11 remaining unsold
houses with a debt of $1.2 million that were turned back over to the mortgage holders,
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its City of Portland and Enterprise Foundation funding had ceased completely earlier
that year, and the rudderless agency was “out of gas” (Oliver, 2000b; NECDC, 2000).
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CHAPTER 5.
CASE STUDY 2: FRANCISCAN ENTERPRISE OF OREGON

The mission of St Francis is one of service to all; Franciscans espouse charity
and humility and honor these values with good works, “to live life in solidarity with
those in need” (Schraw quoting Fr. Matt Tumulty, 1992). In 1987, Franciscan
Enterprise of Oregon was born out of an effort, based on these principles, to bring
together parishioners from mainly white, upper middle class southwest Portland
Catholic parishes. Inspired by a priest from Inner Northeast Portland’s St Andrew’s
Church, a group of volunteers came together to acquire and renovate existing houses
to rent to very low-income families in the poor neighborhoods of Inner North and
Northeast Portland. These volunteers brought a host of specific skills with them that
were connected to construction, development, and finance (Purcell interview: 3).
The original intent of the organization was to attract and mobilize a small and
consistent group of volunteers who would partner with churches in Inner
North/Northeast Portland to form a broader network of volunteers, much like the
Habitat for Humanity model. This network would undertake housing renovation
projects as a means of good works – it was about “the transformative nature of this
kind of work … it was a way to open their eyes” (DelSavio interview: 2). Early
endeavors to partner with North/Northeast Portland churches on work parties worked
well. Primarily black congregations from neighborhood churches would turn out in
force to work on Saturdays to work with the suburban parishes, but cultural
differences, and the fact that the white suburbanites were bankrolling the organization,
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precluded these partnerships from becoming a mainstay of the organization (Purcell
interview: 2). These differences, and the inability to overcome them, were some of the
inherent obstacles that Franciscan would face in attempting to integrate themselves
into the neighborhoods in which they worked.
Franciscan Enterprise was the only truly church-based volunteer organization
among the CDCs that were active in the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast
Portland. Its first director, Father Matt Tumulty, was the parish priest whose
inspiration initiated the group and was well known and liked in the community
(Simmons interview: 9). Father Matt ‘s “focus was on the transformative nature of
(volunteer) work” (DelSavio interview: 2). The organizational mission statement
emphasized Franciscan’s “commitment to people, not programs buildings or projects”
(Franciscan Enterprise, 1994). Like NECDC, the housing production was a bonus, but
not the primary reason for the organization’s existence.
The work party model, while the mainstay of Franciscan’s existence, was not
the most effective means of engaging neighborhood residents and working towards
being a community based organization. The work parties, or “volunteer blitzes, “
swooped in on Saturdays and then left for 6 days; as a result, some neighbors became
resentful of this technique and questioned the real purpose of the organization – to
provide affordable housing or to assuage the guilt of wealthy parishioners (Kowalczyk
interview: 11). In addition, the stop and start nature of the work-party renovations was
neither an effective nor an efficient way to complete the projects – and subsequently
Franciscan’s board realized “that it could not justify its existence (and public funding)
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if we were doing maybe 2 houses a year” (DelSavio interview: 16, Kowalczyk
interview: 4). As Franciscan took on larger and more complex projects, work parties
began to have a smaller role in the organization’s mission and practice, although
volunteers continued to be utilized for landscaping and demolition (Warner interview:
8).
The parishioners who participated in the work parties were not necessarily
without judgment. Class differences were readily apparent, as parishioners often felt
that they were “on safari in the ghetto” (Warner interview: 12). At one such work
party, parishioners were overheard complaining that the tenants were lazy and had no
sense of pride in their houses and wondering aloud why the tenants were not doing the
yard work themselves, while the tenants were within earshot. In addition, staff were
required to attend the work parties, without comp time, a fact that some resented
(Warner interview: 13).
Franciscan’s first project was a house near St Andrew’s on NE 8th between
Wygant and Alberta. While the renovation process was protracted, the project was
completed and rented to a low-income family in about a year (Purcell interview: 1).
Franciscan’s first tenant, a single mother with 5 children, was subsequently evicted
after a year for nonpayment of rent; at that point, the house was in such a state of
disrepair that it required many more Saturdays of volunteer work to make it habitable
again. It was at this point that the group decided to form a CDC to separate themselves
and their charitable mission of community service from the more complex and
demanding job of managing rental housing for very low-income tenants (Purcell
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interview: 1). Franciscan Enterprise gained its nonprofit status in 1987 and proceeded
to expand slowly in three stages: the early volunteer-oriented years (1987-1993) that
were led by the board and Fr. Matt Tumulty, the middle growth-oriented years (19931996) that were led by Jerry Lindsay and Tom DelSavio where the group
professionalized and took on larger projects, and the later, internally chaotic years
(1997-2000) that were led by Karen Voiss.
Soon after its incorporation, the group procured, renovated, and rented a
second house around the corner from St Andrew’s. During the renovation work parties
for this house, radio talk show host Lars Larson took notice of the group, because he
owned a rental house around the corner on NE Wygant; soon after the completion of
the second house in 1988, Franciscan Enterprise bought that house from Larson for
$22,000 (www.portlandmaps.com). With three houses in their portfolio and newly
acquired 501(c)(3) status, Fr. Matt attended the NPF training sessions for emerging
CDCs, in spite of the fact that he was conflicted about the apparent cross purposes of
establishing a housing development corporation with the volunteer driven model that
he had begun (Sohl interview: 8). While Fr. Matt completed the trainings and wrote
the group’s business plan with its board, he was not fully engaged with the process of
growing an organization and increasing its capacity to undertake new and larger
development projects, as was expected of the groups who participated in the training
sessions (McNamara interview: 5). Even as the group obtained 14 more houses that
had been slated for demolition in conjunction with the renovation of the Roseway Fred
Meyer grocery store into a Safeway, Fr. Matt began to distance himself from the
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organization and left much of the work on these projects up to the board (Purcell
interview: 2).
These 14 structures, acquired in 1992, were relocated to vacant lots in the
King neighborhood that had been procured from Multnomah County’s Tax
Foreclosure program (Franciscan Enterprise, 1994). This was a complex project that
required multiple levels of financing, planning, and construction expertise that delayed
the project for well over a year (Rudman, 1993). There had been very little
neighborhood outreach, and neighbors were surprised when one Saturday morning “14
houses get plopped on the neighborhood”; the empty structures were surrounded by
chain link fencing and became a magnet for criminal activity, the most infamous
incident being the dumping of a murdered woman’s body under one of the structures
as it sat up on blocks (DelSavio interview: 7). Seven of the fourteen houses sat vacant
and seemingly forgotten for several months while the Franciscan board worked on a
financing package before any construction activity began, and were the source of
much neighborhood frustration (but little action) with group; however, at that time, the
neighbors were not organized enough to force Franciscan into quicker action, even
though the organization operated often at cross purposes with neighbors (DelSavio
interview: 27).63 What did force Franciscan to speed up their development timetables,
though, were the demands of public agencies and banks. The 14 houses were a larger
scale development than Franciscan had previously completed and highlighted the need
for the organization needed to update its development model. As a result, Franciscan
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Franciscan volunteers completed the renovation of 4 houses during 1992-1993, and 3 more by May of
1994 (Franciscan Enterprise Annual Report, 1993-1994).
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adopted a more professional model by hiring new leadership (Kowalczyk interview:
6).
In 1994, the organization hired Jerry Lindsay and Tom DelSavio as coexecutive directors and Bill Kowalczyk as construction manager. DelSavio and
Kowalczyk were instrumental in moving Franciscan Enterprise from a volunteer
organization to a professional housing development corporation. On the finance side
of development, DelSavio was able to access “nun money,” funds from the Sisters of
Charity, Sisters of Loreto, and Sisters of St Francis orders that were used as
Franciscan’s equity contribution to development projects (Franciscan Enterprise,
1994; Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997). As DelSavio explains, “ these were
groups of nuns … who traditionally loaned money to community development credit
unions… these loans were 3-5 years, with the understanding that if you were good
users of their money, and the program was still consistent with their values, they
would renew your loan.” The loans were typically 2-3% interest rates for loans of
$25,000 – 50, 000 (DelSavio interview: 30). DelSavio prized this relationship that he
had established in his previous work in Eastern Kentucky as a cornerstone of the
Franciscan’s mission and worked diligently to maintain it (DelSavio interview: 29). In
terms of organizational capacity, access to these funds allowed Franciscan to begin to
develop its first new construction project, a multi-family housing complex (8 units at
Killingsworth Court seen below) and to serve a broader population by partnering with
a local mental health care provider.
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Figure 5-1
Killingsworth Court

Photo by Author

On the construction side of development, Franciscan’s board initially
encouraged Bill Kowalczyk, the construction manager, to manage the volunteer work
party system; however, the coordination of the volunteer labor consumed a significant
amount of Kowalczyk’s time and caused him to question the efficacy of that model
when the group was faced with the responsibilities that surrounded the ownership of
houses in need of renovation (Kowalczyk interview: 4). The intent was that “by using
volunteers, you could keep the cost down, and you could keep your costs down by
doing the minimum work required…” - this model ended up costing more money and
more time than using professional contractors (Kowalczyk interview: 3). Kowalczyk
remembers “trying to move the board to its mission to being more involved in what
was needed in the neighborhood, than making the volunteers feel like they had a good
volunteer experience; I felt like that was too weighted in the interest of servicing the
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interests of the volunteers, not the interests of the neighborhood” (Kowalczyk
interview: 4).
This situation was both the cause and the result of one of the organization’s
biggest conundrums: the use of volunteer labor created a long and drawn out
development process, and drained resources that could otherwise be spent on creating
better quality housing; however, the volunteer model is what made this organization
unique. This uniqueness diminished as projects got larger and demanded a more
professional approach, a task that Kowalczyk achieved, but not without cost to the
organization’s mission.
Franciscan Enterprise also struggled with its image as a neighborhood outsider
throughout its existence. The disparities between the skill sets of the board members
who were from outside of the neighborhood and those who lived in the neighborhood
were quite stark. The board members who did live in the neighborhood “didn’t have
backgrounds in housing, and … were figureheads from the neighborhood, not true
participants with real power and the sort of skills to make the organization based
there” (Kowalczyk interview: 5). The neighborhood resident women board members
tended to be low-income and black, while the other board members were mostly
wealthy and white. For a number of years, too, the two neighborhood based board
members were also women. Alberta Simmons, one of the neighborhood board
members, characterized most of the members Franciscan’s board as “good old boys,”
white men who translated many of the top-down, paternalistic qualities of the Catholic
Church into their work in Inner North/Northeast Portland (Simmons interview: 9). The
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role of race and gender differences contributed to a power imbalance that assured that
Franciscan Enterprise would fully integrate itself into the communities in which it
operated.
The fact that Franciscan was not considered a CHDO (Community Housing
Development Organization as defined by HUD) and therefore was not eligible for
HOME funds for housing development, limited the organization’s housing
development opportunities. Franciscan had missed out on a considerable number of
funding opportunities without the CHDO funds, but more importantly had not built up
the political capital in its neighborhoods, so that it was not considered an
indispensable part of the community.64 While Franciscan had provided tenant services
and focused on building the skills of its residents, it had failed to truly incorporate
itself into the community; in fact, Franciscan’s budgets did not have a specific line
item for neighborhood outreach (Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000). HOF,
through its neighborhood liaison staff members, Sabin, by virtue of its membership,
and PCRI by the shear volume of housing that it owned, all had huge stakes in their
neighborhoods. This was not apparent for Franciscan, especially in the later 1990s
when the work parties, their greatest potential for community building, became fewer
and further between. As the work party emphasis of the organization decreased, so did
any specific outreach to neighborhood churches (Purcell interview: 9).
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The main criterion for a CHDO that Franciscan did not meet was that 1/3 of its board membership
was not low income and did not necessarily represent the community in which it worked. For more
information, please see:
http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/training/materials/factsheets/CHDO.pdf
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The board members from outside the North/Northeast neighborhoods saw their
community participation differently: they strongly identified themselves as “working”
board members, and their participation in construction work parties, real estate
acquisition, development and finance was evidence of their skill sets (Purcell
interview: 6). The “working board” members wrote grant proposals, organized
neighborhood activities, and were the backbone of the Saturday work parties (Purcell
interview: 4; Franciscan Enterprise, 1994). This approach changed, though, as the
organization professionalized and the board became less hands-on, as staff took on
responsibility for project finance and development and assumed the role of liaisons to
PDC and BHCD (Warner interview p. 12).
Franciscan’s challenges with property management were evident as the
organization took on larger and more sophisticated development projects. Franciscan’s
early guiding principles included providing “housing for (very low-income) people
until they got up on their feet” (DelSavio interview: 18; Franciscan Enterprise, 1994).
Even as the organization matured, the group did not have systems in place to govern
rental rates and procedures, and “no one had a plan to say you’re in for a year, then
we’re going to review your income, then we’re going to kick you out” (DelSavio
interview: 18). This lack of systems development was a reflection of the disparate and
idealistic views of the board (that tenants would have the opportunity to increase their
incomes and want to move on) and the realities of poverty and lack of opportunity for
residents of Inner North/Northeast Portland. Franciscan’s mission was set up to serve
very low-income families, those whose incomes were below 50% of area median; they
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were to pay 30% of their income in rent, with Franciscan absorbing the remaining debt
through different grants and donations (Schraw, 1992, Franciscan Enterprise, 1994).
Rental income was inconsistent at best: former Executive Director Tom
DelSavio remembers that the organization’s rental income was inconsequential to the
livelihood of the organization, in part because the “financing of these things allowed
people to go months on end without paying their rent, there was little if any debt on
any these … 2 or 3 houses (in the early days)” (DelSavio interview: 2). With such lax
self-regulation and unpredictable rental income, Franciscan was only able to continue
to function in the early years because its rental properties had very little debt service
and the fact that development projects were fairly easy to come by. DelSavio and
Lindsay succeeded in putting some systems in place to ensure that the organization
would be able to collect rents, pay its bills, and develop new properties, but they
continued to struggle with the day to day issues of property management. The realities
of the complexity of the management of a small, scattered site, single-family house
portfolio were apparent in simple chores like mowing lawns.
It was the cost and the logistics of who is going to cut the grass; we can’t
afford a professional landscaper, so we have some neighborhood guy who
does it, and there’s issues of worker’s comp, and if you had a particularly
concerned board member who is worried about being sued, you have these
long conversations about Jim could cut the grass, but he’s a disabled
person, and so do we want him cutting the grass, and are we paying him
under the table, he’s not an employee, a little thing like cutting a patch of
grass, 3 feet by 20 feet in front of the house became this long drawn out
conversation, and they got multiplied because you ended up making the
decisions based on the particular tenant in that particular house. Property
management was huge, and again because the rents were so low you
couldn’t afford a property management company, when in fact that’s
probably what you wanted.
DelSavio interview: 25.
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The staff time spent on property management exceeded the rental income realized
– a model that was only sustainable at a certain level of organizational
development and at a time when neighborhood property values were very low.
Property management demands a unique, and sometimes adversarial,
relationship between tenants and landlords. Franciscan, like the other
organizations in the neighborhood, encountered several problems, both internal
and external, with the management of the properties it developed. Franciscan
Enterprise had a particularly difficult time being property managers because of its
charitable mission to create shelter and its naïveté about the responsibilities of
owning rental property. Franciscan was “wanting to do all this other grandiose
sort of community building, but I think we were really bad (at being) landlords,
none of us wanted to play the bad guy…” (DelSavio interview: 6).
While the property management was an ongoing struggle, the construction side
of the organization was catalyzed by with the hiring of a professional contractor. Bill
Kowalczyk had been seeking “more meaningful construction employment” and
endeavored to produce high quality housing for Franciscan Enterprise. He oversaw the
completion of the rehabilitation of the remaining 8 of the 14 Fred Meyer houses in
under two years and began work on the Killingsworth Court project (8 units of special
needs housing developed in partnership with Cascade Behavioral Health services), one
of Franciscan’s two new construction projects (Kowalczyk interview: 2). Just prior to
DelSavio and Lindsay’s departure, Kowalczyk and DelSavio initiated the acquisition
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and re-development of the Texas Lounge on Alberta St into the Maggie Gibson
Apartments.
This move towards a professionalization was undermined when Lindsey and
DelSavio decided leave Franciscan, and the board hired Karen Voiss, a former
volunteer with the organization who had no formal training in either property or
organizational management or property development (Warner interview: 2).65 Voiss
had come to the organization as a volunteer, “started working with the board, and
within a very short period of time, the board only talked with Karen … they relied on
Karen for all the information flow back and forth between the board and staff.” The
staff was very upset with this situation, so that after DelSavio and Lindsey had left and
the board went through a hiring process, the staff protested their lack of input. In spite
of these protests, the Board hired Voiss as Executive Director, and the remaining staff,
including Kowalczyk, all quit.66 As a result, Voiss’s first order of business was to hire
an entirely new staff. Staff upheaval was an ongoing issue during Voiss’s tenure as
Executive Director – the staff that she hired all quit within 18 months of being hired
(Warner interview: 2-3). This conflict and resulting lack of continuity or overlap of
staff members contributed to a certain level of disorganization at Franciscan that made
it a necessary participant in the merger process (DelSavio interview: 4).
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DelSavio left because he needed to earn more money. He remembers that his children were entering
school, and he wanted a full time job, so that he could afford to buy a house (DelSavio interview: 15).
Lindsey was not interviewed.
66
Voiss declined to be interviewed, and Purcell declined to discuss this issue, as he considered it a
confidential personnel matter.
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Figure 5-2
Purcell Building

Photo by author

If the “Fred Meyer” houses were the turning point for Franciscan Enterprise,
then the Maggie Gibson Plaza was its downfall. The former Texas Lounge building
was located at NE 17th and NE Alberta; it was a large two-story building with a rich
and jaded history. Bill Kowalczyk remembers the Royal Esquire Club – a social club
that catered to mostly older black neighbors – as a welcoming place; the Royal
Esquire was supplanted by the Texas Two, or Texas Lounge, a seedy bar considered a
“neighborhood danger zone, often sprayed with gunfire and a central spot for criminal
activity” (Kowalczyk interview: 8-9; Levine, 1997). The building’s renovation into
the Maggie Gibson Plaza mixed-use project entailed significant design, construction,
and building code challenges and, more importantly, a complex financing package.
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The development includes two commercial buildings with offices and nine apartments
upstairs and a duplex that has seen both commercial and residential uses. Acquired in
1996, the building’s renovations were not completed until 2000 (Leeson, 2000).
Figure 5-3a
Maggie Gibson Plaza

NE Alberta St between NE 16th and NE 17th, (www.portlandmaps.com)

Figure 5-3b
Maggie Gibson Plaza

Photo by the Author
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This project was the last development that Franciscan Enterprise completed,
was stalled by Voiss’s inexperience with development, as the rest of the organization
was in “melt down” (Sohl interview: 10). This project was particularly complex
because it required two different financing packages, one for the ground floor
commercial spaces, and one for the rental apartments because it was receiving
subsidies for the apartments (Warner interview: 15).
Because Franciscan had no experience in commercial or mixed use
development, Warner had commissioned local developer Eric Wentland to complete a
market study and business plan for the building to include retail and restaurant uses on
the ground floor. Since Franciscan had been struggling to put together a finance
package that included realistic costs for the mixed use project, Wentland specified the
construction requirements and their associated costs, but the plan “never saw the light
of day … Karen glommed on to all the copies, and it disappeared” (Warner interview:
5). Voiss apparently insisted on sticking with unrealistic numbers and layouts for the
buildings, but was determined to show some kind of progress on the building. Without
building permits, Voiss authorized the demolition of the 2nd floor apartments
(including the accidental removal of structural walls) by volunteer work parties prior
to the closing on construction loans (Warner interview: 15). The completion of a
financing package for the building was delayed for 2 years, due to Voiss’s inability to
reconcile real costs for construction and development, oversee realistic redesign work,
and put together a financing package; hence, the timeline for the completion of the
buildings dragged out over a four year period of time, just as the Alberta St Corridor
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Plan was being enacted, and developers like Roslyn Hill were positioning themselves
to take advantage of city led improvements, ones that Franciscan was not able to
access due to the delayed development schedule (Levine, 1997; Sohl interview: 9;
Warner interview: 5). As a result of the time consuming missteps, Franciscan was
weakened as an organization.
Because of its small size, the organization needed the developer fees associated
with small and medium sized housing development projects to maintain cash flow and
thrive as an organization. The fact that the surrounding neighborhood was beginning
to gentrify made these development opportunities both more elusive and more
expensive, and Franciscan Enterprise had missed their chance for a more stable
organizational cash flow from the rents associated with the Maggie Gibson.
In addition, this lack of either consistent or larger scale development activity
hampered the organization because of the need for PDC’s recognition that the
organization was meeting benchmarks for growth and merited continued funding (the
Enterprise Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999;
Warner interview: 9). As seen in Figure 5-4, Franciscan’s early housing production
was very slow, because it was based on the volunteer work party renovation model.
With the renovation of the 14 “Fred Meyer” houses, its production significantly
increased between 1993 and 1995. However, it was the acquisition of the LIHPRHA
properties beginning in 1996 that significantly increased Franciscan’s portfolio, but
also put them in the position where their management responsibilities surpassed both
their organizational capacity and their cash flow. Franciscan Enterprises acquired two
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LIHPRHA projects, the 14-unit King/Dishman apartment complex and the 22-unit
Avenue Plaza Affordable Housing. The management of Avenue Plaza was another
instance of turmoil in the organization’s existence. Each LIHPRHA project, or Single
Asset Entity (SAE), was a quasi-autonomous housing corporation, at least on paper;
however, each CDC counted their SAE units as part of their portfolios - which both
inflated their unit counts and helped them meet PDC’s benchmarks.
Figure 5-4
Franciscan Enterprise Housing Production 1986-2000

Sources: Merrick and Abel-Hamid, 1998; Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000.

Franciscan’s unit counts left it in a precarious position: like it had experienced under
DelSavio’s watch, the organization did not have enough units to manage effectively
internally, but it had too many (with not a lot of margin for error) for a small
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organization to manage by themselves. Franciscan was at a crossroads: it would either
have to develop a considerable number of units to achieve a scale at which it could
afford to manage the units effectively, or forgo the management fees altogether.
Neither option was realistic for the organization and contributed heavily to the board’s
decision to enter into merger discussions (Purcell interview: 4).
Like several other CDCs, Franciscan had utilized other programmatic funding
to supplement its housing development activities. Funding for in-home childcare was a
locally popular HUD program that provided money for renovation and operating
subsidies for low-income child care providers. It was potentially a win-win situation
for both landlords and child-care providers, as there was guaranteed grant money for
renovations, subsidies and income for tenants, and guaranteed income for landlords.
Franciscan partnered with ROSE CDC, an organization based in outer Southeast
Portland, to establish a low-cost loan fund for in-home childcare providers to renovate
houses to accommodate these facilities and act as a clearinghouse to match parents and
providers (Dursch and Frater, 1995). However, Franciscan’s efforts to add childcare
services were limited in scope and funding and gradually dissolved (Purcell interview:
10). The program was never allocated more than $36,000, whereas both ROSE and
PCRI allocated significantly more resources and not only provided technical
assistance and loans, they renovated houses specifically for childcare providers, set up
networks of providers with their tenants, established scholarship funds for families in
need, and provided support to both parents and providers, so that the program became
a mainstay of the organization (ROSE CDC, 2000).
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Another program that Franciscan participated in was the Neighborhood
Network Center development, a program that met with limited success for several
organizations. This program was instituted in conjunction with the LIHPRHA
program and was intended to provide computer facilities, education and job training
for low-income residents of the apartment complexes and surrounding neighborhoods.
Franciscan partnered with Sabin CDC and Housing Our Families on some of these
projects, to avoid overlapping services too much (Meisenhelter, undated-b), given that
each group had at least 1 medium sized apartment complex within ½ mile of others
(the Maggie Gibson [FE], The Alberta St Apartments [Sabin CDC], King Dishman
Apartments [FE], Lydia Roy Gardens [HOF], the Margaret Carter Apartments [HOF],
Gladys McCoy Apartments [NECDC]).
In the case of HOF and Franciscan Enterprise’s properties, the failure of the
Neighborhood Network Centers occurred with its operation. In each apartment
complex, the owners set aside and renovated units for use as computer centers,
ensured the ongoing funding to staff the centers, provided initial training for residents
to use the computers and access internet resources, and committed to providing
upgrades to both hardware and software on a regular basis. After a few years, several
of these Neighborhood Network Centers became glorified storage rooms for out of
date technology, as poor management and lack of staff led to underutilization of the
centers.67

67

I was a Board Member of three SAE’s and on a site visit to the Margaret Carter Apartments in 2004
was very disappointed to find that the Neighborhood Network Center was no longer functioning due to
lack of staffing.

128

Franciscan Enterprise also relied on a variety of grants throughout its tenure to
enhance neighborhood safety initiatives. Because of their joint venture with Cascade
Behavioral Healthcare on the Killingsworth Court project, Franciscan Enterprise
became involved with the New Approaches Anti-Drug grant and received ongoing
funding for this endeavor through the City of Portland (City Recorder, 2000). The
intent of this program was for community groups to find creative solutions that
worked for them in their specific locales to avert drug and crime problems. Solutions
included partnerships with local police and rehab facilities, as well as neighborhood
involvement in activities such as foot patrols, new street lighting, and youth education.
One of Franciscan’s final large grant projects was a community policing
project for which they received $250,000 from HUD. The moneys from this grant
were to be used to “pay for two officers for one year, and one office the second year”;
the rest of the money, $70,000 would be used for “capital improvements” for lowincome housing units in the area (Bernstein, 1998). At this point in time, direct
operating support from the Collaborative (the Enterprise Foundation, BHCD, and
NPF) was dwindling (Franciscan’s had declined from $250,000 in 1997 to $135,000 in
2000), and Franciscan’s staff was pursuing different types of grant money that could
be incorporated into existing projects (Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000).
Franciscan Enterprise benefited from the prodigious funding for operating
expenses that flowed into Portland’s CDCs in the early 1990s. Core operating support
came from BHCD, the Neighborhood Partnership fund, and smaller foundations like
the Meyer Memorial Trust and the Collins Foundation. PDC project based finance was
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augmented by Tom DelSavio’s access to “nun money,” so that the organization had
ready access to project equity at a very low interest rate for small development
projects. In addition, Dorene Warner remembers the “$200,000 week”, where she and
three colleagues had won large grants for different programs from tenant services to
childcare programs to housing development (Warner interview: 7). While the core
operating support from the Collaborative was being reduced in the late 1990s,
Franciscan was expanding its fundraising capacity, realizing the income from new
rental properties, and selling off single-family houses to offset the loss of income and
maintain cash flow (See Figure 5-5). Given that Franciscan’s housing portfolio was
acquired though a combination of donations, Multnomah County foreclosures, and
LIHPRHA, several units had a very low cost basis, and the asset to debt ratio was
fairly positive. The increased property values in the neighborhood added to
Franciscan’s stability on paper (and their potential revenue should they sell off
additional properties) but did not reflect the larger challenges of finding properties to
develop within the target area. For example, a lot that Franciscan acquired in 1996 for
$10,000 was valued at $35,000 in 1998, so that the organization was unable to have a
continuous pipeline of developable property in reserve (Siegel, 1998).
As a result, the organization had a staff of 15, income from apartment rentals
that did not cover its costs, funding for programs other than housing to support most of
the staff, but no development opportunities in sight. In its financial analysis of
Franciscan Enterprise in 1999, PNDSC staff found that the organization had not
broken even for three years and was not in control of its revenue stream (The
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Enterprise Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999). It was
at this time, too, that the Collaborative began to strong-arm several CDCs into merger
discussions and strongly encouraged Franciscan to participate, given its modest (and
low cost-basis) asset base and organizational and fiscal instability.
As the merger discussions were plodding on, and Franciscan needed more
immediate cash, they sold three single family house properties for a total gain of $56,
000 and reduced their debt, without reducing their income substantially (See Figure 56). These sales, and their gains, would not have been possible 10 years prior and is a
reflection of the changing role of the organization in its gentrifying locale (Siegel,
1998). In addition, it magnified the necessity of a CDC that could compete with the
private interests that were gentrifying the neighborhood.
Figure 5-5
Franciscan Enterprise Revenue and Expenses 1997-2000

Sources: Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000
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What these graphs do not show is that by 1999 Franciscan was immersed in the
development of the Maggie Gibson, whose units were already counted as a part of the
housing portfolio even though they were not producing income, and had no other
Figure 5-6
Franciscan Enterprise Assets and Debt

Sources: Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000

development opportunities “in the pipeline” (Warner interview: 16). It had reduced its
staff size from 15 to 6, and the board’s focus was on the merger discussions with
Sabin CDC and Housing Our Families (Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1997-2000).
In August 2000, too, Karen Voiss resigned as Executive Director after a tumultuous
tenure, so that the organization’s stability was shaken up further. Fran Ayaribil
assumed the position of interim Executive Director as the board weighed its options to
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continue with the merger process (Farnum, 2003: 11; Oliver, 2000). Because of the
combination of the reduced operating support, lack of development activity and
ongoing opportunities, and the staff instability, Franciscan Enterprise had “run out of
steam” and no choice but to merge with another organization or organizations, or to
liquidate its assets (Sten interview: 12).
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CHAPTER 6.
CASE STUDY 3: HOUSING OUR FAMILIES

Housing Our Families (HOF) was formed in 1991 and obtained its 501(c)(3)
status in 1992. Originally a loosely affiliated
group of women from many different walks

Figure 6-1
NCNW Goals

of life, HOF sought to bring together
professional women and low-income
women and to utilize their collective skills
“develop affordable rental housing and
improve neighborhood livability” (Smock,
1999:3). Using the National Congress of
Neighborhood Women (NCNW)’s model
and goals for developing “principled
partnerships”, the group sought to honor
each woman’s skills and contribution and to
encourage women’s leadership development
using the NCNW goals (Willer interview:
7).
The idea for Housing Our Families
coalesced at a 1989 conference of local
activists and neighborhood residents at
NCNW Brochure, Undated
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Portland Community College’s Cascade Campus in North Portland; this conference
provided a forum for people to “speak out” about their experiences with housing.
Linda Grear, a single mother and long time North Portland resident, spoke about the
tremendous difficulties that she had encountered trying to find decent affordable
housing in the surrounding neighborhood for herself and her two daughters (Sohl
interview: 4). As a result of this meeting, a core group of women continued to meet
to discuss how to form an organization that would address the issues surrounding
women in poverty, including housing and women’s leadership development. This core
group took the name of the initial conference, Housing Our Families, as its
organization’s name. Founding members Barbara Willer and Alberta Simmons went to
New York to participate in an NCNW training that was designed to help solidify the
organization by defining goals and a framework for growing the organization and
returned to share those ideas at a second conference in 1990 (NCNW Brochure: 1).
The NCNW organizational model (Figure 6-1) espouses inclusion, respect for
others, and principled partnerships as a means of empowering low-income and
minority women. This model that HOF adopted included “a real commitment to
partnership, to operating on equal playing fields, to the developing of strong
relationships with one another and to developing a strong mutual understanding … it
was very non-bureaucratic” (Smock interview: 3). Since NCNW had been the
cornerstone of the inspiration that created HOF, several founding board members felt
strongly that their model of decision-making process and ideas about equality should
form the basis of HOF’s ethos (Schleiger interview: 2).
135

Using the NCNW goals, HOF created a set of ground rules that were read at the
beginning of each meeting and served as the structure for the ensuing “principled
partnerships”:
•
•
•
•
•

Speak from your own experience: All participants are considered experts.
No putdowns, blaming, judgments, or unsolicited advice.
Go-rounds: In discussions, each participant is given an opportunity to speak in
turn.
Equal time for all: Time limits are often used during go-rounds; interruptions,
cross talk and speaking out of turn are not allowed.
Decisions by consensus. A series of go-rounds allows for the sharing of
information, establishment of a position on an issue, and the reaching of a
decision that includes all particpants’ perspectives.
Smock, 1999: 4.
Because HOF did not originate in a specific neighborhood and therefore did

not fit NPF’s definition of a community development corporation, NPF did not
include HOF in their first round of capacity building training sponsored by the Ford
Foundation (Schleiger interview, p 3). The women of HOF were ruffled by this
exclusion and followed up with NPF to see what it would take to include HOF in the
trainings. The answer was simple: pick a geography (Willer interview: 4, Sohl
interview: 5). As a result, the group chose to focus on the Boise, Eliot and Humboldt
neighborhoods, the very neighborhoods that Linda Grear had spoken about at the first
meeting. With assistance from TACS, HOF acquired a four-unit apartment building
from Multnomah County in the Boise neighborhood and renovated it; as would be the
case with all of HOF’s properties, it was named for a living woman who had inspired
the group, in this case local activist Vesia DeWeese Loving. Run initially by a
volunteer board, HOF acquired its 501(c)(3) status in 1992; the group was still in its
nascent stages as it continued to apply for grants from local foundations to hire its first
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staff person; Gretchen Dursch was hired as Executive Director in November 1992, and
her first task was to raise the money for the rest of her salary, as the organization did
not yet have adequate funding (Simmons interview: 4). By 1993, HOF Board
Members had successfully participated in the NPF trainings and drew up a business
plan that qualified them for NPF’s start-up funding, a sign of both stability and
legitimation from the funding community. In order to accommodate the new staff,
HOF rented office space in a building with PCRI. In addition, the group completed its
second housing development project, the rehab of a duplex on NE 7th Avenue (HOF,
1993).
HOF’s housing development curve soon steepened. After the completion of the
7th Avenue duplex in May of 1993, the owners of the 48 unit Colonial Park
Apartments put the word out that they were interested in selling the problem-plagued
complex approached Gretchen Dursch. Colonial Park was located in the heart of the
Boise neighborhood adjacent to Unthank Park; it was the site of ongoing police calls
and numerous building code violations (Fitzgibbon, 1993; Dursch interview: 5). ThenKafoury aide Erik Sten remembers that “they used to have a vat of acid so you could
throw your drugs in there when the place got raided or chased, and the guy who
managed the place came into my office with a gun” (Sten interview: 3).
Dursch presented the project to HOF’s Property Development Committee and
Board; in general, Dursch presented every development opportunity to the group
because she felt strongly that by allowing Board to choose, she and they would
“honor the group’s consensus process” (Dursch interview: 5). To Dursch’s surprise,
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the Board was interested in the Colonial Park – because it was a huge leap in scale for
the group (Dursch interview: 7). She had worked closely with Gretchen Kafoury’s
office on this property acquisition and noted that both Kafoury’s office and HOF’s
Board eagerly took credit for the initiation of the redevelopment (Dursch interview: 5).
Since HOF’s goal was to provide housing for women and their families, the
group set about creating a family friendly apartment complex. In their plans, they
reduced the number of units from 48 to 42 to include a Head Start Center and ruffled
some feathers in the process (Christ, 1995; White and Swanson, 1993). Ron Herndon,
the local leader of Head Start and founding board member of NECDC, was irked
because he was not consulted about this part of the project and felt that the new Center
would compete with existing ones. As a key leader in the African American
community, Herndon’s opinion carried much weight in the neighborhood (McLennan
interview: 17).
Each courtyard of the complex was designated for active play, quiet play, or
gardening (Christ, 1995). Much care was given to the inclusion of benches, play
structures, and raised beds for gardening; however, much like Potemkin’s village, the
Maya Angelou apartments began to disintegrate soon after the tenants moved in. What
drove the project was the “strong political pressure from city council and elsewhere to
maximize unit production” … and for funders to “look at a proposal and say what is
the least amount of money we can put in so that we can have some money left to do
yet another project,” (White interview: 2). PDC, the main funder of development
projects sought to “leverage their inputted dollars to the maximum” (Lokan interview:
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1); in other words, “to do it (housing development) as cheap as you can” (Kelley
interview: 9).
Figure 6-2
Maya Angelou Apartments

Photo by Author

The undercapitalization of the renovations required a piecemeal approach to
the construction. Not all plumbing was replaced: decrepit fixtures were left in place,
aging hot water heaters were repaired rather than replaced, and the cheapest possible
materials were used. The general contractor on the project called this approach
“basically putting lipstick on a pig” (Purcell interview: 6). In spite of this lack of
investment and looming maintenance problems, HOF persevered, but this lack of
attention to basic systems would cost the organization much more in terms of property

139

maintenance in the ensuing years, and also require that the every unit in complex
would have to be entirely re-renovated only 8 years later (Learn, 2001).
Colonial Park, later renamed the Maya Angelou Apartments, “flipped (HOF)
to a larger scale” (Dursch interview: 7; Fitzgibbon, 1993). Because of the money from
the developer fees for the project, HOF initiated an effort to organize the
neighborhood surrounding the Maya Angelou and hired Kris Smock as a community
outreach coordinator to “get people engaged in developing action plans for the
neighborhood” (Smock interview: 1). Smock was hired under the AmeriCorps/VISTA
Volunteer program, a federal program that subsidizes the efforts of community
organizers like Smock to link up to public and private non-profit organizations to work
in low-income neighborhoods.68 Smock’s work was recognized by the Enterprise
Foundation and its Rudy Bruner Award for creating a community organizing endeavor
and was, by all accounts, one of HOF’s most successful endeavors (Kafoury,
undated).69 The result of Smock’s efforts was a “comprehensive initiative that was
intended to build leadership skills of residents” (NCNW: 3). This initiative was
divided into four action plans: Youth, Crime, Physical Revitalization, and Community
Building (Smock interview: 1). Known throughout the neighborhood as “the girl on
the bicycle,” Smock succeeded in bringing neighbors together to form a neighborhood
watch, participate in neighborhood clean-ups, and to operate youth programs (Morgan
interview: 11). Smock describes her time at HOF as the “magical years” when she was
68

AmeriCorps VISTA is the national service program designed specifically to fight poverty. Founded
as Volunteers in Service to America in 1965 and incorporated into the AmeriCorps network of
programs in 1993, VISTA has been on the front lines in the fight against poverty in America for more
than 40 years (www.Americorps.gov).
69
HOF beat out NECDC’s Walnut Park development for these honors in 1995.
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able to “gain the trust of the black community, especially amongst the elders” (Smock
interview: 3, Morgan interview, 11). This trust, though, depended on Smock’s efforts,
and, after two renewals of her VISTA contract, Smock left for Chicago to attend
graduate school. Those organizers who followed her were not as successful in
bringing the neighborhood and organization together, in part because property
management and internal staffing issues had begun to hamper the success of the
organization and in part because of the change in the demographics of the
neighborhood (Pequeño interview: 1; Smock interview: 5).
HOF’s efforts with tenant organization were much less successful, in part due
to the efficacy of the individuals and in part due to tenants’ realization that “they did
not want to be organized by their landlord” (Pequeño interview: 4). In addition, these
efforts were undermined by high tenant turnover rates, something that affected both
the finances and the mission of the organization. The mission of the organization was
linked to empowerment. After Smock’s successes, organizing efforts became the stepchild to housing development (Pequeño interview: 4). Barbara Willer noted that by
the time that she returned to the organization as Interim Executive Director in 1998,
HOF’s organizing efforts “had served their purpose, which was to improve the
neighborhood, (and) there was less need for them” (Willer interview: 3).
As HOF, like the other groups in the surrounding neighborhoods, began to
amass a significant housing portfolio, there was an underlying current of discontent
between neighborhood groups, especially the Boise Neighborhood Association (BNA)
and HOF. For several years, HOF identified itself as a women’s development
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organization, and one of the underlying points of discomfort between the neighbors
and HOF was that the organization was perceived as an outside white women’s
organization, even though 60-70% of the Board of Directors were African American
and/or neighborhood residents (HOF, 1994 and 1996). The other point of discomfort
for the neighborhood organization, and sometimes within the organization, was that
approximately 30% of the board members were Lesbians. While the board (and most
of the staff) remained exclusively female, and while this distinguishing characteristic
was a source of pride for the organization and its board, it was the source of distrust in
the neighborhood (Willer interview: 5). The fact that the organization was perceived
as a lesbian organization was also source of discomfort for HOF’s first Executive
Director who was often the public face of the agency (Dursch interview: 3).
In one Boise Neighborhood meeting, Charles Durham, a local builder whose
sister Kahlia was HOF’s bookkeeper in the late 1990s, expressed concern and mistrust
for HOF because of their “exclusion” of men from the Board at a Boise Neighborhood
meeting; later, Durham referred to HOF as “poverty pimps” (Lydgate, 1999). This
distrust grew as “people were sort of offended by the image that a bunch of women
were running this organization and were exclusive, and would not allow men, and this
was primarily amongst some of the business owners… only a few people that knew of
the tremendous successes they had had and could say that HOF had great moments
and could point to it” (Bauer interview: 6). Neighborhood trust of the organization
was also tempered by the perception that the group was composed of outsiders, and
mainly white women, who had access to City money (Smock interview: 11).
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Janet Bauer was the Manager of the Mississippi Target Area project, a City led
organizing effort that was intended to organize the businesses along Mississippi and
promote local economic development. Bauer’s office was initially located in HOF’s
offices, so that she had a multi-faceted view of the work of the organization and its
criticism. Bauer remembers that because the organization identified itself with the
empowerment of local women, its board and staff did not “anticipate the need to do
bridge building beyond the women that it was empowering;” they were not as
sensitive to the needs and perceptions of the neighbors and did not realize that they
were as accountable to them as to their tenants, a fact that encouraged the initial
flourishing of the organization but then contributed to its eventual downfall (Bauer
interview: 10-11). Early on, the BNA had been very leery of HOF – they were
skeptical of change that was led by perceived outsiders, as witnessed by their history
with the Model Cities programs and later Urban Renewal; the early doubts led to a
distrust of the organization that became more magnified as it encountered its own
internal management difficulties. Smock described the relationship with the
neighborhood residents and the Boise Neighborhood Association (BNA) as a “house
of cards” - Smock’s efforts to organize neighbors were often met with both resistance
and inertia because the neighbors well understood that HOF did have a relationship
with the City of Portland and was able to access funding that they were not (Smock
interview: 11).
The BNA in 1994 represented the old guard of the neighborhood: older
African American homeowners who were not particularly organized or proactive. The
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group was not able to put together groups of volunteers for neighborhood foot patrols
or paint-a-thons or come to an agreement on a common planning agenda (Smock
interview: 5). By 1996, this group had changed, as younger white residents had begun
to settle in the neighborhood. These newcomers felt attacked with the use of the word
“gentrification” – because they could not believe that they were part of that trend;
however, in time, this group of newcomers “took over the neighborhood association”
because they were frustrated with the level of participation and actions of the old
guard in response to what was going on in the neighborhood (Grear Long interview:
15). This new generation was more active and more vocal in its criticism of HOF
(Smock interview: 4-5). In the end, the BNA became HOF’s greatest critic (NPF, et al,
1999: 15; Swart and Wolf, 2002). The neighborhood association and neighborhood
CDC never truly saw eye to eye; the BNA’s initial skepticism of the early organization
was never overcome, and there was no established history of a solid working
relationship, especially after Kris Smock’s departure.
In 1996, HOF acquired the vacant lot at the corner of N. Mississippi and N.
Shaver to begin its most controversial development: the Betty Campbell Building. The
Betty Campbell was developed just as most of the original board members were being
“termed out” and new Board leadership was engaging with both the machinations of
the organization and the gentrifying neighborhood, whose leadership was also in the
process of turning over. Begun in 1995 and completed in 1997, this building was one
of two new buildings on an otherwise run-down N. Mississippi Ave. The lot at the
corner of Mississippi and Shaver was at the center of an old commercial district - and
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Figure 6-3
Corner of N. Mississippi Avenue and N. Shaver Street, 1995

Photo by Author

held great meaning to the neighborhood residents. HOF’s building (see Figures 6-4,
6-5) was intended to be a mixed use structure with 5 units of housing upstairs and
HOF’s office space on the ground floor; this structure’s design was intended to fit with
the historical character of the neighborhood. Initially, the upstairs housing units were
3-4 bedrooms with a provision for play space for children on a roof terrace. Because
of the demands of PDC and the inability to make the building “pencil”, the number of
housing units was increased to 8 (with a third story added to the building), and the
exterior play space was eliminated. These major changes to the density and scale of
the building added to its poor reception in the neighborhood. In hindsight, the
provision for family housing without places for families was a poor decision for the
organization, one that contributed to its ultimate downfall.
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Figure 6-4
Original Concept Sketch of the Betty Campbell Building

Files of the author

Figure 6-5
The Betty Campbell Building

Photo by Author

During the initial stages of construction of the Betty Campbell, a significant
amount of site contamination was discovered. Apparently, the demolition of the
previous structure had not been inspected by the City of Portland, and the contractor
146

had imploded the structure on top of some potentially toxic chemicals, including old
oil tanks that had not been properly decommissioned. The malodorous sludge was
termed “black goo” by the contractor and necessitated an additional $300,000 cleanup
of the soil before construction could even begin (Purcell interview: 4). No one had
anticipated the extent of this problem, so that the building had to be re-designed with
much of its interior play space and architectural details lost to value engineering.
The apartments in the Betty Campbell were difficult to rent; few families
wanted to live in a poorly constructed apartment building with no play space for
children. As a result, the tenant population was particularly hard to manage. Others
have referred to the building as a “war zone;” former construction manager Chris
Cross noted that the proximity of a bus stop, a pay phone, and a perpetually unlocked
front door exacerbated the drug dealing that already existed in the area (Cross
interview: 16-17). The resulting building has been the target of ongoing neighborhood
criticism, too; in 2007, a neighbor appealed a design review decision for a new
construction just up the street and cited the Betty Campbell as “a social and
architectural failure” that neighbors considered to be an eyesore from day one
(Lydgate, 1999; Elizabeth, 2007).
Ironically, Franciscan Enterprise developed a residential structure of similar, if
not lesser, quality 3 blocks to the north a few years earlier (Purcell interview: 7;
Warner Interview: 6). This building remained under the radar, in spite of the fact that
it housed a similar density of low-income tenants, while the Betty Campbell, probably
because it was located at the very heart of the Mississippi Historic District and
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developed by HOF when its shaky reputation was already declining further, was an
easy target for the neighborhood to rally around.
HOF’s property management staff had their work cut out for them with
properties like the Betty Campbell and the Maya Angelou Apartments. HOF originally
hired two property managers from its board; these managers proved ineffective and
were let go – causing a rift amongst staff and the board (Alexander, et al, 1996).
Subsequent efforts to hire professional property managers proved futile, as the salaries
that the organization could offer were below what other professional management
companies were offering. As a result, the property management side of HOF never
fully matured into a rigorous and professional part of the organization; however, the
property development side grew under “the constant pressure to be developing new
rental properties” (Pequeño interview: 1).
Property management problems were most evident at the Maya Angelou
Apartments and the Betty Campbell. These apartments were the sites of regular drug
sales; it appeared that tenants were directly involved with the activity and facilitated
the sales (Cross interview: 16). While neighbors were concerned for their own safety
because of the drug problems, HOF suffered ongoing economic losses because of the
increased maintenance and high tenant turnover. Apartment units regularly required
costly repairs, and the jerry-rigged construction of the projects, especially at the Maya
Angelou, compounded the organization’s inability to meet the needs of its tenants and
satisfy the safety concerns of the surrounding neighbors (Morgan interview: 12). This
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loss of neighborhood support and social capital created a feedback loop that HOF
could not escape.
In spite of this situation, HOF continued to acquire and develop new properties
at a fast pace. Just before the completion of the Betty Campbell, the organization
embarked on its first large-scale new construction project, the 64-unit Alberta
Simmons Plaza.70 In 1996, the group signed a development agreement with Union
Manor Management to develop a low-income senior housing apartment building with
commercial spaces on the ground floor. This development signaled a new life for that
part of Martin Luther King Jr. Blvd and a new challenge for HOF. The project’s
financing included not only multiple sources of funding for both the residential and the
housing parts, it also drew on the Low Income Housing Tax Credit for project capital
Figure 6-6
The Alberta Simmons Plaza

Photo by Author
70

The Betty Campbell had 10 housing units and a ground floor commercial space and was considered a
small project. Projects over 30 units were generally considered larger scale.

149

and signaled HOF’s foray into a realm of larger scale project development. Because of
the financial structure of the deal, this apartment complex was a separate entity from
HOF; it had its own governing board and separate property management, so that HOF
was not able to realize any ongoing income from the project after the completion of
development.
In addition to the aforementioned developments, HOF acquired three
properties through HUD’s Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident
Homeownership Act (LIHPRHA) Program that mandated that private developers, who
had taken advantage of federal tax credits to construct apartments beginning in the
early 1970s and subsequently utilized the Section 8 Voucher Program (mostly unitbased, as opposed to tenant-based vouchers) to subsidize the rents for their projects,
could not simply sell these apartment complexes on the open market when the tax
credits expired 20 years later. A new HUD mandate required these property owners to
offer the complexes to non-profit groups, in an effort to preserve affordable housing.
Several apartment complexes in the Portland area were eligible for this program, and
HOF acquired 4 complexes with a total of 100 units of housing in 1996.
Each apartment complex became its own Single Asset Entity (SAE), so that the
sponsoring non-profit would become the fiscal agent for each property. This meant
that HOF acted as a bridge between the property management company and HUD,
was responsible for convening board meetings, and was a repository for all required
paperwork; sponsoring non-profits were not allowed to receive any compensation for
these services per HUD regulations. One of those apartment complexes, the Martha
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Figure 6-7
The Martha Wells Court

Photo by the author

Wells Apartments, is located one block off of N. Mississippi Avenue. Always
incongruous with the single-family homes on the street, it was not inviting to begin
with, and drug dealers would regularly cut through the courtyard to the alley. The
apartments eventually became an eyesore and an ongoing source of neighborhood ire;
the fact that it was connected to Housing Our Families added to the organization’s
poor reputation both with neighbors and with HUD.
By 1996, HOF was undergoing some dramatic internal organizational
upheaval. A division between staff and the Executive Director became more
pronounced as HOF was in the process of determining how it wanted to grow with its
five-year strategic plan; the organization had grown very quickly between 1993 and
1996 – there were 2 staff in 1993 and 7 in 1996, but no clear personnel system in
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place. Executive Director Gretchen Dursch conceded that human resource issues were
not her strength, but also pointed out that the many development deals were
consuming the bulk of her time (Alexander, et al, 1996; Dursch interview: 9). As a
result, she was being pulled in several different directions as the organization grew. At
this point, HOF included management systems and procedures and how to grapple
with the property management issues that had plagued the organization in its new
strategic plan (HOF, 1995).
One of HOF’s missteps that contributed significantly to their property
management difficulties had occurred early on. HOF’s Board made a critical property
management decision to forgo police background checks and discount credit histories
in their tenant screening process (HOF, 1994; Dursch interview: 11; Fitzpatrick,
1999). This was at a time when the African American community had a particularly
contentious relationship with the Portland Police Bureau, and many Board members,
naïvely in retrospect, felt that these requirements would preclude those who deserved a
chance for housing (HOF, 1994; Willer interview: 5). The discounting of credit
histories was consistent with the group’s effort to house a marginalized population.71
What HOF did not realize was the number and depth of problems that their tenants
would have and the excessive wear and tear on the units (Schleiger interview: 9). The
result of these two policies combined with a poorly renovated or constructed building
was a high turnover of tenants, increased maintenance costs, and property destruction.
In the case of the Maya Angelou Apartments, it was necessary to re-renovate it fully in
71

As was often discussed at meetings, but never formally documented, the organization sought to create
housing for those who could not afford market rate rents, but either did not qualify for or could not
obtain a Section 8 voucher.
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2002, and again before the transfer of the property to PCRI in 2006 (Learn, 2001;
Fitzpatrick Interview: 9).
Coupled with the property management issues was a neighborhood perception
that the staff was “incompetent” (Morgan interview: 11). Part of HOF’s mission of
empowerment included the development of skills for women in the neighborhood. As
part of the implementation of these goals, HOF hired several women from the
neighborhood as organizers and/or administrators. Executive Director Gretchen
Dursch remembers the ineffectiveness of a particular staff member because of a lack
of experience: “she was able to build relationships with people and people liked her …
but she was not able to make things happen” (Dursch interview: 24). While neighbors
noted the organization’s good intentions, it was also clear to them that several of the
staff hired from the neighborhood were not able to up to the challenges of their
positions (Morgan interview: 11). The Board, on the other hand, was committed to the
idea of developing women’s skills to gain the experience necessary to gain real power
in their neighborhoods – this was what made the organization unique and drew this
initial group of women together (Schleiger interview: 5; Willer interview: 12).
However, this basic tenet did not always serve the best interests of the organization,
especially as the organization had taken on the responsibilities of being a landlord.
The need for a professional staff to run the more technical property
development and management side of the organization conflicted with the reality of an
inexperienced staff and came to a head in 1996 (Willer interview: 12). A
neighborhood resident who had been acting as property manager was let go, and the
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staff had several contentious retreats to work through a series of internal conflicts;
these conflicts also divided the Board of Directors, with several of the original
members leaving when their terms expired (Willer interview: 12). In 1997, the board
composition had changed – it reflected a larger neighborhood presence, and HOF
experienced the first of its organizational crises (HOF, 1997-1998).
Executive Director Gretchen Dursch had taken maternity leave and returned in
1998 to find a different organization. A few months later, the Board asked her to leave
permanently, with much bad blood between Dursch and several board members
(Dursch interview: 27). Dursch’s abrupt departure, too, left many questions in limbo –
and no way to answer them. Dursch’s forte had been housing development, and with
her departure, HOF’s development activities, and their associated revenue from
developer fees, dropped off significantly (see Figure 6-8, below, and Figure 6-9). The
housing development opportunities were becoming scarcer and more complex at this
time; without an experienced property developer at the helm, HOF forewent a number
of opportunities, and the volume of production was permanently curtailed.
One of the great sticking points for HOF as the organization took on more
responsibility and grew in complexity was its commitment to its consensus model.
HOF’s organizational model ostensibly focused on broad-based community inclusion,
a model that is slow and deliberate and not necessarily commensurate with the
decisions that were required as the organization had grown and professionalized.
While the process “provided an ideal framework during HOF’s early years for
fostering a respectful, inclusive atmosphere for discussion and decision-making about
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Figure 6-8
Housing Our Families Housing Production 1992-2001

Sources: Merrick and Abel-Hamid, 1998; McGee, 2005

the organization’s vision, mission, and policies”, it was not a sustainable model
because of the increasing complexities of decisions, especially concerning housing
development finance, and HOF shifted toward a more traditional style of leadership
and management (Smock, 1999: 6). This shift alienated several long-time members
because it undermined the very essence of the organization: creating a safe space
where a woman’s voice could be heard and valued.
One of the wonderful pieces of that process was, very simplistically,
getting the women who talked a lot to shut up and the women who didn’t
talk a lot to start feeling safe enough to voice their wisdom and talk
about what they knew; it was a phenomenal process because it really
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worked... to engage women in all different kinds of levels. So while we
were trying to empower women and build leadership in women who had
identified themselves as leaders, we were creating our vision of
ourselves, … and we made a decision that we were a women-only run
organization, (be)cause there wasn’t anything like that, and because the
model that we were using really supported women coming into their
own…
Schleiger interview: 2
This schism played out along racial lines in the structure of the Board of
Directors: those with more technical expertise were generally white, and those with
local social capital were generally black. Deferring decisions to those with expertise
steered the organization towards a more conventional model, rather than its original
consensus based model. This process was especially evident during board meetings –
board decisions were theoretically reached by consensus. However, key board
members’ opinions and when they were expressed in the dialogue played a role in
decisions. At each meeting, the group would sit in a circle, and each member would
speak. The person who spoke last had the often had greatest effect on the direction of
the subsequent vote. One board member reminisced that she would specifically choose
where she sat in a meeting, because the seating arrangement would most likely
determine how resulting votes would turn out; the words of the final person to speak
would have the most lasting impact on the group decision (Pequeño interview, p 1112).
By the late 1990s, HOF experienced declining neighborhood support and an
increased sense of outsider-ship, two circumstances that further undermined any sense
of solidarity that the organization had. In 1997, HOF had moved their offices into their
newly constructed Betty Campbell Building, an action that was intended to give them
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neighborhood presence and alleviate concerns about the organization and their tenants.
However, their choice to locate here, and subsequently close the shades and lock the
doors at all hours, was a perceived as an affront to the neighborhood and a denial of
their responsibility for the drug deals on Mississippi (Bauer interview: 8). Staff
members of HOF remember feeling out of place in the neighborhood. As businesses
that catered to new residents moved in to N. Mississippi Ave, HOF’s African
American staff felt increasingly ill at ease in what they perceived as their
neighborhood (Schleiger Interview: 11). For example, when the Fresh Pot coffee shop
opened across the street from the HOF offices, white staff members rejoiced in being
able to get a cup of coffee near their office; while black staff members would avoid
going there, as it was a “white people’s hang out” where they did not feel welcome
(Long interview: 17). The flip side of this was that white staff members had not
previously felt comfortable going to the NuRite Way Market, where black staff often
purchased food and beverages (Schleiger interview: 11). The fact that at all times at
least some staff members did not feel comfortable in the neighborhood where the
organization was based can be seen as a allegory for the lack of synchronicity between
the neighborhood and HOF.
In 2002, Cornelius Swart and Spencer Wolf released a documentary of the
neighborhood strife with HOF, Northeast Passage. Ostensibly conveying the stories of
individuals in the Boise neighborhood who were caught between the irresponsible
CDC and the forces of gentrification in the late 1990s, this movie fueled support for
the BNA and vilified HOF to a point where it was no longer able to develop properties
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in the Boise neighborhood (Swart and Wolf, 2002). A key factor in HOF’s downward
trajectory, the BNA and its membership represented an increasingly changing hostile
towards low-income housing developers in Inner North/Northeast Portland (Schleiger
Interview: 11).
When HOF began its work in the early 1990s, the BNA was composed of
primarily older African American homeowners. While this group was leery of HOF’s
work because it was composed of a “white women that lived outside the
neighborhood... They were used to dealing with NECDC, a group of black people who
were promoting homeownership. NECDC was reaching something that was an
ingrained goal in an older black generation’s mind: our thing is to help our younger
people buy a home” (Long interview: 18). Through HOF’s organizing efforts, the
neighborhood residents eventually became more comfortable working with HOF for
several years; however, this changed as they residents who were involved in the
neighborhood association changed (Long interview: 19; Morgan interview: 4; Smock
interview: 7). By the early 2000s, neighborhood organizations’ membership rosters
had changed dramatically and reflected the newer demographic composition of the
area; there was no institutional memory for supporting HOF, and, with the new, and
more active and vocal membership, the BNA used HOF as an example of what was
wrong with the neighborhood (Bauer interview: 6; Long interview: 19; Smock
interview: 11).
One of the reasons that HOF’s perceived outsider-ship was an issue for the
BNA in the early 1990s was the fact that a significant number of Board members were
158

lesbians. The early BNA members, albeit unorganized and less effective than later
members, were elderly black homeowners who were not comfortable with HOF’s
leadership. This early difference between the board and the neighborhood contributed
to the BNA’s ongoing skepticism of the organization. As a result of ongoing strife
between the BNA and HOF, the two groups worked out a Good Neighbor Agreement
(Housing Our Families, 1999a). This agreement was the result of mediation efforts
between the BNA and HOF and a response to the BNA’s Housing Preservation and
Development Policy that was intended to preclude HOF from developing any more
rental housing in the neighborhood - a direct blow for the organization as they were in
the pre-development phase of Fargo Row, a townhouse development just off the
Kerby St off-ramp at the south end of the neighborhood (Housing Our Families,
1999a). As a result of these interactions, HOF changed its policy of a women-only
board, and invited several active members of the BNA to join the board. Carl
Edwards, a Boise neighborhood resident, joined the board in May, 1999 (Housing Our
Families, 1999b).
HOF’s leadership also suffered in the late 1990s. After Gretchen Dursch was
asked to leave the organization in 1997, HOF suffered a significant blow. In 1998,
Interim Executive Director Barbara Willer discovered that the bookkeeper Kahlia
Durham had embezzled $20,000 while Dursch had been on maternity leave in 1997; as
a result of the impropriety, HUD became very concerned that their portion of HOF’s
funding had been “tainted”, and other funders were reticent to consider any new
projects of HOF’s, so that the organization’s cash flow from development
159

opportunities was severely restricted (Dursch interview: 23; Willer interview: 15).
Willer had only agreed to an interim position, and the Board eventually hired Joan
Miggins, a former board member, after a yearlong fruitless search (The Enterprise
Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999: 16). However,
Miggins “did not have the capacity or the skills to run the organization”, and HOF was
in a weakened position with scarce leadership and little cash flow (Cross interview:
13; Bauer interview: 6).
At this point, HOF was in a weak position financially: a PNDSC Financial
Analysis Report noted that HOF was heavily reliant on government funding for
operating support and had a bleak long term outlook (The Enterprise Foundation’s
Figure 6-9
Housing Our Families Net Income 1993-2002

Sources: Housing Our Families, 1997-2002.
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Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999).72 As a result of this financial
analysis, the City-initiated discussions for a merger of Inner North/Northeast CDCs,
referred to as the “Northeast Collaborative Approach Action Plan” began in earnest
(PNDSC Staff, 1999). HOF, Sabin, NECDC, and Franciscan Enterprise boards and
staff began to discuss the principles and procedures for such an undertaking, and
HOF’s development activities were further curtailed. Both their rental income and
grant revenues dropped, as a result of the chronic leadership turmoil, focus on merger
talks, and changing local development opportunities. As a result, HOF was in the red
for the first time.
In spite of the drop in revenue, HOF did not reduce staff or expenses in part
because of the pending merger (Figure 6-9, Figure 6-10). Staff turnover, entwined
with the leadership problems, added to the organizational disarray. The increase in
expenses in the late 1990s reflected an increase in consultant fees to make order from
the confusion that was necessary to satisfy the other merger participants. Because its
revenues could not cover its expenses, HOF’s asset to debt ratio (Figure 6-11) also
declined steeply, in spite of the increasing property values in the neighborhood and the
fact that it had completed a new eight-unit project in 1999. This decline further
weakened its position in the merger negotiations.

72

HOF, along with Sabin CDC, NECDC, and Franciscan Enterprise, received an “Enhanced Level of
Funding” from PNDSC (PNDSC Allocation Chart, 1998-1999).
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Figure 6-10
Housing Our Families Organizational Expenses 1994-2002

Sources: Housing Our Families, 1996, Housing Our Families, 1997-2002

Figure 6-11
Housing Our Families Asset to Debt Ratio 1995-2002

Sources: Housing Our Families, 1996, Housing Our Families, 1997-2002
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At this point, too, HOF’s Board of Directors, led by Janice Flowers, an African
American teacher who had grown up in the neighborhood, was floundering. The
dwindling financial position, and no clear remedy for it, pushed Flowers and the Board
to forge on with the merger talks and eventually dissolve the existing organization, as
it had alienated its surrounding neighborhood, was an anonymous landlord to much of
its tenantry, was failing to manage its existing properties adequately, had no
development opportunities on the horizon, and its leadership had “run out of gas”
(Sten interview: 11).
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CHAPTER 7.
CASE STUDY 4: SABIN COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

Sabin Community Development Corporation (Sabin CDC), formed in 1991 by
a group of concerned neighbors, was an “outgrowth of the Sabin Community
Association” and their work on the Albina Community Plan (Meisenhelter, undatedd). This group acquired its 501(c)(3) (non-profit) status in 1992 and endeavored to
address a host of issues including rising housing costs, diminishing neighborhood
diversity, high crime rates, and a lack of local job training. The main purpose of the
organization was to “keep resources and money in the hands of the community”
through developing low-income housing, job training and youth employment
programs, economic development, and commercial revitalization pieces (Meisenhelter
interview: 3). Probably the most programmatically diverse of the Inner N/NE
Portland’s CDCs, Sabin CDC “did everything from those arts, cultural things, to the
affordable housing, tenant support, resident organizing, tenant counsels, jobs and
social service support for our tenants, the rent to own piece, the commercial
revitalization, the computer labs, job search, special needs housing” and was the
closest thing to the form of a grassroots, geographically based CDC model of the five
organizations in Inner North/Northeast Portland (Meisenhelter interview: 3; Kelley
interview: 10; Sten interview: 9)
Diversity within its mission has continued to be a cornerstone of the
organization as both the surrounding neighborhood and the organization leadership
changed. In 2006:
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Sabin’s primary purpose was to make sure there was a stock of
affordable housing for all people within this neighborhood of change,
because we knew the change was coming. Secondly, we know that our
goal is to provide more than just a roof over your head. We know there
has to be accompanying services in order to get you from a renter with
us to homeownership, and to placing your children to send them off to
college or whatever works,
Fondren interview: 4
Sabin CDC’s service area includes “the Vernon neighborhood, the lowincome portions of Sabin Neighborhood and small adjacent potions of the King and
Concordia Neighborhoods” (Hoereth, 1998; Sabin CDC, 1996). The organization
participated in the Neighborhood Partnership’s early training sessions that enabled
this group of residents to form a CDC with a business plan and seed money to hire
staff. Because of the fear of losing the cultural and racially diverse neighborhood to
gentrification, affordable housing development became the cornerstone of Sabin’s
mission:
The Mission of Sabin CDC is to stabilize and improve the livability of
culturally diverse Portland neighborhoods by assuring the availability
of long-term affordable housing for its low and moderate income
residents, and by encouraging community partnerships for local
economic development, self-help projects, and youth and senior
programs.
www.SabinCDC.org
As a result, Sabin CDC, like other organizations in the adjacent
neighborhoods, began its broad based community efforts by redeveloping derelict
housing into affordable units. “We were very much wanting to secure a pool of long
term affordable housing, and that was affordable for families at 50% of median
family income, or below” (Meisenhelter interview: 1). Their foray into housing
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development began modestly, with the renovation of single-family houses that had
been acquired from another defunct non-profit developer (Meisenhelter, 1993; Sabin
CDC, 1995).
Because the neighborhood changes that occurred in Inner North/Northeast
Portland were rooted in both race and class, CDCs, especially those who were viewed
as the projects of white outsiders, were targets of resistance from black residents
within the community (Frater interview: 30). Sabin CDC staff members often
encountered animosity from black neighbors, especially in the early days
(Meisenhelter interview: 2). This status as an outsider and its accompanying
resentment was a common issue for the other CDCs as well – the downside of having
access to public dollars and publicized housing development.
Soon after procuring office space, Board chair Diane Meisenhelter assumed
the position of Executive Director and hired Jane Ediger, who had previously worked
at PCRI and was also a neighborhood housing activist, to run their housing
development programs (Ediger interview: 8; Sabin CDC, 1995). Under Ediger’s
direction, Sabin’s housing development capacity grew, and incorporated a land trust
model and a limited equity lease program, in addition to rental housing (Meisenhelter,
undated-a; Sabin CDC, 1996). This focus on development was reflected in both an
increased portfolio and new challenges for the organization. By 1996, Sabin CDC had
completed “54 units of housing ... and had 46 units in various stage of development”
(Sabin CDC, 1996; Figure 7-1). At that time, Sabin staff recognized that they were
“facing the challenge of moving from primarily developing single family, scattered166

Figure 7-1
Sabin CDC Housing Production 1993-2006

Sources: Sohl, 1995; Sabin CDC 1995-1997; Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2006.

site homes to beginning work on larger (apartment) complexes as well” (Sabin CDC,
1996). Sabin CDC, like their counterparts, initially re-developed existing singlefamily houses. As these opportunities soon proved both scarce and too costly, the
organization looked to the redevelopment of duplexes and small apartment
complexes. Sabin CDC’s largest construction projects were relatively modest: Otesha
Place, a new mixed use building at the corner of NE 15th and NE Alberta, that houses
the organization’s offices and 11 affordable apartments, and a seven-unit townhouse
development at the corner of NE 27th and NE Killingsworth.
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Figure 7-2
Otesha Place and Sabin CDC Offices

Photo by Author

Figure 7-3
Sabin CDC Housing NE Killingsworth St and NE 27th Ave

Photo by Author
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Through the federal Low Income Housing Preservation and Resident
Homeownership Act (LIHPRHA) program, Sabin acquired three apartment
complexes with a total of 49 units of affordable housing and continues to be the fiscal
agent for them today, thereby preserving a significant number of units in N/NE
Portland. These apartment complexes represent the largest holdings in Sabin’s
housing portfolio, and, in 1996, when BHCD first asked groups in North/Northeast
Portland to work together to mitigate an overlap of services, and Sabin, Housing Our
Families, and Franciscan Enterprises worked together to establish a series of
Neighborhood Network Centers (NNCs) in their recently acquired LIHPRHA
properties. These Centers were developed in conjunction with the LIHPRHA program
and were intended to provide residents of those apartment complexes, and other lowincome neighborhood residents, access to computer training and the Internet. In 1997,
these same organizations initiated discussions on a joint workforce development
program. This program was intended to utilize the technology of the NNCs and to
“provide pre-employment training and related support service workshops” so that
their collective tenantry could “get good services from workforce agencies that would
lead to living wage jobs” (Dursch, 1997).
In addition to its low-income rental housing programs, and as a part of its
holistic approach to community development, Sabin CDC initiated a number of other
types of housing programs: Limited Equity Lease and Land Trust programs for
homeownership, as well as transitional housing for women emerging from drug
rehabilitation programs. The Limited Equity Lease Program requires that prospective
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buyers lease homes for two years, so that they have an opportunity to “work on their
credit history, prepare for the responsibilities of homeownership, and to save their
portion of their down payment and closing costs,” and targets very low-income
buyers, those at or below 60% of the area’s Median Family Income (Meisenhelter,
undated-c).
Sabin CDC’s Limited Equity Lease Program was developed in conjunction with
the Vernon Neighborhood Action Group (VNAG). In 1993, VNAG approached Sabin
CDC to explore a partnership to address community concerns about problem
properties in their area. The two groups decide to utilize a lease purchase strategy to
promote neighborhood stabilization by redeveloping several vacant and abandoned
properties that VNAG had previously identified (Sabin CDC/VNAG Lease Purchase
Pilot Project, undated). This partnership was unique among CDCs - none of the other
groups responded as directly to a Neighborhood Association’s specific need as Sabin
did for Vernon. The concept of “limited equity” was especially important to Sabin’s
leadership because the neighborhood had begun to gentrify in the mid 1990s, as the
intent of this program was to prevent “speculation by homebuyers and assure
continued affordability” (Sohl, 1995).
Sabin CDC’s Land Trust program, the first of its kind in Portland, took
advantage of vacant lots in their target neighborhoods and built new infill houses, as
well as renovating existing housing stock (Ediger interview: 9). The land trust model
legally separates the land (and its value) from the value of the structure. The land is
placed in a community trust, and the buyer pays for the structure and any subsequent
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improvements that they make. When an owner chooses to sell his or her house, they
have a limited gain on the sale, so that the house will remain affordable in perpetuity
(Sabin CDC Land Trust Program Pamphlet, undated). This solution enabled several
families to enter into homeownership at a time in Portland when wages were not
keeping up with increased home values. Portland’s other Land Trust Program, the
Portland Community Land Trust, operates independently and works with several
CDCs in the area, but Sabin CDC’s Land Trust is the only specifically community
based one. A total of 16 housing units were developed under the Limited Equity
Lease and Land Trust programs (Figure 7-1).
The Ujima Project was a relatively short-lived effort to develop supportive
housing for women and their families, as they transitioned out of drug treatment
programs. This highly structured program sought to provide housing and services
such as drug counseling, parenting, and anger management classes, as well as job
training classes, for African American women (Perlman, 1994). While near and dear
to Diane Meisenhelter’s heart, this program encountered a number of difficulties from
NIMBYism; in spite of the fact that over 25 community organizations had initially
signed letters of support for the program and its location in the Sabin neighborhood,
property management difficulties and complaints from neighbors eventually shut
down (Meisenhelter, undated-e; Meisenhelter interview: 6). Sabin CDC sold the
property that housed the Ujima project in 2003 (Sabin CDC, 2004).
Sabin developed all of its rental housing units prior to 1998, when Jane Ediger
left the organization; at that point, the emphasis shifted from housing production to
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economic development and youth opportunity activities for several reasons: the local
and federal funding for housing had begun to dwindle, there were few vacant or
abandoned houses left in the neighborhood, vacant lots had become too expensive for
non-profits to develop into affordable housing, purchasing existing houses and
apartments on the open market was prohibitive, and, most importantly, the new
executive director, Felicia Allender-Brant, had a different focus from the earlier
leadership.
Sabin CDC’s housing production totals 108 units of rental housing, 16 land
trust houses, and four limited equity lease houses (see Figure 7-1). While other CDCs
managed their own rental units and continued to expand their housing development
expertise, Sabin contracted out both its property management and housing
development activities after 2000 (Fondren interview: 16). This shift in part reflected
the focus of the organization and the funding sources accessed. PDC provides projectbased funding, while the Collaborative of BHCD, Enterprise, and the Neighborhood
Partnership Fund provided operational support. Given that Sabin CDC was forced to
forgo funding from the Collaborative when it declined to proceed with the merger
process in 2001, it is no surprise that its focus, while already shifting towards
economic development and youth education programs, continued in that direction
because Allender-Brant had been successful in acquiring grants from sources outside
of the region (Fondren interview: 8; McLennan interview: 14; Sohl interview: 10
White interview: 9).
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Instead of seeking out new and larger housing development opportunities on its
own and in partnership with private developers, as several other CDCs have done,
Sabin has focused on youth education and training programs in part because of
leadership and staff enthusiasm and in part because of stiffer competition for
diminished housing development prospects in its service area. The limited production
levels ensured a small staff size (never more than twelve) that shrank to four persons
or less after the withdrawal from the merger process (Sabin Community Development
Corporation, 2003-2006). This has had mixed results: the organization is less visible
to the broader community, in part because they are focusing on the construction of
skills rather than the construction of housing, but they are less vulnerable to housing
market shifts and local housing funding priority shifts.
Sabin’s work outside of housing development began in 1995, when Sabin staff
worked with the merchants of Alberta Street in its most visible project, the Alberta
Corridor Plan. Sabin CDC initiated this strategy with the City of Portland as a way of
knitting together the concerns of neighborhood newcomers and long time residents
(Sharpe interview: 2). Begun as the Alberta Corridor Plan to revitalize the street into
a “prosperous, neighborhood-serving business district”, this endeavor initially
focused on youth, residential and commercial revitalization (Bureau of Planning,
undated-a). Eventually, Sabin CDC and other stakeholders split off into different
approaches: the Alberta Streetscape Improvement Plan and Sabin’s ongoing Youth
Employment Programs. The original steering committee of the Corridor Plan
struggled for membership in its first year, but in 1996, its workshops overflowed with
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participants (Bureau of Planning, undated-b). At the first street fair in 1997, though,
over 1500 people came to view the art galleries on a rainy Thursday evening (Bureau
of Planning, undated-b).
The Alberta Corridor Plan represented a new and different level of
engagement and production for Sabin CDC. The organization engaged a host of
diverse stakeholders: a number of bureaucracies (Portland Department of
Transportation, Oregon Department of Transportation, TriMet), neighborhood
business and property owners, old and new neighborhood residents. As the Plan was a
project of the City of Portland, a broader group of stakeholders was involved, and the
focus was on the “newcomers into the neighborhood” (Sharpe interview: 8).
As a result, Sabin saw their role in the long-term plan and interim projects diminish,
and a new non-profit organization, Art on Alberta, formed to coordinate the monthly
art walk and the publication of a map and directory of local businesses.
Roslyn Hill was one of the business owners who played an active role in both
the Alberta Corridor Plan and the Alberta Streetscape Improvement Plan. A long time
neighborhood resident, Hill had by 1995 redeveloped two buildings near the corner of
NE 15th and NE Alberta and had opened a coffee shop and art gallery in one of those
buildings (AARP, 2008; Barnett, 2007b). The Alberta Streetscape Plan committee
met at Hill’s coffee shop because “that was the only place that there was” on Alberta
(Sharpe interview: 9). Hill’s development expanded as she bought and sold property
(including a house from Sabin CDC [Fondren interview: 11; Sabin Community
Development Corporation, 2004]). Her development aesthetic, funky architecture
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with corrugated metal, siding set a tone for the rest of the street (Fondren interview:
6). Roslyn Hill has been recognized nationally for her contributions to the
revitalization of Alberta Street and continues to be one of the largest landholders on
the street (Barnett, 2007b; Herzog, 2000).
Sabin’s marginalization from the Alberta Corridor plan was indicative of the
shifting political power in the neighborhood, as Alberta Street was revitalized, and
new business owners and residents sought a greater role in their neighborhood. Diane
Meisenhelter laments Sabin CDCs role in encouraging gentrification, where “outside
forces got PDC money to do their buildings, and then it was like a little bit, it doesn’t
take very much before the ball really, really starts rolling fast” (Meisenhelter
interview: 17).
Sabin CDC was unable to capitalize on their role as the initiator of the
Corridor Plan in part because their ability to develop commercial projects that
would secure an ongoing grass roots presence was limited:
We should have secured those properties before we did, (because) we
weren’t into commercial revitalization and commercial development,
we were into housing development. There were city policies that
affected the housing (development) that they didn’t use in the
commercial realm, for instance. We tried to buy some commercial
property or at least explore the possibilities, and sometimes people who
had these vacant properties. They wouldn’t do anything about, or they
wouldn’t talk to you about, but they were just sitting there all boarded
up and stuff, and (the owners) were just sitting on them waiting until
they could make a killing on them. The City (missed the opportunity)
to level the playing field a little bit more in that area with some sort of
public good in mind down the road…
Meisenhelter interview: 19.
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The result of Sabin’s initial endeavor is the revitalization of a commercial strip that
caters to a different clientele: once-empty storefronts now house trendy shops and
restaurants that cater to the neighborhood newcomers. While only some of the
redevelopment has remained in long time residents’ hands, the overall improvement
is striking, and the age and race of those walking down the street has changed just as
significantly (Simmons interview: 1). Last Thursdays on Alberta, the organized
gallery walk, is one of the most visible results of the planning efforts: a gallery open
house and street fair that has become so popular that additional traffic control
measures are instituted on those days (Bales, 2008). “Alberta Street represents the
new population not the old population, but on the other hand, there wasn’t a lot there
before, there was things there but there wasn’t a lot there, and by and large it catered
to a select number of people, obviously more the black community, there was
remnants of the old black community, and a lot of boarded up old buildings, a lot of
unused space” (Sharpe interview: 4, Barnett, 2007a).
These days, long-time residents complain that they are not welcomed, either
by design or default, in many of the newer establishments and still must go out of the
neighborhood for restaurants and entertainment:
But I have trouble with some of the changes because (of the way) it
used to be... As a woman of color it hasn’t changed for me; Alberta
Street is really weird, and it’s nice, it’s beautiful. I go there to get my
hair done, believe it or not, but it’s like if you’re a woman of color,
anybody of anybody of color, I don’t feel comfortable, I really don’t. I
feel out of place. They’re ... looking at you like you’re the second class
citizen, and I want to say, Honey, I was here before you was even born,
I’ve seen the ups and downs... (But now), we’re welcome I’m sure, but
I don’t feel the closeness of the welcome, I feel left out. (It’s) good that
my kids, my grandkids will be welcome, but I feel like (the new
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residents are) just taking over and want to change a lot of things; a lot
of things are good changes, change is always good if it’s done right...
It’s like we’re going so far, and what amazes me, I don’t drink but I did
(laughs), oh I did, but this wine stuff and all of that, to me that’s just
like putting something that’s not supposed to be in our neighborhood,
the wine tasting, I guess the wine is so high tail, we as the colored can’t
go in there and buy it.
Simmons interview: 2.
While the neighborhoods surrounding Sabin were changing, the organization
itself was undergoing a number of changes, both in terms of structure and finances.
As local funding diminished towards the end of the 1990s, and Sabin shifted gears to
take advantage of other programs and revenues, its overall financial picture shifted as
well. Figures 7-2 – 7-5 depict the financial history of Sabin CDC. Figure 7-2 shows
Figure 7-4
Sabin CDC Organizational Support 1993-2006

Sources: Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1996-2006; Sabin CDC, 1993-1997.
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the levels of organizational support and reflects an early reliance on BHCD and NPF
funding, as well as the waning levels of federal support. Sabin’s decline in support
from 1998 onward was noted by PNDSC staff as a key indicator of its financial
instability, a key reason for its inclusion in merger discussions (The Enterprise
Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999). The most
dramatic drop in Organizational Support, though, occurred when Sabin CDC
withdrew from the Merger process. In 2002, the local funding of the organization all
but ceased. This withdrawal of local support had a broad effect on the organization as
reflected in Figure 7-5.
Figure 7-5
Sabin CDC Net Income 1993-2006

Sources: Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2006, Sabin CDC, 1993-1996.
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In order to sustain the organization, Sabin CDC sold a total of six properties
between 2001 and 2006 (Sabin Community Development Corporation, 2001-2006).
Because of the increase in neighborhood property values, the property sales in 2006
enabled the organization to have a positive cash flow for the first time since 1999.
The trend of selling former rental properties does not bode well for the future of the
organization (its rental income has declined by $35,000 since 2003; while it is
contradictory to its mission and decreases its revenue in the long run, the sale of a
housing unit is a stop gap measure – and a way that this organization was able to take
advantage of the rising neighborhood housing prices to keep itself afloat. However,
this trend of selling a property or two every few years has persisted as the
organization continues to struggle internally and with its outsider status.
As a result of the home sales, too, the overall asset valuations for the
organization declined (Figure 7-6), in spite of the fact that real estate prices have
continued to rise in the area. The asset valuations are also indicative of the rise in
property values in the neighborhood and the shift in development activity from
affordable housing development, seen in the rapid increase in units and their value in
the early and mid 1990s, to the leveling off of Sabin’s participation in the housing
development market in the late 1990s.
Sabin CDC’s revenue came from a variety of sources. Early on, most of the
revenue was operating support via BHCD, NPF, and the Enterprise Foundation,
developer fees, and small grants from foundations like the Meyer Memorial Trust and
the McCauley Foundation (Sabin CDC, 1997). These revenues increased as the
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organization grew, developed more housing, and took on projects like the Alberta
Street Corridor. In 1999, Felicia Allender-Brant and Craig Fondren shifted the focus
to more youth opportunity and education programs and stabilized the rental income,
so that they were able to weather the loss of support from the Collaborative (Fondren
interview: 8; Sohl interview: 10).

Figure 7-6
Sabin CDC Asset Valuations 1997-2006

Source: Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2006.
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Figure 7-7
Sabin CDC Gross Revenue 1993-2006

Source: Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2006, Sabin CDC, 1993-1996.

While Sabin’s finances have been somewhat inconsistent, its leadership has
been fairly consistent and a clear reflection of the organization’s level of involvement
in the neighborhoods. The Board of Directors, Executive Director, and Staff have
been primarily neighborhood residents. Sabin’s first executive director, Diane
Meisenhelter, held that position for almost 7 years. During that time she shared
executive director duties with Jane Ediger, whose focus had been housing
development. Meisenhelter left in early 1998, and Topaz Faulkner was hired as an
Interim Executive Director (Ediger remained through late 1998) while the
organization searched for a permanent replacement (Meisenhelter interview: 2). The
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Board hired Felicia Allender-Brant in 1998, a relative outsider; she remained with the
organization through 2006. Allender-Brant was originally from Portland, but had
been working on the East Coast in the early 1990s, where she had developed strong
ties to several social service organizations including the United Way, Big Brothers
and Big Sisters, and the YWCA (University of the District of Columbia, 2007). She
capitalized on these ties when Sabin CDC withdrew from the merger process and
sought funding elsewhere.
Sabin’s board roster has continually reflected the changing neighborhood
(Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2005; Sabin CDC, 1994-1996).
The founding board represented a “broad cross section of the community. Over twothirds of the Board are low income, and over half the Board is African American”
(Meisenhelter, undated-d). While primarily neighborhood homeowners, the board has
been and continues to be both diverse and primarily neighborhood based. Sabin has
had a fair amount of Board continuity, both a benefit and a detriment for the
organization (Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2005). A benefit
because Board Members were familiar with the organization and did not require
training and time to acquaint themselves with the policies and projects of the
organization. A detriment because often the Board represented the neighborhood
from a moment in time, and in the late 1990s and early 2000s, those moments were
fleeting, as the neighborhood experienced gentrification and rampant housing
speculation, so that there was what felt like a continuous demographic shift (Fondren
interview: 12).
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As the neighborhood changed to a wealthier, whiter demographic, the board
evolved and began to draw on experts, both black and white, moving into
neighborhood, as well as long time residents, and reflected the changing racial
composition of the neighborhood. The ensuing board expertise and corporate
connections helped to refocus Sabin’s priorities through a number of tumultuous
years following their withdrawal from a City mandated merger process (Fondren
interview: 8). For example, one Board Member worked for Microsoft, and through
her efforts, Sabin CDC acquired computers and software that enabled both the
Neighborhood Network Centers and the Education Video Project to provide
opportunities for low-income neighborhood residents. These projects also represent
some of the different partnerships that Sabin CDC capitalized on as it moved away
from housing development (Fondren interview: 8).
In addition to its Executive Directors, there were key staff members who had
an impact on the direction of the organization. Craig Fondren, whose latest title is
Director of Economic Development, was a driver behind Sabin CDC’s youth outreach
and education programs; his arrival in 1995 signaled the beginnings of the shift in the
focus of the organization:
I came in to do programs and services to kind of expand what we were
doing with our affordable rental housing and affordable other units to
design some homeownership programming, educational programming,
which I think were both very successful, but then also expand on our
partnerships as well as grant writing and foundation research.
Fondren interview: 1.
Because of Sabin’s ongoing work with Franciscan Enterprise and Housing
Our Families and the Collaborative’s desire to eliminate the competition for funding
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in Inner North/Northeast Portland, these three CDCs were set to merge to form
Albina CDC in 2000;73 however, at the 11th hour, Sabin called a meeting of its
membership and withdrew from the merger process that the Board had previously
agreed to (Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas, 2003). Fondren was a pivotal player in organizing
Sabin’s membership vote that ultimately led to their withdrawal from the merger
process because he felt strongly about Sabin’s status as a membership organization.
He saw “the merger of Northeast CDCs (as) orchestrated from downtown not from
the community...” and reiterated that the “membership told us we don’t want you to
be a part of that, we went through the whole thing of all the meetings, and the studies,
we went through all that, but our membership said that this is a good idea” (Fondren
interview: 7). Others, both inside and outside of the Collaborative, feel that Fondren
“orchestrated that outcome” (White interview: 9). Given the fact that the organization
formed from the merger (Albina CDC) ultimately failed, Sabin CDC’s withdrawal
from the merger process ultimately saved them from the same fate.
With this withdrawal, though, Sabin entered into a new realm. The political
fallout from this bold move was significant and is remembered ten years later. Local
funding for operating expenses all but ceased and has not been actively sought since
then, but Sabin was fortunate enough to have an Executive Director, Felicia AllenderBrant, whose priorities reached beyond housing development. In addition to selling
houses, Allender-Brant garnered key grants from national organizations such as the
United Way, so that while Sabin’s rental and development income decreased, their
program service revenue actually increased substantially between 2001 and 2006
73

A more in depth discussion of the merger process can be found in Chapter 9.
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(Fondren interview: 8; Sabin Community Development Corporation, 2001-2006).
This subsequent shift in funding sources ensured that it would remain a smaller
organization. When combined with Sabin’s affordable housing, the emphasis on
educational programs both enabled and encouraged low-income families, albeit a
limited number, to remain in the neighborhoods. In the middle part of the decade,
Sabin seemed to have overcome some critical hurdles in establishing and maintaining
neighborhood ties and weaning itself from local development-oriented funding. At
Sabin CDC’s 15th Anniversary Party in 2006, various funders and politicians attended
– at least giving the appearance that some of the animosity had subsided.
Sabin CDCs current presence in the neighborhood, though, is muted. Its
previously higher profile role in the Alberta Street Fair and Last Thursday events has
been overshadowed as the events, created for and by the creative community that
initiated the gentrification process, have taken on a life of their own (Mitchell, 2006).
The results of the youth education programs and economic development activities
have manifested themselves in very different ways. The youth education programs
have sponsored summer internships, filmmaking classes, and business community
partnerships for teens to gain work experience and focus to either go on to college or
find gainful employment (Fondren interview: 16; Stimson, 2009). These programs,
while empowering to its participants, no longer focus on bringing neighbors together,
as the Alberta Corridor Project had. Combined with Sabin’s minimal new housing
development, often an organization’s most visible neighborhood activity, their
visibility in the neighborhood has lulled (Andrews interview: 7). Former Executive
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Director Diane Meisenhelter lives 5 blocks from the Sabin CDC office and was not
aware of Sabin’s current projects and programs (Meisenhelter interview: 3).
“Today’s neighborhood does not know who the heck we are,” surmises Craig
Fondren (Fondren interview: 17). Sabin, in its “streamlined” position as tenant
service provider and advocate, is not a visible presence in the broader neighborhood;
its limited presence at neighborhood-wide events and the organization’s limited
resources in recent years does not bode well for the organization’s future.
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CHAPTER 8
CASE STUDY 5: PORTLAND COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
INITIATIVES

Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives (PCRI) was the brainchild of
future City Commissioner Erik Sten, then aide to Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury.
The result of neighbors clamoring for the City to resolve the issues that resulted from
the bankruptcy and indictment of the owners of the Dominion Capital, PCRI was
specifically created by the City of Portland in 1992 to renovate and manage the 354
housing units of the tainted Dominion Capital portfolio. Dominion Capital’s owners,
Geoffrey Edmonds and Cyril T. Worm, had amassed their portfolio by inflating
appraisal values and offering financing that included a complex series of secondary
transactions associated with each loan; as a result, they were arrested and subsequently
sued for damages by the State of Oregon. Worm and Edmonds filed for bankruptcy in
response to the lawsuit, and their creditors were left with a legal mess of entangled
ownership and housing that was worth less than what they had invested in it (Lane and
Mayes, 1990; Lane, 1990a; Lane, 1990b). In addition, many of the houses had blatant
building code violations that rendered them uninhabitable (Lane and Mayes, 1990;
Kraus interview: 11).
The Dominion Capital scandal was first reported by Dee Lane in The
Oregonian in 1990 in her expose, “Blueprint for a Slum”. This three part series of
articles detailed the debacle, the endemic neighborhood redlining and lack of
regulatory oversight, and spurred the City of Portland to take action. Dominion
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Capital, funded by mostly out of state investors, had acquired significant numbers of
single family houses to sell on contract to homebuyers, many of whom were unable to
qualify for conventional financing, either due to the location of the property or their
own credit limitations, or both (Lane, 1990b). If an individual wanted to buy a home
in any of the Albina neighborhoods at that time, they had very few choices because of
the combination of bank lending reluctance and low home values. Banks were
unwilling to loan on properties worth less than $30,000, because they would not make
a profit on the loan. The average property value in Inner North/Northeast Portland at
that point in time was approximately $25,000. Dominion Capital swept in to this
vacuum and provided loans, albeit under false pretenses; the company offered to
finance their properties for buyers, but their financing packages included fraudulent
appraisals, estoppel deeds, and balloon payment requirements that were not clearly
noted (Lane and Mayes, 1990).74 Even after Dominion Capital declared bankruptcy,
the holders of the 1st mortgages sought to foreclose on the homebuyers – and offered
loans at 17% interest rates as a way of avoiding foreclosure (Lane and Mayes, 1990).
The City of Portland stepped in and sought to buy out the investors (Edmonds and
Worm had rescinded their interest in the properties). A local consortium of real estate
investors led by Michael Debnam had tried as well to bid on the properties but were
rebuffed by the City (Axley, 1992; Messinger, 1991; Stewart interview: 14). The
negotiations between the City of Portland and the non-Dominion Capital investors
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An estoppel deed contains more than one property on a single deed. With multiple properties on a
single deed, clear title to a single property was nearly impossible (Stewart interview: 15).
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went on for about a year with the investors reluctantly relinquishing their interest in
the portfolio of houses to PCRI (Pickett, 1991; Mayes, 1991; Lane, 1992a, 1992b).
Given that PCRI’s original housing portfolio was primarily single family houses
that were spread out over a fairly large geographic area (27 different neighborhoods),
their undertaking would require a tremendous amount of financial and property
management finesse. The fact that this was a City backed effort was a tremendous
political risk for its proponents, Gretchen Kafoury and her chief assistant, Erik Sten
(Fitzpatrick interview: 10; Stewart interview: 14). During the negotiations for the
property acquisition, parties interested in buying the properties warned Sten that PCRI
would “find itself hopelessly in trouble as it tries to digest this large (sic) an operation”
(Messinger, 1991). Because the City’s approach had never been tried, there was plenty
of skepticism and expectation that the effort would ultimately fail.
The financing for this endeavor was a heretofore-untested combination of
public and private money, an approach that neither the City of Portland nor any of the
lenders had significant experience with. The bulk of the money was a $12.43 million
line of credit, at below market interest rates, from a consortium of lenders led by US
Bank. This loan was secured by the State of Oregon’s entire allocation of Affordable
Housing Tax Credits for 1992 and a Section 108 Loan from the City of Portland
(Kiyomura, 1992; PCRI, 1993; Kelley interview: 2).75 Yielding to the political
pressure to issue such a large loan to an untested organization was evidence of the
banking community’s commitment to improving their Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) and Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) ratings and the political will of
75

A Section 108 Loan is guaranteed by future local Community Development Block Grant Funding.
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City Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury and her aide Erik Sten and their commitment to
championing affordable housing (Frater interview: 20).
The line of credit was divided into property acquisition ($10 million) and
property renovation ($2.43 million) (City Recorder, 1992). The extent of the property
renovations was somewhat unknown at the time of the securing of the properties
(Fitzpatrick interview: 5). As the portfolio was being acquired, assessments were
being made of the individual properties to determine the extent of the renovations
required, but Craig Kelley, PCRI’s first construction manager, remembers “nobody
had any idea what they were getting into … they were literally driving by homes, and
before they acquired the portfolio saying that house needs this much work” (Kelley
interview: 5). Kevin Kraus, former construction manager for REACH CDC who
volunteered to help out with the assessments, recalls his inspections of a number of the
houses and that “there were some pretty abysmal dwellings that needed a lot of work”
(Kraus interview: 11). It became clear that very few if any of the rental houses were in
good condition, and the bulk of the portfolio required at least a moderate amount of
rehabilitation work.
The first order of business for PCRI, though, was to stabilize 70+ fraudulent
land sale contacts (Kafoury, 1993a; Ediger interview: 3; Fitzpatrick interview: 1). Guy
Alverson and Jane Ediger were hired to clarify and clean up these contracts in order to
relieve the investors of any lasting legal and financial interests they may have had in
the properties (Ediger interview: 2). Many of the residents who held these contracts
were not “bankable”, so US Bank representatives went out into the community and
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wrote up new mortgages for those who were “bankable” and extended new land sale
contracts to those who weren’t (Ediger interview: 3). While PCRI’s staff was involved
with this aspect of the portfolio, the rental houses remained in a state of limbo; many
were uninhabited and boarded up, while others had residents who were living in often
substandard conditions (Kelley interview: 2). Because Dominion Capital was
originally set up to sell properties and not necessarily to manage them, they had
become unintentional landlords when they foreclosed on a property; often, units were
not re-saleable without a “significant investment”, so they remained rental units
(Fitzpatrick interview: 4).
During this initial flurry of activity, PCRI’s Board of Directors was conducting
a national search for a permanent Executive Director. In 1994, Maxine Fitzpatrick
was hired and has been with the organization ever since. Fitzpatrick came to Portland
from Milwaukee, Wisconsin where she had been responsible for several housing
programs (Fitzpatrick interview: 6). She has steered the organization through the
uncertainty of its early years and is well respected by both her peers and funders for
her persistence in stabilizing and managing the original portfolio (Benjamin interview,
p 9; White interview: 9). The fact that PCRI has had only one director in its existence
is both a strength and a weakness: a strength because Ms. Fitzpatrick has established
strong relationships with funders, neighborhood leaders, and other CDC staff, a
weakness because there will come a time when she will be moving on, and that
transition for the organization will be difficult, even with the most astute planning,
because of the duration of her tenure (Guajardo, 2009b).
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When Fitzpatrick arrived, she had a two-pronged approach to running PCRI:
stabilize the rental portfolio and build the capacity of the organization. She hired staff
specifically to take on the task of renovating properties and establishing property
management standards and policies. PCRI’s staff has morphed with the transition of
the state of the portfolio and in response to available funding. There were three
construction managers from 1994-1997: Craig Kelley, then fresh out of college, and
Michael Gardner who had similar experience ran the major rehab projects, while
former contractor Michael Quinn ran the moderate rehab projects (Kelley interview:
2).
PCRI was initially hampered by the rental homes’ numerous building code
violations and its limited initial housing rehab budget (Lane, 1992b; Kraus interview:
12). The renovation process proceeded modestly (50 rehabs in 4 years) as the staff
grappled with the condition of the properties and their own learning curves. In
addition, one of the goals for the organization was to utilize neighborhood based
contractors as a part of an overall economic development scheme; however, this goal
became an impediment because staff were unable to find experienced contractors to
complete the work within their limited budgets (Kelley interview: 4). Most of the
CDCs were similarly making a concerted effort to hire smaller, neighborhood
contractors to complete the rehab work; in many cases it was the contractors’
introduction to paperwork that was more than the “back of the envelope” level of
sophistication, so that they were “building capacity” along with the PCRI staff about
the requirements of working on a project that had some public oversight (Loving,
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2001; Kelley interview: 4). Because of the dearth of experienced contractors, PCRI’s
need for internal capacity building, and the backlog of houses in need of repair, some
units remained boarded up for several years. This lack of progress irritated some
neighbors who realized that their opportunities for buying houses in their
neighborhood were limited as surrounding property values began to rise (Stewart
interview: 21).
PCRI moved forward with initial renovation projects until the US Bank Line of
Credit, after one extension, reached its limit in 1997-98 (Kelley interview: 3). At that
time, PCRI shifted its focus from portfolio stabilization to the establishment of
management practices that would ensure the longevity of the portfolio and the
organization. In order to streamline and maintain its remaining portfolio, PCRI
divested itself of several houses that were too expensive to renovate or too far flung to
manage effectively; one of the early core tasks of the organization was to develop a
business plan and to establish criteria “by which PCRI should consider selling versus
trying to maintain as affordable rentals” (Fitzpatrick interview: 4). By 2000, though,
the selling of houses did add to the problem of gentrification, as 6 of the 15 units sold
between 1997 and 2000 were resold within 6 months at a substantial profit (Jaquiss,
2000).
During this time period, the other CDCs in Inner North/NE Portland began to see a
drying up of development opportunities and began to focus on more sophisticated
multi-unit developments, the acquisition of LIHPRHA properties, and the
development of more tenant service based programs. In 2000, PCRI reinvigorated its
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housing development programs with the hiring of Valerie Garrett who was both a
licensed architect and experienced project manager. Garrett expanded PCRI’s
portfolio to include PCRI’s only new-construction projects, oversaw the renovation of
Park Terrace, and facilitated the development of homes for child care providers.
When Garrett left in 2004, PCRI’s housing portfolio consisted of 366 units of housing,
205 single family houses, and 161 multi-family units (McGee, 2004). During its
existence, PCRI had only divested itself of a total of 30 units: 6 homes sold on the
open market and 24 sold to low-income tenants (Jaquiss, 2000).
Figure 8-1
Park Terrace Apartments

Photo by Author

Initiated in 1999, the acquisition of the Park Terrace apartments was one of the
high points of PCRI’s Executive Director Maxine Fitzpatrick’s tenure (Fitzpatrick
interview: 2). Park Terrace is an 88 unit apartment complex located in the Humboldt
neighborhood. Its previous owner had taken advantage of tenants with HUD’s Section
8 voucher program to populate the complex; these tenants had started to organize in
1992 to combat “harassment effort of management” (Portland Community
Reinvestment Initiatives, 2002a).
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Park Terrace was a unique project in that it was one of the first “preservation
projects” completed in the City of Portland. The City Council had passed an
“Affordable Housing Preservation Ordinance” in 1998 that stated “ owners of Federal
Preservation Projects who have decided to “opt out” of their contracts” must notify the
City of their intent and first negotiate with the City, or its designee, to sell the property
in order to maintain a supply of affordable housing (City Recorder, 1998; City of
Portland, 1998). The subsequent time frame for maintaining affordability (where
tenants pay no more than 30% of their income for rent and utilities) is 60 years (City
of Portland, 1998). In PCRI’s case, Park Terrace not only required substantial rehab,
but also was a foray into a new level of property management – a multi-family
apartment complex with a mix of unit-based Section 8 vouchers and market rate units
(McGee, 2004).
PCRI’s instant housing portfolio catalyzed its organizational capacity building.
While it had an initial staff of 8, three of those people were construction managers in
charge of the moderate and whole house rehab programs (Kelley interview: 4). As
time went on, PCRI’s original US Bank line of credit began to dwindle, and its focus
expanded beyond the physical stabilization. As a result, PCRI’s staffing became more
diversified and involved with property management, tenant services, and child care
development programs. Marni Vlahos was hired in 1994 to initiate PCRI’s childcare
programs. Under Vlahos’s leadership, PCRI’s childcare program flourished into three
parts: the Parents Child Care Network, the development of homes for small family
childcare businesses, and an emergency scholarship fund (Meyer, et al, 2003).
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Figure 8-2
PCRI Rental Housing Unit Acquisition 1993-2006

Sources: Merrick and Abel-Hamid, 1998; Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2002a and
2006a.

Working in conjunction with the Peninsula Children’s Center, PCRI staff have
expanded these programs as a part of their tenant service package and have worked to
incorporate these programs a model into its holistic tenant services. Access to
childcare programs became a cornerstone of PCRI’s tenant services, and served as the
basis for moving PCRI from a low-income housing development and management
agency into a model other CDCs strive to follow (Warner interview: 26).
By 1999, as other CDCs in the area were struggling to find new development
projects (and their associated fees to help keep the organizations afloat), PCRI was
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enjoying a fairly consistent revenue stream from its properties, in addition to the
developer fees from the Park Terrace development. The time that Fitzpatrick had
Figure 8-3
PCRI Childcare House

Photo by Author

spent initially to solidify the organization was beginning to pay off – but perhaps even
more beneficial was the low cost basis on the portfolio. PCRI had acquired the bulk of
its portfolio when the real estate market was at its nadir (approximately
$30,000/house); hence, the debt cost was very low, so that rents could remain low, and
even intermittent higher vacancy rates or unit repair would not adversely impact the
organization’s cash flow to the extent that they would be forced to sell properties or
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explore other avenues to maintain the staff and services (Sten interview: 9).76 Hence,
PCRI’s solid financial position has allowed the organization some latitude when
choosing new projects.
Figure 8-4
PCRI Revenues from Rental Income
and Development Fees 1995-2006

Sources: Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 2003a, 2004c, 2005b,
2006c.

One of the avenues that PCRI chose to pursue was development that addressed
green building practices. In addition to Park Terrace, PCRI completed 10 additional

76

PCRI’s housing revenues are based on a combination of rental income and developer fees for major
renovation and new construction projects (which have been somewhat limited in recent years). They
reflect both the availability of public money and property for development and the economy as a whole.
Development activity had its ebbs and flows, while rental income, once the units were stabilized,
remained somewhat consistent, although not a reflection of the increased market rents, due to the
income and rent restrictions necessary to be.
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construction projects in 2003, under Construction Manager Valerie Garrett’s auspices.
The Russet Morris Green Plexes and the Fab Four Green Building Rehabs were
constructed with particular attention given to green building principles (Portland
Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2003b).77 These developments represented a
new direction for affordable housing: a greater investment in up-front building costs
with higher quality and more efficient and less toxic systems and materials. This
investment would pay off in the long run for both management and tenants; for
management in lower replacement costs and greater longevity and for tenants in lower
utility bills and a healthier environment. Greener building principles had been
encouraged by PDC, the main funder of development projects; however, PDC did not
increase its funding commensurate with the increased costs of green building, so
groups like PCRI were pushed to seek more creative financing of these projects,
especially the smaller ones with fewer economies of scale78.
In 1999, the Collaborative asked the CDCs of Inner North/NE Portland to enter
into discussions of ways to consolidate their organizations. The Collaborative’s
rationale was that they could no longer continue to fund a total of 6 organizations that
were overlapping each other in terms of service delivery and were competing for a
limited number of development opportunities (PNDSC Staff, 1998; Farnum, 2003;
Oliver, 2000). PCRI’s board decided to not participate because Fitzpatrick was very
77

The Morris Green Plexes were constructed on sites that PCRI had already owned, so their addition to
the portfolio offset the loss of the previous unit that was torn down. They also represented an increase in
density for the sites from 2 units to 5. The green building practices utilized included the mitigation of
lead based paint, the use of low energy light fixtures and appliances, low VOC paints, natural flooring
materials, and higher efficiency furnaces and water heaters (Portland Community Reinvestment
Initiatives, 2003b).
78
Green Building practices are now standard for publicly funded affordable housing development.
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leery of the mandate and “it wouldn’t cripple the organization” to forgo that funding
(Fitzpatrick interview: 7). By staying out of the fray of the organizational merger
process, PCRI was able to stay focused on its property management, restructure the
financing on many of its units, to explore homeownership opportunity programs, and,
unknowingly, to place themselves in a position to acquire Albina CDC’s units when it
foundered in 2004 (Rudman interview: 9; White interview: 9).
PCRI’s housing portfolio was both its greatest challenge and its greatest asset.
Acquired when property values were very low, PCRI’s portfolio has only increased in
value (Figure 8-5); one of the organization’s great conundrums, though, is how to take
advantage of the equity that PCRI has in its portfolio (Rudman interview: 9).
Figure 8-5
PCRI Asset Valuations 1999-2006

Sources: McGee, 2004; Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b,
2003a, 2004b, 2005b, 2006b, 2006b.
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Leveraging the equity allowed PCRI to acquire properties like Park Terrace, but
Fitzpatrick is keenly aware of the danger of encumbering the properties with debt
because the margins between adequate cash flow and indebtedness are very slim
(Fitzpatrick interview: 1). It should be noted that the Asset to Debt Ratio grew at a
uniform pace until the acquisition of the Albina CDC Portfolio in 2006 (Figure 8-6).
Figure 8-6
PCRI Asset to Debt Ratio 1999-2006

Sources: Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 2003a, 2004c, 2005b,
2006b; Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2004a and 2006c.

With PCRI’s portfolio in good shape, Fitzpatrick turned her attention to a problem
that had become more magnified as the surrounding neighborhood had gentrified:
minority homeownership (Fitzpatrick interview: 11; Housing and Community
Development Commission, 2004; Malloy interview: 13). Earlier, she had been part of
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an advisory committee that had recommended funding for such a program – and she
expanded PCRI’s expertise to include homeownership opportunities as one of her
tenant service goals. The minority homeownership program was established in
response to the gap in homeownership rates - 38% of African American households
are homeowners versus 59% of white households (Guerrero, 2004; Housing and
Community Development Commission, 2004). Begun in 2004, shelved in 2007, and
reinvigorated in 2010, PCRI’s homeownership program was not been nearly as
successful as either its rental housing or its childcare initiatives, in part because of it
was established at the height of the real estate market. PCRI established an Individual
Development Account (IDA) program to assist participants (mainly from its own
tenantry) in saving for a down payment, as well as financial counseling and education
about the home buying process (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2004a;
Malloy, 2010; www.pcrihome.org, 2010). The Portland City Council allocated
substantial funding to this endeavor and prioritized minority homeownership in the
face of one of the hottest real estate markets in the country. In its first year, only one
family was able to navigate the system to buy a home; however, in its second year, 11
tenants became first time homebuyers, while “more than 80 residents were counseled”
(Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2005a).79
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By contrast, the Portland Housing Center, a local nonprofit that assists first time homebuyer
education programs, foreclosure prevention, and financial counseling, has assisted more than 5,500
individuals since 1991 with homeownership process (www.portlandhousingcenter.org) . This program,
and its public support, has since foundered, due to the reorganization of the Housing Department of the
Portland Development Commission (the program administrator) with the Bureau of Housing and
Community Development, but more importantly due to its establishment at the height of the housing
market.
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Success was not a given with PCRI. They had weathered a number of
controversies with both the neighbors and the local press, in part because of its
position as a publicly created and partially publicly funded agency. Because of its
initial high profile, PCRI could have been a magnet for criticism, but it managed to go
about its business, in part because it did not complete any large flashy new
construction projects that inevitably drew the attention of the neighbors and the press.
Mike Andrews, formerly of the Enterprise Foundation, gives credit to the efforts to
stabilize the portfolio, rather than expand it with new construction projects, as the
reason for PCRI’s low-key endurance (Andrews interview: 9).
However, the organization did not escape all scrutiny. In 2000, an article in
Willamette Week criticized PCRI’s personnel costs and other policies; this article
stated that PCRI’s personnel costs had increased 140% since 1993 – a reflection of not
only the increased numbers of staff, but also its professionalization (Jaquiss, 2000).
This professionalization of staff was required as both the organization and projects
became more diverse and complex and the fact that all property management was
handled in-house (Fitzpatrick interview: 4). Childcare programs, resident services,
property development, management and maintenance were amended to include
homeownership services in 2004. More importantly, though, the creation of the
positions of Deputy Director and Human Resources/Office Manager reflect a change
in the structure of the organization to a broader management configuration, one that
shifts some of the day-to-day responsibilities of the organization from the Executive
Director and could ensure the longevity of the organization.
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Another critic of the organization is Fred Stewart, long time neighborhood
resident, former president of the King Neighborhood Association, and local realtor.
Stewart has often wondered if PCRI should “go away” (Stewart interview: 14).
Neighbors, led by a vocal Stewart, perceived that PCRI was trying to muscle them out
of opportunity (Jaquiss, 2000). Since the inception of the organization, Stewart had
been conflicted about PCRI’s role in the neighborhood; boarded up houses were not
only an eyesore, but a foregone opportunity for neighborhood residents who wanted
to buy homes in the area (Stewart interview: 16; Jacquiss, 2000).80 When competition
for cheap houses was heating up between non-profit and for-profit developers,
“investors who would call up on houses if they found out a nonprofit owned it, or the
city, and start making complaints. I’m a neighbor that lives at 4566, that address
doesn’t even exist, I’m tired of this, they’ve got gang members, they’re hoping the
city or somebody will force the nonprofit to sell that out” (Stewart interview: 17;
Morgan interview: 4). This created tensions between non-profits like PCRI and
neighbors, because they would have to decipher which calls were red herrings, and
which were legitimate, especially when it came to tenants. Stewart’s personal lack of
trust with the organization has decreased since they now have been good neighbors
for 15 years – he appreciates the fact that some affordable housing has been preserved
in Northeast Portland, especially since the “window of opportunity” for affordable
housing development, now viewed in hindsight, closed so quickly (Stewart interview,
p 26).
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Houses would remain boarded up for several years, as the organization gained capacity and worked
through its backlog of renovations in its early years.

204

On the other hand, each time PCRI staff began to work on a house in the early
days, neighbors would come up and ask, “Hey, what’s going on?” They were “happy
to see the houses get fixed up” (Kelley interview: 3). These renovations proceeded
steadily in the early years and tapered off as the neighborhood began to gentrify, so
that the flurry of activity associated with renovation projects quickly became
associated with gentrifiers, rather than a low-income housing provider. This was a
function of both the timing of PCRI’s finite funds from its line of credit for housing
renovation, and the tremendous influx of private development in the neighborhoods
of Inner North/Northeast Portland beginning in the late 1990s.
As private investment in the neighborhood created a wider gap between the
haves and have-nots, PCRI shifted its priorities from major renovation of its units to
maintaining low rents for its tenants and provided additional services for those
tenants. This shift to include more tenant services was reflected in the organization’s
income sources and staffing. Because most staff positions are in part funded by
individual grants (in PCRI’s case, it is roughly 20% of the organization’s income, but
varies as seen in Figure 8-7), the number of staff and their job descriptions fluctuate.
The size of the organization has varied from eight to twenty four staff at any one
point in time (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001,
2002b, 2003a, 2004c, 2005b, 2006b; Personal observation). Early staff focused on the
renovation and management of housing units to stabilize the portfolio, while later
staff focused on the maintenance of units and accessing programs that would
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Figure 8-7
PCRI Organizational Support and Program Support from Grants
1995-2006

Sources: Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 2003a, 2004c,
2005b, 2006b.

expand PCRI’s tenant service delivery (child care programs, financial literacy and
IDA accounts, thriving family programs).
One of the greatest impacts on PCRI was the shift in the types and levels of
housing development funding. As housing development became more expensive, the
Collaborative encouraged more multi-family housing development, and virtually
eliminated its funding of single family housing redevelopment, in part because
development costs were very expensive for only 1-2 units of housing, and in part
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because of the funding priority for very low-income families.81 Because PCRI’s
portfolio was composed of mainly single family houses, it was nearly impossible for
it to redevelop any that had not yet been renovated; most funding from the
Collaborative or PDC was earmarked for housing for families in the 0-30% MFI
range (and limited the rents that could be charged), and the costs of construction and
development far outweighed the rents that could be realized. This was also counter to
PCRI’s renovation approach under Construction Manager Valerie Garrett – to spend
more money on each unit up front in order to ensure a smoother long-term unit
management.
As a result of the shift in housing development priorities and a contraction of
tenant service funding in the early 2000s, PCRI became, once again, a lean
organization. Its revenues continued to exceed its expenses, and it successfully retired
almost half of its original US Bank Line of Credit (Portland Community Reinvestment
Initiatives, 2006a, 2006b). Because of its fiscal soundness, PCRI was one of the few
candidates for the acquisition of ACDC’s portfolio in 2004 (Albina CDC Board SAE
Boards, 2004a). Its solvency, too, made it unique among its counterparts in Inner
N/NE Portland, where the other organizations did not have the benefit of a substantial
portfolio with a low cost basis, one of the key factors that allowed PCRI to weather the
gentrification of the neighborhoods. The fact that the cost basis for PCRI’s portfolio
did not demand a relatively high level of cash flow to keep it in the black,
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In 2004, the City of Portland created the 10 Year Plan to End Homelessness and having already
focused its housing funding on those in the 0-30% MFI range (Walsh interview: 9).
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Figure 8-8
PCRI Revenue v. Expenses 1999-2006

Sources: Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002b, 2003a, 2004c,
2005b, 2006b.

and that the organization maintained a 97% occupancy rate over a several year period,
are evidence of a business operation that was in a position to expand without risking
the equity that it had built up.
In April 2004, the board of PCRI entered into negotiations with the remnants of
the board of Albina CDC to acquire their portfolio. The board of Albina CDC had
decided to cease operations and divest itself of its properties, after trying to reinvigorate the organization and bring on some new board members (Albina CDC SAE
Boards, 2004c). They considered NW Housing Alternatives, REACH CDC, and PCRI
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and ultimately chose PCRI for its success in managing a large portfolio and its strong
and stable leadership and its commitment to the neighborhoods of Inner North/NE
Portland (Albina CDC SAE Boards, 2004b; Purcell interview: 4).
At that point, PCRI was on sound financial footing, and had set its sights more
towards homeownership programs when this opportunity arose. Maxine Fitzpatrick
took the opportunity to “negotiate with PDC, renegotiate loans, and reduce monthly
payments”, as well as renovating a significant number of the properties to ensure that
they would be more manageable (Purcell interview: 4). While the Albina CDC Board
originally intended to transfer the properties by August 2004, the negotiations with
PCRI lasted for two years, during which time the properties were renovated, and the
staff of PCRI prepared to take on the management of a significantly larger portfolio
(Albina CDC SAE Boards, 2004b). By acquiring 360 housing units in 2006 from
Albina CDC, PCRI brought its total number of housing units to just over 700 –a
dramatic increase since the portfolio had remained relatively stable since its inception
(Jaquiss, 2000; Fitzpatrick interview: 2).
When assuming the Albina CDC portfolio, PCRI was in a unique position to
stipulate that these units arrived in a freshly renovated condition and with financing
that provided for reasonable loan repayment, adequate reserves, and affordable rents;
more importantly, the acquired units would be of benefit to the organization as a
whole – they would not be a drain on PCRI’s finances, as was witnessed in the
creation of Albina CDC (White interview: 9). However, after Albina CDC had
entered into negotiations, the debt on much of its portfolio was restructured by PDC,
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and properties that had not been previously encumbered with debt were saddled with
debt and lender restrictions (McIllhattan, 2003; McGee, 2005; Fitzpatrick, 2010). This
refinancing, along with the initial increase in expenses to accommodate such an
increase in unit management, proved to be a drain on PCRI’s cash flow in the long
run. PCRI’s decreased asset to debt ratio from 1.5:1 to 1.375:1 and compromised the
overall stability of the organization (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives,
2006b; Fitzpatrick, 2009).
With the increased unit counts (and greater concentration of multi-family
apartment complexes), though, PCRI can now enjoy some economies of scale and
certainty with its asset management, a status long heralded by funders. Because they
have attained this “scale”, PCRI, once the organization has worked through the newly
acquired debt issues, will be in a position to leverage new programs and expand
development opportunities, an approach that will secure them a long-term role in the
neighborhoods they serve (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2006a).82
One of the property management issues that is magnified with the large portfolio is
the changing racial and ethnic composition of the tenantry. When PCRI was founded the
majority of its tenants were Black or Caucasian, the demographics have shifted, and
their tenant population is increasingly Hispanic. Accordingly, PCRI staff composition
reflects the neighborhood racial and ethnic changes that have occurred in the past 16
years. In 2004, PCRI’s staff could communicate in 10 languages other than English, and
their diversity mirrored the diverse tenant population (Portland Community
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Generally the term “scale” refers to organizations that operate several hundred units of housing
(McLennan interview: 20; Walsh and Zdenek, 2007).
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Reinvestment Initiatives, 2004a). Former City Commissioner Erik Sten has remarked
that PCRI is “the only CDC, and I don’t mean any offense to anyone else, where, when
you walk into their office, the maintenance staff is Russian, and the property manager is
African American, and in this very, very white town, they serve a very diverse
constituency extraordinarily well …” (Sten interview, pp. 8-9).
Another property management issue that has become magnified as the
neighborhood has gentrified is PCRI’s role as a landlord. Being a responsible
landlord has two sides: to the tenants and to the surrounding neighborhood. Each
group has a different kind of reciprocal relationship: tenants are more likely to pay
their rent and remain as tenants when landlords respond to their requests for repairs
and upkeep, while neighbors are more likely to support another project by the CDC
when their track record of having good tenants and property maintenance is evident
(Lydgate, 1999). Conversely, if a CDC is not a good landlord, neighbors respond not
only by withdrawing their support for new projects, but by applying increased
political pressure on organizations to rein in their development activities and clean up
their existing properties. The dilemma is that the diminished organizational income
(from developer fees) due to a lack of new development opportunities can cripple an
organization, especially one highly focused on housing development, and, as a result,
impede the remedying of existing management problems by cutting off the flow of
money.
One of the lasting questions about PCRI is whether it is a CDC by definition.
Maxine Fitzpatrick maintains that the organization was created because the
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community clamored for a resolution to the Dominion Capital debacle (Fitzpatrick
interview: 1). Its board has consistently had a nominal, yet consistent tenant
representation: Ayanna Curry, PCRI tenant, is one of the longest serving board
members (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2002a, 2003b, 2004b,
2005a).83 The remainder of PCRI’s Board of Directors has been a list of who’s who in
Portland and has always been primarily “downtown” oriented. Drawn from Portland’s
development, finance, and political communities, the Board has not been a grass roots
effort. Initially, Erik Sten, the aide to City Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury who
initiated the idea of forming PCRI to acquire the Dominion Capital houses, served on
the board for several years before he ran for City Commissioner. The faces on this
board were initially very different from the faces in the neighborhoods in which they
worked; this is no longer the case, as the neighborhood demographics have changed.
The Board has also boasted bankers, lawyers, politicians, and key players in city
development agencies: “it was not grass roots up, it was City-backed and opportunity
driven” (Sten interview: 8).84
What has made PCRI successful, though, is its consistency as a property
developer and manager, its relatively low-key presence in the neighborhoods in which
it worked, and its consistent and strong leadership. These three strategies facilitated
PCRI’s ability to manage its portfolio and gradually expand its tenant services. When
83

This dearth of resident control has prevented PCRI from being designated as a CHDO, so that it
would be eligible for HOME funds, something that other CDCs strive for, while PCRI, with its readymade portfolio, may not feel is a necessary funding addition.
84
Other board members have included Fred Hansen, Director of Tri-Met, and Judith Pitre, former
program director of the Housing Authority of Portland, Amy Miller-Dowell, project manager for PDC,
and Dave Castricano, Vice President for US Bank (Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives,
2002a, 2003b, 2004b, 2005a).
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coupled with its ready-made, low cost-basis portfolio, PCRI’s more business-like
approach to its mission of housing and service delivery allowed it to weather changes
in funding priorities and development opportunities that other organizations were
unable to achieve.
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CHAPTER 9.
CASE STUDY 6: MERGER TO CREATE ALBINA CDC

The Merger Process
Every BHCD staff member still cringes when they hear the word “merger”. With
hindsight, BHCD staff, Enterprise staff, and CDC boards and staff agree that while it
may have been a fiscally necessary process, the implementation was so poorly
executed that it left the resulting organization weaker and more dysfunctional than its
predecessors (Farnum, 2003: 24; McLennan interview: 11).
The merger process took root in 1996, soon after the Enterprise Foundation
established an office in Portland, and the Portland Neighborhood Development
Support Collaborative (PNDSC) was created. PNDSC was an agreement between the
Enterprise Foundation, the Neighborhood Partnership Fund, and the Bureau of
Housing and Community Development to pool their resources and streamline CDC
funding and reporting requirements (Neighborhood Partnership Fund, et al, 1996).
Enterprise had brought a new level of accountability to Portland, as it was been in
charge of the disbursement of funds from a consortium of nation-wide corporations
and private philanthropic organizations called the National Community Development
Initiative (NCDI); NCDI monies, while plentiful at that point, were restricted in their
use (Luckett & Allen interview: 13). The initial infusion of support was for a two year
time period, with the potential for a two-year extension (Andrews interview: 2). Until
this point, the Neighborhood Partnership Fund (NPF) had been funding organizations
on an ongoing basis – they had been in the business of “flowering many small CDCs”
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and were less concerned with performance or accomplishment (Luckett and Allen
interview: 7); an organization would receive funding because it was in year three of a
five-year cycle, and not for a particular project or because they had attained a
particular benchmark (Andrews interview: 3). Towards the mid-1990s, NCDI relied
increasingly on local partnerships to encourage CDCs to diversify their funding
sources, so that it would be “easier to weather the departure of any single funder”
(Walker, 2002: 55). By 1996, too, BHCD’s main sources of federal funding were
diminishing, and the Housing Investment Fund that Gretchen Kafoury had established
in 1994, and Erik Sten later championed, from the City of Portland General Fund had
limited and finite resources (McLennan interview: 8).85 The idea for the creation of a
Real Estate Transfer Tax as a permanent and stable source of funding was in its very
nascent stages and was to face a long uphill, and so far unsuccessful, battle in the State
Legislature.86
Across the river, the by-products of neighborhood improvement, increased
property values and new residents with higher incomes, were already visible in the
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland (Farnum, 2002:5; Hunsberger,
1998). With the increase in property values, development became more expensive, and
as the Albina neighborhoods became more desirable places to live, non-profits began
to compete with for-profit ventures for development opportunities. The saturation of
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CDBG funding was waning, and HOME had a particular set of requirements that prevented CDCs
from using its monies for operating support. The Housing Investment Fund was a one-time designation
of $30 million for affordable housing production over a number of years – this fund’s greatest
expenditures occurred in its first three years, 1994-1996 (www.pdc.us/hsg-brc).
86
Previously defeated several times in the State Legislature, the current Real Estate Transfer Tax bill
seeks to increase the real estate document recording fee by $15. Its projected revenue that will be
dedicated to affordable housing production is $15 million in the current biennium
(http://oregonon.org/newsletters/newsletter-october-28/#Public%20Hearing%20for%20Housing).
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CDCs in such a small geographic area forced the organizations to compete against
each other for the limited development opportunities. One factor that magnified this
competition was the decline in the number of properties that Multnomah County made
available through its foreclosure program: between 1992 and 1998, the county
transferred 170 properties to CDCs in Inner North/Northeast Portland for redevelopment, and between 1998 and 2003, it transferred 22 (Tupper, 2007).87 The
North/Northeast Portland CDCs had relied on these properties for essentially free
development opportunities, and the decline in available county properties required that
CDCs search for lots, apartment complexes, and houses on the open market – an
increasingly unviable approach for them.
Given the finite streams of funding, the neighborhood improvement that was
readily becoming more visible, and the increased level of competition for scarcer new
development opportunities, “ the city and funders wanted to rationalize the various
funding streams” so that they could improve CDC “productivity and efficiency”(Rohe,
Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a: 25). Because PNDSC staff felt that this rationalization was
an abrupt transition, “we did the Portland thing – we asked them to get it together”
(Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a: 35). PNDSC initially requested that the CDCs of Inner
North/Northeast Portland discuss opportunities where they could share resources and
take advantage of skills that they had developed in order to increase their efficiency
(Farnum, 2002: 2).
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This number includes properties donated to non-profits who were located in the vicinity but whose
work was included in this study: Habitat for Humanity, NW Housing Alternatives, Jubilee
Communities, and Network Behavioral Healthcare.
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The CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland had a history of cooperation. For
example, Gretchen Dursch of Housing Our Families and Diane Meisenhelter of Sabin
CDC met several times to discuss different economic development projects that they
could work on together (Dursch interview: 13). Karen Voiss of Franciscan Enterprise
and Maxine Fitzpatrick discussed a shared vision for their in-home childcare programs
(Dursch and Frater, 1995). In the case of HOF and Sabin, these discussions did not
yield any substantive results because of a change in leadership at both organizations
and shifts in focus.88 Also, HOF, Sabin, and Franciscan, along with the Housing
Authority of Portland, shared the $250,000 federal grant for neighborhood policing
and community safety in 1998 (Bernstein, 1998). While these efforts to work together
were laudable, they were, for the most part, tangential to the real issues of
inefficiency, overlapping service areas, and redundancy that the organizations faced.
Gretchen Dursch remembers the conundrum that the organizations were trapped in:
trying to “create a reason why we (were) different”, but at the same time work
together (Dursch interview: 13). This need for the organizations to distinguish
themselves occurred as each group was becoming more similar – HOF, Sabin, and
Franciscan had all graduated to developing similar multi-unit rental projects. These
three organizations, at certain times, even shared board members and staff.89 In
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The lack of continuity in leadership not only affected the ability of the organizations to work together,
it also undermined the organizational stability in some cases. HOF, Franciscan, and Sabin CDC each
transitioned between their first and second Executive Directors during this time. Please see the next
chapter for further discussion.
89
Jane Ediger, co-Executive Director of Sabin CDC, sat on HOF’s board. Alberta Simmons sat on both
Franciscan’s and HOF’s boards. Linda Grear was a founding member of HOF and worked for Sabin
CDC. Teri Duffy worked for NECDC and sat on HOF’s board. Sheila Simmons worked for HOF, and
later Albina CDC, and sat on Franciscan’s board. Mike Dolan sat on Franciscan’s board and later on
Sabin CDC’s board.
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addition, the organizations were overlapping geographically. HOF, NECDC, and
Franciscan had projects in the Sabin Neighborhood, and Franciscan and Sabin CDC
had developments in the Boise Neighborhood where HOF was based (see Appendix I).
However, being that each organization sprang from different roots, each had an
independent identity that was the basis for many of the difficulties encountered in the
merger process (Dursch interview: 13, McLennan interview: 10).
Concurrent with the City’s request that organizations streamline their
operations was the creation of the Portland Neighborhood Development Support
Collaborative, or PNDSC. Ostensibly creating a more efficient funding process, the
Collaborative was the result of negotiations between BHCD, NPF, and Enterprise to
pool their funding and subsequent reporting requirements for CDCs, to rationalize the
funding stream (NPF et al, 1996; Sten interview, pp.6-7). Instead of three funding
applications and three sets of reporting requirements, there would be one application
and one set of reporting documents. This shift in thinking met with mixed reviews. On
one hand, both the applications and reporting requirements would be simpler and more
streamlined, and there would be less duplication of efforts (NPF, et al, 1996). On the
other hand, a CDC would only get one chance for operating support – and if it did not
get it, there would be serious financial implications (NPF, et al, 1996).90 This shift in
how organizations were funded was also an opportunity for the City and NPF to cull
the number of organizations that they had played a key role in creating; this
rationalization of the CDC industry, so soon after it had been created, left several
90

BHCD and NPF had supplied operating support for the five organizations at varying levels, from
$50,000/year for PCRI to $250,000/year for NECDC (PNDSC, 1999; Fitzpatrick interview: 7; Kafoury
interview, p, 7)
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Executive Directors shaking their heads (Dursch interview: 23). With Inner
North/Northeast Portland’s neighborhoods showing signs of gentrification rather than
blight, the City had turned its attention to the revitalization of “other struggling city
and suburban neighborhoods” (Oliver, 2000b).
One of the largest issues for the organizations was that they had become
“housing-centric” – they had relied, for the most part, heavily on the City’s operating
support combined with developer fees from their housing efforts to stay afloat – and
had not diversified their activities enough to be able to adapt to the dramatic changes
that were occurring in the real estate market (NPF, 1994; McLennan interview: 9). In
some cases, other programs were compromised by the focus on housing and
development (Dursch interview: 8; Pequeño interview: 11). This focus on housing was
in part due to Portland’s funding structures that emphasized housing development and
did not encourage broader economic development activities (NPF, 1994; McLennan
interview: 9; McNamara interview: 9). As a result of this focus, CDCs increased their
capacity on the development side to meet these opportunities; however, as the
opportunities and funding began to recede, what CDCs experienced was a feeling of
desperation (Neil Mayer & Associates, 1998). Jaki Walker responded by taking on
development opportunities that were ultimately not very successful and
“entrepreneurial” endeavors that proved farfetched (Rudman interview: 8; Rubenstein,
1999). HOF, Sabin CDC, and Franciscan chose to cooperate with the Collaborative’s
suggestions, as the Collaborative required each organization to submit a work plan that
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detailed how they would achieve a series of fiscal and organizational benchmarks that
were required for renewed funding (NPF et al, 1999).
The Collaborative Approach Action Plan was initiated in October 1999
(Neureuther, 1999). 91 The intended outcome of this plan would be that PNDSC would
fund no more than 2-3 of these CDCs, so that the rest would have to merge
(Neureuther, 1999). The Collaborative’s initial “suggestion” that organizations
consider sharing resources evolved into a “suggestion” that organizations merge –
financial incentives were offered to those groups that were interested. This was the
result of PNDSC audits and analyses of organizations that sought to establish a series
of performance benchmarks in an effort to establish and maintain quantitative
performance criteria (NPF, et al, 1999). In December 1999, CDC representatives
gathered to discuss “mergers and other service changes” with consultant Joan BrownKline (Neureuther, 1999; Loving, 2001b); however, no CDCs “responded to the
invitation to explore merging” (Farnum, 2003:10). The chairs of each board began to
meet regularly to examine how best to streamline their operations so that they would
not be in competition with each other and their services would not overlap. These
chairs chose a 2nd member of their respective boards to join the discussions for a total
of 6 representatives at the table (Farnum, 2003:12). This group spent six months
developing a “shared services agreement”, per the recommendation of a consultant
who had been hired by the Collaborative to facilitate the discussions (Sohl interview:
11). The organizations proposed a “Housing Federation”, a “concept that did not meet
our (PNDSC’s) stated objectives”: nothing less than a merged organization
91

The original five participants were NECDC, Franciscan Enterprise, HOF, Sabin CDC, and PCRI.
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(Neureuther, et al, 2000; Farnum, 2003: 11). As a result, the Collaborative staff then
“insisted” that four CDCs in Inner North/Northeast Portland enter into merger
discussions (Farnum, 2003:11). At this point, CDC leaders felt that they had been
misled about the expectations of the Collaborative, especially since their consultant
had encouraged them to proceed with the shared services agreement (The Skanner,
2001; Sohl interview: 11). This miscommunication was the first of many missteps in
the merger process and indicative of the power struggles that were ongoing, not only
between the organizations, but also between the organizations and the funders. It left
all parties exasperated, and the process stalled after 12 months of negotiations
(Farnum, 2003:12).
The evolution from the Collaborative’s suggestion to merge to its requirement
that the organizations merge coincided with the end of the second round of NCDI
funding and the realization that it “wasn’t going to go on forever” (Andrews
interview: 8). Further constraints on funding meant that the honeymoon phase was
over for CDCs in Inner N/NE Portland: the Collaborative was requiring a new level of
accountability for funding, and the CDCs as a group were not strong enough to
overcome these measures (Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a: 44).
PCRI was the only CDC that was in a sound enough fiscal and managerial
position to decline the Collaborative’s requirement, and they quickly dropped out of
the discussions; Maxine Fitzpatrick realized that her organization had a very different
asset base, and “we weren’t reliant as much on public subsidy” because of the fact that
PCRI’s housing stock had been acquired for a relatively low cost and all at once (The
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Enterprise Foundation’s Management Organizational Development Unit, 1999;
Fitzpatrick interview: 7). They had made excellent progress on their loan repayment to
USBank and had enough units of housing to pay for the staffing required to ensure its
proper management. Also, PNDSC’s funding of PCRI was $70,000 – a drop in the
bucket for its overall budget of $1.2 million (PNDSC Staff, 1998). PCRI’s board
approved withdrawing from the discussions, but the City “came back and said …why
don’t you just do it anyway?” Fitzpatrick sat in on the conversations for a few months
but withdrew as soon as possible, as she saw no positive outcome for her organization
(Oliver, 2000b; Fitzpatrick interview: 7).
The first round of merger talks resulted in the following steps taken: NECDC,
HOF, and Sabin CDC proposed to establish a joint venture “Community Housing
Partnership”, Sabin and NECDC would discuss merging their organizations, and all
three organizations would share office space and divide up tasks that would benefit all
three, as Franciscan Enterprise had withdrawn from the merger process at this time
(Neureuther, 2000b). Karen Voiss, Franciscan’s Executive Director, had written a
letter to her board that criticized Housing Our Families because of a conflict over the
community policing grant that HOF, Franciscan, and Sabin shared. This letter became
public, and both HOF and Sabin refused to meet further with Voiss and Franciscan
(Sohl interview: 11). Franciscan Enterprise withdrew from the merger discussions, As
a result of her actions, Voiss was forced to resign, and Franciscan, risking the loss of
its PNDSC support, withdrew from the merger talks, publicly citing financial struggles
and a redefinition of its mission (Oliver, 2000a, Neureuther, 2000a; PNDSC, 2000).
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The PNDSC Board approved the establishment of the Community Housing
Partnership; the organizations had until January 1, 2001 to complete this endeavor
(Neureuther, 2000b). The boards of the three organizations worked through their
individual issues and returned to the negotiations (Farnum, 2003: 13).
In April 2000, “new information regarding the financial situation of NECDC
caused both the Collaborative and Sabin and HOF to reconsider whether a structural
arrangement or merger with NECDC was viable” (McLennan, 2000). This information
included the discovery of “substantial unsecured short-term and long-term debt”
(Neureuther, 2000a). This debt was the result of Executive Director Jaki Walker’s
leading the organization down a very unconventional path. The negotiations for the
sawmill in Zambia had cost the organization dearly both financially and politically.
When Walker entered into the merger discussions on behalf of NECDC, the other
groups had little confidence in their ability to negotiate with her, given her headstrong
and defiant personality and NECDC’s insolvency (Fitzpatrick interview: 7; PNDSC,
2000; Sohl interview: 11). After Walker’s departure from the organization, NECDC
foundered, as an ambitious, for-profit homeownership project (Historic Riverpointe)
encountered insurmountable difficulties. While the Collaborative released the
“remainder of NECDC’s FY 1999-2000 funding early”, they refused to fund NECDC
for FY 2001-2003, citing its lack of a clear business plan (Neureuther, 2000a; Oliver,
2000; PNDSC, 2000). NECDC had been so reliant on the City’s support that this was
the final stranglehold – NECDC closed its doors 2 months later, amid neighborhood
gossip that the City had been looking for an excuse to shut it down (Sohl interview: 2).
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In spite of the fact that it had “been a line item on the City’s budget” and had received
more operating support than any other organization in Portland, NECDC had liabilities
of $1.7 million, including an unsecured loan from Fannie Mae for $250,000. Its total
liabilities outweighed its remaining assets: 11 unsold houses for low-income families
that were returned to the lenders (Oliver, 2000b). Steve Rudman remembers his
exasperation: he “pulled the plug” in May of 2000 when the negotiations for the saw
mill deal fell through, and Walker, ever defiant, insisted on continuing (Rudman
interview: 8).
NECDC’s withdrawal from the merger discussions, and subsequent demise,
left HOF and Sabin CDC to forge an agreement between themselves. These CDCs,
along with Franciscan Enterprise, “were performing at a lower level financially and
managerially than the other CDCs in Portland”(Farnum, 2003:11). Recognizing that
they needed to cooperate, HOF and Sabin CDC had hired a personnel consultant to
“explore ways that the staff of their organizations could collaborate around the shared
services concept” for the two organizations (Farnum, 2003:16). In the meantime,
Collaborative staff coaxed Sabin and HOF into allowing Franciscan back into the
merger talks after Voiss’ resignation in August 2000, with the proviso that a new
consultant would be hired to facilitate the process from this point forward (Oliver,
2000b; Sohl interview: 11). However, this consultant continued to work with HOF and
Sabin staff after the decision for the three way merger was resumed; when this fact
came to light, it created a conflict with the staff of Franciscan, as they “felt actively
misinformed about the decisions their respective boards had made” (Farnum,
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2003:16). The conflict also created more friction with the development of the new
organization’s overall staffing plan as each board “had a strong commitment to its
staff”, and the staff of the individual organizations were already concerned about the
future of their jobs (Farnum, 2003:14 &19). The level of communication, or lack
thereof, between the three boards reflected an underlying desire of each organization
to maintain some semblance of autonomy, in spite of the fact that some members of
the Collaborative were under the impression that the organizations would value their
missions first and foremost, rather than the livelihoods of their respective
organizations (McLennan interview: 10; Warner interview: 17).
The three groups agreed on the formation of the new organization’s board of
directors, and the Collaborative gave them a six-month time frame (until May 2001) in
which to complete the merger process (Farnum, 2003:14-15). Well-respected local
consultant Kay Sohl of Technical Assistance for Community Service (TACS), came
on board as the lead facilitator at this point to officiate the “shotgun wedding” that
would lead to the creation of the new organization in time to participate in the
Collaborative’s funding cycle – and if the organizations failed to merge, then no one
would be eligible for funding (Sohl interview: 12; Farnum, 2003:14). Two board
members from each of the three organizations sat down to “create a program plan,
develop a comprehensive budget, and initiate a funding strategy” in only six months –
nowhere near enough time to complete the necessary comprehensive due diligence
activities (Sohl interview: 11; Farnum, 2003:14).
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At last, and in spite of the compressed timeline, the new board had clear steps:
establish a new identity for the merged organization, establish the common values and
mission that would guide the organization, and bring the assets of the two
organizations under one umbrella. As a first step in establishing the new
organization’s identity, the new board chose a name for the new organization. Board
members well understood the meaning of the new name, both to themselves and the
surrounding communities. Given the fact that each of the organizations, especially
HOF, had encountered difficulties with its neighbors, finding a name that symbolized
a unification of the organizations and a fresh approach to community development
was important. One board member described the new organization as a “reflection of
the community, not a corporate arm of the city” (Farnum, 2003: 17). Ideas included
an amalgamation of the different names, when Mike Purcell, from Franciscan
Enterprise, suggested the name “Albina Community Development Corporation” as a
way to integrate both the ideas and the missions of the different groups (Purcell
interview: 12; Farnum, 2003: 17).
The establishment of common values and a common mission were more
difficult, and, in many ways, never occurred. Different perceptions abounded – what
had been officially recorded as the mission statement was so broad that it included the
diverse goals of the organizations, but “created conflict”, as some board members
wanted to focus on community relations, while others were focused on the process of
merging three sets of finances that were in various states of disarray (Purcell
interview: 3). In hindsight, Sohl regrets the decision to lead the process because of the
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various states of the finances: Sabin was well documented and on firm ground, but
HOF had not had an audit in 2 years “they had no records – it was garbage,” and while
Franciscan “had had at one time very good accounting,” that was no longer the case
(Sohl interview: 12). This complicated the next task of communicating with lenders
about the capacity and viability of the new organization, so that the work necessary to
create the new organization was not truly completed by the date of merge and
ultimately caused a number of headaches for the new organization (Farnum, 2003: 17;
Sohl interview: 12)
While the original three-step merger process had been sidetracked months
earlier, it was cast aside completely when lawyers for Albina CDC came to the
conclusion that it would be far less costly for the groups to reach a “resolution to
merge” and “have one corporation (act as a shell to) begin handling all the operations”
(Sohl interview: 12). Because of the fact that Sabin was still fairly sound, and both
HOF and Franciscan were in more precarious financial situations, the choice between
using HOF and Franciscan was a difficult one because of the symbolism associated
with being the first organization to lose its identity. One board member noted, “we
must know now that this is the end of our organization. ...The merged organization
will not be this organization. ...it can’t be and it shouldn’t be. ... we must do this and
we must accept that the end of what we began has come” (Farnum, 2003:13). The
Albina board chose to use Franciscan Enterprise as the shell and to fold HOF’s and
Sabin’s assets into it. This meant that Franciscan would essentially dissolve first, and
HOF and Sabin, both membership organizations, would have their respective
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memberships vote on the resolution to merge. With that vote, the decision-making
power of the membership would be rescinded, and a board of directors would govern
the new organization exclusively (Farnum, 2003: 22, Purcell interview: 2).
The boards diligently worked together to create this resolution, along with the
creation of a new mission, funding and staffing plans. Because of the sensitive nature
of these discussions, the six board members signed, at the behest of the Collaborative,
a “confidentiality agreement” that limited the information that they could share with
their individual organizations and the community (Loving, 2001b). There had already
been ineffective levels of communication between the Albina Board and the boards of
the HOF, Sabin CDC, and Franciscan, and this document magnified and reinforced the
levels of miscommunication throughout the community (Farnum, 2003:13).
Given the already difficult situation that the groups had encountered with their
previous conflicts concerning personnel strategies, the creation of a staffing plan for
Albina CDC presented the most problematic part of this aspect of the merger. The
Albina board made the decision to hire an Executive Director prior to the completion
of the merger, but did not have the time to allow their candidates to have input on the
hiring of staff. Neither Joan Miggins Executive Director of HOF nor Felicia AllenderBrant of Sabin was considered a strong candidate to lead the new organization.
Miggins had floundered as HOF’s Executive Director, and Allender-Brant’s interests
and strengths lay outside of housing and finance (Purcell interview: 13; Sohl
interview: 10). The Albina board formed a screening committee to interview
additional candidates and chose to introduce their two finalist candidates (both from
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out of town) to the community at an “informal breakfast meeting” (Farnum, 2003:21;
The Skanner, 2001). Breakfast attendees were able to complete comment cards and
share their thoughts with the screening committee who ultimately decided to hire an
outsider, Shelley Earley a mental health professional originally from Texas, much to
the chagrin of some local housing advocates who felt that she was neither qualified for
the position, and that hiring someone not from Portland was detrimental for the new
organization (Benjamin interview: 8). The hiring of an out-of-towner for the position
did introduce a new set of complications to the process: on one hand a fresh set of eyes
had the potential to invigorate the organization, but, on the other, there was a
significant learning curve for the new Director to accomplish in a very short period of
time.
The hiring of staff for the new organization was made more problematic
because of the sequence of the hiring of the Executive Director prior to the hiring of
staff. No then-current staff from each organization was guaranteed a position in Albina
CDC, although they were encouraged to apply; each Executive Director was asked to
write letters of recommendation for their respective employees. As the Executive
Directors were no longer candidates for the new leadership position, this was a
particularly awkward situation for all involved. According to the hiring committee,
these letters did not paint a truthful picture of staff skills, and, as a result, Albina
CDC’s initial staff did not have a suitable set of skills for the positions for which they
were hired (Farnum, 2003:23). This may have been in part due to the confidentiality
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agreement – whereby the communication between the Albina board and the existing
organization staff was so minimal that misunderstandings were bound to happen.
The timing of the staffing of the Albina CDC came at a critical point in the
merger process. Both Sabin CDC and HOF staffs were bitter about the uncertainty of
their positions (Farnum, 2003: 21; Loving, 2001b). Because both HOF and Sabin were
membership organizations, their by-laws required a vote of their membership to
approve a resolution that would extinguish individual membership rights (Farnum,
2003: 22; Fondren interview: 6). The HOF membership passed the resolution with no
fanfare, but staff at Sabin CDC, who were angry about the lack of communication
with the Albina board and the inevitability that many of them would lose their jobs,
saw this as an opportunity to break away from the discussions because they were
“orchestrated from downtown and not from the community” (Fondren interview: 7;
Loving, 2001b).
Because Sabin’s membership rolls were not in good order, a new membership
list was created in order to establish who could vote on the resolution (Farnum, 2003:
23). Sabin called a meeting of this revised membership 3 weeks before the merger was
supposed to be approved. Twenty percent of the total membership turned out for an
evening meeting on June 22, 2001 (Loving, 2001b). The membership unanimously
“rejected the merger that its board of directors had endorsed” (Oliver, 2001; Fondren
interview: 7).92 Alberta St developer and Sabin member Roslyn Hill cited her reasons
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There was much unsubstantiated speculation in the CDC community that Sabin staff had “stacked”
the meeting because of the uneasiness with the merger, and their realization that they were on much
firmer financial ground than the other organizations and would have nothing to gain from the merged
organization (Andrews interview: 11).
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for rejecting the resolution as Albina CDCs lack of clear mission and lack of
neighborhood presence (Loving, 2001b). Sabin’s rejection of the merger had profound
implications for both Sabin CDC and Albina CDC. In addition to the emotional blow
to the board members who had spent two years working on the merger process,
Sabin’s withdrawal created a logistical nightmare for Albina CDC in order to meet the
July 1 deadline for funding from the Collaborative. Sabin, too, was subsequently
“penalized by the Collaborative – no more funding”, (Fondren interview: 7; Loving,
2001b; Oliver, 2001; White interview: 9).
In a flurry of activity, all of the necessary steps were completed for HOF and
Franciscan to merge, although with much less diligence because of the extreme time
crunch, and Albina CDC was formed using Franciscan Enterprise as the shell. With
Sabin’s withdrawal, though, members of Franciscan’s board questioned the wisdom of
the merger and voted to delay the merger (Loving, 2001b). Mike Purcell was
Franciscan’s board chair and played a pivotal role in the creation of Albina CDC. His
leadership helped to break the deadlock on June 29th and the merger proceeded on
schedule (Farnum, 2003:24).

Albina Community Development Corporation
Albina CDC officially opened its doors on July 2, 2001 with Shelley Earley at
its helm (The Skanner, 2001).93 The decision had been made to occupy the former
HOF offices in the Betty Campbell building and to remodel them to accommodate the
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The previous deadline of May 1, 2001 had been revised to July 1, the day that PNDSC contracts
commence, as the organizations encountered several difficulties in garnering the necessary
documentation to complete the process (Albina CDC Board, 2001).
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new staff. Earley faced a difficult task with the oversight of a staff that she had no
input on hiring, the looming transfer of properties, and the salvaging of HOF’s
financial reports and updating its compliance status on several properties (Albina
Community Development Corporation, 2001; Purcell interview: 2). Mike Andrews,
formerly of the Enterprise Foundation and a key participant on the funder side of the
discussions, likened the early operations of Albina CDC to those of driving your car
down the street while you are trying to fix it, a situation that generally ends badly
(Andrews interview: 12).
In short order, much of the staff at Albina CDC were found to be unqualified
for their positions. By the end of the first year of operations, “more than half of the
remaining staff were not part of the initial group transition from the merger partners”
(Farnum, 2003:27; Albina Community Development Corporation, 2001 & 2002). The
staff turnover was a blow to the organization, as it consumed much of the Executive
Director’s time and energy and detracted from her attention to finances and
fundraising (Farnum, 2003: 24). The initial staff total was 15, with duties divided
between operations, property management, and asset management (Austin, undated).
Earley hired a Fiscal Manager, because her strength did not lie in finances, to oversee
the completion of the transfer of the books from Franciscan and HOF to Albina CDC,
the completion of audits, and the set-up of a financial system for the new organization
(Farnum, 2003:25). This process did no go smoothly, as the fiscal manager “turned out
to be incompetent”, further compromising the organization’s stability (Purcell
interview: 3).
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In spite of the fact that several of HOF’s small development projects were to
be continued under Albina CDC, there was no mention of these development activities
– “it was totally about trying to figure out the finances and trying to establish our
survival in where we were going” (Purcell interview: 3; Albina Community
Development Corporation, 2001). Without any development income, Albina CDC
was completely dependent on the Collaborative, in particular a grant from the
SURDNA Foundation that NPF had won to facilitate the process (Farnum, 2003: 25).
The lack of additional outside grant support (see Figure 9-1) was a result of the
weakness of the organization and the lack of focus on the future of the organization –
Figure 9-1
Albina CDC Organizational Support 2001-2005

Sources: Albina Community Development Corporation, 2002-2006.
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as Earley, the board and staff were focusing on the immediate needs of the
organization, they lost sight of the need for ongoing support (Albina Community
Development Corporation, 2001-2003).
Most of HOF’s assets were finally folded into the new organization by 2002.
Albina CDC’s rental revenues increased, due to the inclusion of the revenue from all
of HOF’s properties, while its grant support declined (compare Figure 9-1 and 9-2),
but its overall income was still negative, in part due to the excessive and ongoing
consultant expenses that were needed to clean up HOF’s finances (Albina Community
Development Corporation, 2002-2003). At this point, most of the property
management responsibilities had been contracted out (and reduced the organization’s
rental income), a decision that the board had made during the merger process, in order
to focus, ironically, on the financial health of the organization (Farnum, 2003: 30;
Purcell interview: 4).
The final transfer of properties from HOF to Albina CDC, though, proved to
be especially problematic and was not completed until 2003.94 Because of the number
and type of properties, recent management problems, and a lack of attention to Single
Asset Entity (SAE) operations, lenders “used the merger as an opportunity to take the
organization to task on all of the ways they had not met their agreements” (Brown,
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Because Albina CDC had been created from Franciscan’s EIN, their properties transferred with little
problem. HOF’s properties, in general, were larger and more numerous. The financing of these
properties had relied on multiple lenders, some public and some private. Each lender had to sign off on
each property in order for the property to transfer from HOF to Albina CDC (Farnum, 2003: 24; Albina
Community Development Corporation, 2001).
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Garrison, and Glass, 2004; Farnum, 2003: 24).95 The time required to secure lender
approval for the transfer and to sort through the associated property insurance was
Figure 9-2
Albina CDC Gross Revenue 2001-2005

Sources: Albina Community Development Corporation, 2001-2006.

damaging to the organization both in terms of finances and morale, as the lenders and
insurance companies used the opportunity to reassess the health and terms of each deal
(Farnum, 2003: 24).
One of the Franciscan SAE properties, Avenue Plaza Apartments, was the
source of additional drama during the early days of Albina CDC. Mike Dolan, a
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The SAE properties included the LIHPRHA properties, 20-100 unit apartment complexes acquired
from private owners whose tax credits were expiring. See the HOF Case Study and the Franciscan Case
Study for details in the acquisition of the properties.
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former Franciscan board member, had assumed control of the SAE and succeeded in
severing its relationship with Albina CDC because of his adamant disagreement with
the merger process. He also launched an email campaign against the City to criticize
the merger process (Loving, 2001b; Farnum, 2003:26). Avenue Plaza is a 22 unit
apartment complex and was Franciscan’s largest apartment complex, so that the loss
of these units, while mostly symbolic in terms of finances, was very time consuming
for the board and executive director. Dolan oversaw the management of the
apartments personally for a number of years before transferring the fiscal agent
responsibility, ironically, to Sabin CDC (Rudman interview: 8; Sabin CDC, 2009).
HOF’s properties, especially its SAE’s, were no less fraught with difficulties.
Former staff member Janet Bauer remembers that Earley was “terrorized by HUD on a
regular basis it seemed” regarding these properties (Bauer interview: 15). Because of
the previous lax oversight of the SAE’s and the again-deplorable condition of the
Maya Angelou, HUD had stepped in and put the organization on notice that it would
have to meet certain deadlines or risk cessation of funding (Albina CDC SAE Boards,
May 2004). In one case, the Martha Wells Apartments’ finances had been so neglected
that HUD denied Albina CDC a rent increase that was necessary in order to make
repairs on the buildings (HUD Staff, 2004; Albina CDC SAE Boards, 2004c).96 In
spite of the chaos surrounding property management, Earley did succeed in overseeing
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While the income had been steady, neither the capital reserves nor the operating reserves had been
fully capitalized, so that the funds were basically frozen until HUD could determine their proper
allocation, a process that took approximately 3 months. Rental increases can only be requested every 2
years.
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a renovation of the Maya Angelou Apartments and brought the property back up to a
reasonable condition (Bauer interview: 10).
Earley left Albina CDC in March 2003 (Farnum, 2003:30). Her tenure had
been laden with difficulty: she took on huge internal and external issues without the
resources that she needed to accomplish them (Andrews interview: 12). Staff
remember that “the problems of the organization sort of overtook the good stuff what
she was able to start” (Bauer interview: 10). In spite of Earley’s best efforts, though,
the Albina CDC board felt let down after her departure and questioned whether hiring
her was a good idea in the first place (Purcell interview: 13). Earley’s departure forced
the board to make some tough decisions about the future of the organization. Albina
CDC had not coalesced as an organization; the time and energy of its professional
staff had been consumed by meeting immediate regulatory and fiscal demands, while
its tenant and community organizing staff floundered with the lack of direction and
disconnect from the neighborhoods in which it operated.
In June 2003, the board laid off the remaining staff and hired Nanita
McIlhattan as temporary Executive Director (Albina Community Development
Corporation, 2004). McIlhattan was a financial person; her forté lay in sorting out
finances and figuring out a way for the organization to operate in the black once again
(Purcell interview: 3). At this point, neighborhood and tenant outreach activities
ceased, and all remaining property management was contracted out; the complete
focus of the new Director was to sort out the finances and establish effective asset
management (Farnum; 2003: 32). The chaos from the merger had only grown worse:
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finances were more entangled, neighborhood relationships were adversarial at best,
and revenue had declined so that the organization was operating in the red (Albina
Community Development Corporation, 2004; Figure 9-4). It was a do or die situation:
either Albina CDC would get its house in order, or the Board of Directors would have
to consider a different course of action. Issues that they had to grapple with included a
housing stock that had suffered from deferred maintenance, either from a lack of
attention, tenant abuse, or lack of earlier effective rehab or construction (White
interview: 2).
In October and November 2003, Albina CDC divested itself of eight properties
to raise operating capital and cover debt service for the organization (Albina
Community Development Corporation, 2004). These eight properties had a total of 15
units of housing and came primarily from Franciscan Enterprise’s portfolio.97 These
15 units were sold at the height of the real estate market, as primarily rental units: by
removing these 15 units from affordable status, Albina CDC, like Sabin CDC,
inadvertently contributed to the increasing dearth of affordable housing in
North/Northeast Portland.
It was the sale of these properties that signaled the beginning of the closure of
Albina CDC. At this point, too, Albina CDC’s leadership was exhausted. Albina
CDC’s Board was composed, for the most part, of the individuals who had seen
Franciscan and HOF through the merger and had served on their respective boards for
several years prior. Mike Purcell remembers that “there was about a five year period
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One of these units at 833 NE Wygant was flipped by its new owner for a profit of $100,000 less than
six months later (www.portlandmaps.com).
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of time when I would say that all I did was talk about mergers, philosophy, and
finances; it had nothing to do with our mission, we did nothing, and it was the most
grueling, unrewarding experience I could ever be involved with. We had attorneys
Figure 9-3
Albina CDC Asset to Debt Ratio 2001-2005

Sources: Albina Community Development Corporation, 2001-2006

and accountants, and that’s all it was about”; given this experience, it is no surprise
that the group was not able to attract any new board members to reinvigorate the
organization (Purcell interview: 12, 3).
In early 2004, it became clear that the organization was not going to be able to
continue. It had been limping along and surviving on operating support from the
Collaborative and had no development or programmatic opportunities. All of the
properties had finally been transferred to Albina CDC from HOF, and their audits
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completed. The group finally had a picture of where the organization stood financially.
It had been operating in the red since the SURDNA grant money had been exhausted.
When the finances were clarified, the outlook was not positive (Figure 9-4). Because
of this bleak outlook, the Board made the decision to transfer Albina CDC’s assets to
another CDC. It considered REACH and NW Housing Alternatives, but chose PCRI
because it was an organization that was familiar with the history of N/NE
neighborhoods, was committed to providing decent housing to low income families
and had a history of effective scattered site property management, and was a familiar
name to many of Albina CDC’s tenants (McIlhattan, 2005; Purcell interview: 4).
Albina CDC and PCRI entered into negotiations for the terms of the transfer – a
process that would take more than two years to complete.
Figure 9-4
Albina CDC Net Income 2001-2005

Sources: Albina Community Development Corporation, 2001-2006
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As a part of this transfer, many of Albina CDC’s properties were renovated and their
debt restructured, so that when PCRI took possession of the properties on March 31,
2006, they were in good physical condition and had a positive cash flow, but had some
unanticipated debt and lender restrictions (McIlhattan, 2003; McGee, 2005;
Fitzpatrick, 2010; McIlhattan, 2005). While Albina CDC officially dissolved on April
28, 2005, the transfer of 360 properties took an additional 11 months, but there was no
fanfare. There were no newspaper articles, just a blip on the radar of the assessor’s
office (See Chapter 8 for more details of the property transfer).
The differing views about the purpose and needs of the CDCs of Inner
North/Northeast Portland came to light during and after the merger process. The
Enterprise Foundation saw the organizations as a “means to an end (neighborhood
revitalization), and not the end” (Andrews interview: 8). Given that Portland’s CDCs,
for the most part, “did not grow from strong community activism and protest”, their
direction was very much governed by the goals and directives of their funders (Rohe,
Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a: 25). In its providing the groundwork for organizational
development, NPF sought to “create an industry” thinking that it would be selfsufficient within five years (NPF, 1994; McNamara interview: 5). BHCD encouraged
the development of as many organizations as possible because of what staff members
felt was an unending problem of vacant properties, crime, and blight in Inner
North/NE Portland (McLennan interview: 1). Subsequently, after its formation,
PNDSC focused its funding on fewer organizations, in an effort to make the best use
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of its funding that had diminished by the late 1990s (NPF, 1994; Neil Mayer and
Associates, 1998). The inevitable contraction of CDCs was a very painful, time
consuming, and costly process – the depth of which stakeholders did not anticipate
(McLennan interview: 10).
The lessons learned from the merger process were many, and depended on
which organization you consider. Neither Maxine Fitzpatrick of PCRI nor Craig
Fondren of Sabin CDC has any qualms about their withdrawing from the process – the
fact that both organizations still exist and Albina CDC does not is testimony in and of
itself that the merger process was a failure (Fitzpatrick interview: 11; Fondren
interview: 11). Mike Purcell, Franciscan board member who was involved in the
merger and demise of Albina CDC, felt that Franciscan had been railroaded into
participating and regrets that they ever participated. He wishes it had just downsized in
1999, so that the organization could have continued its original mission of charitable
works (Purcell interview: 13).
One of the critical failures in the merger process is related to the sequence of
events and the uneven timing. Initially, groups spent almost 2 years discussing options
and creating shared development plans. When those outcomes did not meet the
expectations of the funders who were driving the merger process, the time frame for
completing a merger was compressed unrealistically to six months for three
independent groups, who had been consciously differentiating themselves from one
another, to create an organization that merged all of their missions, values, assets and
staff. Had the organizations been on equal footing with clear financial statements and
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audits and each board member seen the merger with positive outcomes, the process
would have gone more smoothly. The Collaborative’s “hurry up and get organized”
approach erased any trust that some board members had in them. One board member’s
statement, “the Collaborative was more on the business side than the heartfelt side”
describes of the divide between the funders and the organizations, as the funders
sought to rationalize the CDC industry that it had aggressively initiated 10 years prior
(Farnum, 2003:10; Neil Mayer and Associates, 1998).
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CHAPTER 10.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
The intent of this chapter is to tie the individual cases together and to relate
them to broader contextual and organizational issues by answering the questions
posited in Chapter 2. Much has been written about CDC growth and neighborhood
change, but prior to the late 1990s and early 2000s, we have not had the opportunity
to examine CDC growth and change in the context of a gentrifying neighborhood.
Because of the geographic and temporal concentration of revitalization efforts in the
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland, the development of five
organizations in a small area allowed such a longitudinal study. The previously
symbiotic relationship between the organizations and their context morphed into a
more disparate one, as organizational and neighborhood priorities diverged. Emerging
at the tail end of a period of disinvestment, the five CDCs began as agents of
revitalization; they matured into more professional development institutions that were
often at odds with market forces; and, finally, they have settled into a role of lowincome housing stewardship.
The emergence, growth, and attrition of CDCs in Inner North/Northeast
Portland gives a unique perspective on how Portland, both its residents and
institutions, have dealt with and continue to deal with issues of race and racism and
demonstrates the ability of a city government to mobilize and focus resources on a
particular issue, in this case, housing problems. In the early 1990s, Portland was a
medium sized city. It was one of the more affordable cities on the West Coast whose
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economy was transitioning from resource based to hi-tech. Between 1990 and 1996,
the city’s housing prices increased by 50%, while its wages did not keep pace with
those increases. Hence, Portland went from being one of the most affordable places to
live on the West Coast, to one of the least (Bole, 1996). This sling shot effect was felt
most deeply in the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland, where property
values had been depressed and rose more steeply than the rest of the city (Appendix
H). This phenomenon is attributable to both localized gentrification, as well as the
larger housing market forces that drove the economy until the end of 2008.
Through the framework established by the research questions, listed below, I
have developed a critical comparison of organizations to each other and an
understanding of their maturation process in a particular social, political, and
economic context.
3. How did the Albina CDCs evolve?
A. What were the roots of these organizations?
B. Do/did the organizations have distinctive organizational
development trajectories?
4. What was the Albina CDCs’ individual and collective contribution to
social and economic changes within their neighborhoods? As
neighborhood revitalization became apparent, how did the organizations
respond to it?
With Hoover and Vernon (1959) and Clay’s (1979) periodization of
neighborhood development/decline/redevelopment in mind, I created a chart that listed
the key events for each organization to better understand the relationships between the
organizations (See Appendix J: Timelines). From the organizational and contextrelated events, four distinct phases of organizational development became clear: the
Early Years – Industry Formation, the Middle Years – Industry Growth and
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Complexity, the Merger Years – Industry Accountability, and the Mature Years –
Industry Contraction. The different periods were typified by similar development
activities and organizational changes, funding and resource opportunities that occurred
or were available for limited intervals. These periods correspond to the increasing
complexity of the organizations, their responsibilities to their funders, and their
relationships to their constituents and to the neighborhoods themselves.
The factors key to understanding these changing relationships are the social,
economic, and physical resources that the organizations began with, the speed at
which the organizations developed properties and their ability to manage them, and
how the organizations reacted to interactions between themselves and their new and
old neighbors. Each group’s initial resources varied greatly, from a workforce of 300
church volunteers to boards composed of neighborhood leaders, to a housing portfolio
of 350 units acquired with assistance from City Commissioners at rock-bottom prices.
The speed at which the organizations developed housing was an indicator of
organizational growth, in both size and breadth of responsibility – and a potential
contributor to organizational downfall, as housing development is not a fully
sustainable endeavor. The potential danger in this haste is twofold: organizations may
not have the capacity to manage the properties that they have developed and the
responsibilities of property management separate an organization from its initial
mission and intent. CDCs establish relationships with their neighborhoods early on;
however, neither organizations nor neighborhoods are static entities, so that they are in
a constant state of negotiation, a dance of leadership and accommodation.
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Discussion of Research Questions
Organizational evolution can be viewed on a number of different levels. In the
case of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland, aspects of organizational
expansion, property development success and/or failure, and relevance to the
neighborhoods in which they operate are three aspects that address the social,
economic, and political sides of each organization.
The Early Years – Industry Formation (1991-1995). In the Early Years, organizations
were relatively well funded, had ample development opportunities, enjoyed fairly
positive relationships with their neighbors, and experienced rapid growth in terms of
their annual budgets and staff sizes. Most of the operating funding came from limited
number of sources: the Neighborhood Partnership Fund and the City of Portland’s
Bureau of Housing and Community Development. NECDC was the exception to this
rule, though, because the organization had already won a Nehemiah Grant from HUD
and intended to produce over 200 units of housing.
It was “the goal of NPF’s programs to ensure that all of Portland’s low-income
neighborhoods are served by effective CDCs” (NPF, 1994: 1). The process that NPF
established to legitimize Portland’s CDCs steered the organizations into the field of
housing development and initiated the professionalization of the organizations, a step
that NECDC, Franciscan Enterprise, and HOF reluctantly followed for different
reasons (McNamara interview: 5; Schleiger interview: 3; Sohl interview: 5). Sabin
CDC readily participated, as Diane Meisenhelter had been actively recruited by NPF
to establish and lead the organization (Meisenhelter interview: 1). The carrot of
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operational funding for the organizations was very tempting, though, and ultimately,
all of the boards of the Albina area CDCs participated in the NPF trainings and
received their funding. This initial steering of the groups into housing development
and the catalyzing of their growth by infusing them with operating support, that in
some cases went against the grain of the organizational objectives, represented a
certain level of intervention and control that altered the organizations’ evolution and
strongly encouraged a housing-centric CDC industry.
One of the great challenges for the community-based organizations was
melding the local knowledge and connections of community members with the
complex financial responsibilities of the development and management of affordable
housing. It was often incumbent on the Executive Director to bridge these divides, and
organizations that had strong consistent leadership and a commitment to broad based
participation proved more successful at this endeavor than those that were swayed by
the promise of development money. In the case of HOF, a group that prided itself on
its full participation, some members noted that a board meeting vote could be
determined by where one sat (Pequeño interview: 11; Smock interview: 3). NECDC’s
Board was composed exclusively of professionals, so it was a non-issue (Northeast
Community Development Corporation, 1997-2000; State of Oregon, 1998-2001).
Sabin CDC’s Board members all resided in the neighborhood, at least in the early
days, and represented diverse groups within the community. Board members generally
served for several years, but after Sabin’s withdrawal from the merger process, the
board shrank to 5 members, many of whom resided outside of the Sabin neighborhood
248

(Sabin Community Development Corporation, 2002-2003). This shift accompanied
Sabin’s “go-it-alone” approach to organizational priorities and contradicted the public
view that the organization was a neighborhood membership based organization.
One of the most divisive issues associated with the revitalization of the
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland is that of race. For a city that prides
itself on transparent and inclusive public processes, Portland has struggled with racial
relations. Driven by what some interviewees referred to as the “Portland Nice”, where
public officials’ actions in minority neighborhoods were driven by a sense of guilt and
a fear of confrontation, City policy was punctuated by gaffs by public officials that
fueled tensions between black and white (Rudman interview: 10; Mayer, 1989; Oliver,
1989; Stewart interview: 2). Portland’s race relations have historically been
downplayed because of the small size of the black population, and politicians,
organizations, and funders approached the issues of racial strife, poverty and
disinvestment as if they were housing problems, in part because much of the available
money was targeted for housing, when in fact, it was more of an income problem.
The evolution of CDCs was entwined with race relations, as NECDC was born
out of a group of black community leaders’ efforts to provide job training to
underserved youth. Ron Herndon was by far the most outspoken of these leaders and
had a profound influence on the direction of decisions. Herndon, in speaking as a
member of the North/North East Development Task Force about the inclusion level of
Portland’s black community in the Albina Community Planning process, noted,
“neighborhood associations have never been used by blacks as a primary vehicle to
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bring about change” and fought for structural changes (Ames, 1989; Carlin, 1990).
While the Albina neighborhoods had been the targets of policies of real estate
steering and subsequent disinvestment and redlining that were associated with racial
discrimination and segregation, they also represented the heart of Portland’s small, but
tightly knit black community. Census data (Appendix D) shows that in 1980, the
census tracts analyzed were between 32% Black and 70% Black. As a result of
revitalization, and a subsequent demographic shift, Portland’s black community is no
longer centralized in Inner North/Northeast Portland; institutions like the Urban
League no longer focus their efforts in a specific geographic area. However, key
indicators like household income, and homeownership rates that signify economic
stability show that Portland’s black community has not benefited to the extent that
whites have in the past 10 years (Guerrero, 2004; www. census.gov).98 According to
these indicators, CDCs contributed to the physical revitalization of their
neighborhoods, but did little to change the more insidious part of the problem:
education, empowerment, and economic development.
In addition to race relations, the role of gender relations stood out as an
important factor in the evolution of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland. The
most obvious relationship was between organizations and funders: men primarily were
in the positions of financial power, while women were the local leaders of
organizations and neighborhood efforts. These relationships reinforced traditional
models and behaviors and placed the organizations into different camps: those who
98

The American Community Survey Data Sets differ from those of the Census, but was the only data
available since 2000. The closest comparisons occur in the Income Data Sets and the Housing Tenure
Data Set.
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worked with the system and those who did not (Malloy interview: 15; Sohl interview:
11). Gretchen Dursch, HOF’s Executive Director, was a model for establishing
relationships and figuring out how to accomplish her tasks without perceptibly going
against the system. Jaki Walker, NECDC’s Executive Director, on the other hand,
“was a force of nature” (Talton interview: 4). Her willingness to ruffle feathers was
legendary, as she alienated those who were supporting her organization, but, at the
same time she felt, were hindering its true potential (Mahoney, 1992; Sohl interview:
3; Lane, 1992). Ultimately, though, Walker instituted greater neighborhood change by
forcing the established system of funders to work with her, but at tremendous personal
costs.
CDC board composition played a significant role in the early years of each
organization. NECDC’s board was composed of elites from the black community, men
and women whose financial acumen and political skills drew attention to the
conditions of the neighborhood. Franciscan Enterprise’s early board was composed of
volunteers from the churches that formed the group. They were committed to
maintaining the volunteer model with little neighborhood representation, an example
of a top-down approach to community development. HOF’s board equally represented
community women and professional women. While this model worked well initially,
the board composition did not serve the fiscal management side of the organization
well in the long run, as the balance of skills was not even. Sabin CDC’s board was
initially composed of neighborhood residents who were not necessarily low-income.
The broad geographic base ensured that board members were committed to the health
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of the entire neighborhood, and part of the organization’s longevity can be attributed
to the fact that Board members were recruited continuously from within the
neighborhood as it gentrified (Fondren interview). PCRI’s board, on the other hand,
was composed of bankers, lawyers, and professional developers. While the idea for the
organization may have come from the community, the structure and intent of the
organization, at least initially, in no way reflected the composition of the community.
The early board compositions reflected the early scale of development that each
organization was able to attain, based on not only mission and intent, but also
resources.
By 1994, the smaller CDCs, Franciscan, HOF, and Sabin CDC, were on
similar trajectories: they were (re)developing single family houses and small
apartment complexes. HOF and Sabin CDC, though, were actively organizing their
neighbors, while Franciscan was struggling with what to do with fourteen donated
houses – an example a development opportunity exceeding the organizational capacity
and overwhelming the health of the organization in the long run. Franciscan had an
additional struggle as it professionalized its housing production: its volunteer model
was no longer the centerpiece of the organization, so that, as a result, the organization
drifted from its original mission.
The issue of trust between organization and neighborhoods was a key
challenge, especially for the smaller CDCs in the Early Years. Sabin CDC, Franciscan,
and HOF struggled with this issue more so than NECDC or PCRI because it was more
important to organizations with more incremental development approaches than to
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those with politically supported ones. HOF worked diligently to build neighborhood
trust as it embarked on the renovation of the Maya Angelou, but lost it over time, as
both HOF and the neighborhood residents changed. Sabin CDC, on the other hand,
was involved with residents on many different levels, from economic development
along Alberta to tenant services, to youth programs, to board development that
included new residents. It was the resultant level of trust that allowed the organization
to operate transitional housing programs with minimal cries of “NIMBY!”
(Meisenhelter interview: 6). The issue of neighborhood trust was more critical to the
smaller, less well-funded organizations, as they relied on developing relationships at
all levels in order to establish themselves as key leaders in their neighborhoods.
NECDC and PCRI were operating at different levels from the smaller CDCs.
NECDC, having won the Nehemiah grant in 1989, suffered politically from the
expectations that it would actually produce housing units in a relatively short period of
time. The reality was that there was a lag time of almost three years between the
winning of the grant and the completion of the first house (NECDC, 1990; Rollins,
1992a). This did not bode well for the organization’s continued success and continued
to be a problem for NECDC99. PCRI had begun the process of renovating its housing
stock, but was hindered by its lack of capacity and the scale of the renovations needed.
As a result, it suffered political consequences on the neighborhood level, but still had
strong support from downtown. Reflecting back on Glickman and Servon’s model of
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The lag time between project initiation and completion became more significant for all of the
organizations as projects grew in both size and funding complexity.
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integrated capacities, this lack of consistency across organizations assured an uneven
distribution of social capital.
All of the organizations stabilized properties and revitalized whole city blocks
through their housing development efforts and created an atmosphere of tremendous
change in the early and mid- 1990s. Most of the activities of each organization were
associated with housing, although groups were still able to distinguish themselves
because of their particular approach to development, the populations they served, and
the broader impacts their developments had. NECDC’s Nehemiah development, in
spite of its mortgage lending issues, created entire new blocks of housing that became
a national model. Franciscan Enterprise housed very low income families; HOF’s
women-centered model was admired for its inclusiveness; and Sabin CDC
incorporated many facets of community development, not just housing, under its
umbrella.
CDC investment in the Albina neighborhoods was significant in the early
1990s – the five organizations built or acquired more than 700 units of housing before
1996 in an area with roughly 11,600 households total (Office of Neighborhood
Involvement, 1991). While important physical indicators of gentrification include a
neighborhood with a historic housing stock and good metro access, the process occurs
when the area has had a modicum of investment, along the lines of these CDC housing
development efforts (Turner and Snow, 2000). According to anecdotal evidence,
neighbors did improve their structures as CDCs renovated and built houses and
apartment complexes (Kelley interview: 3; Purcell interview: 2). With the Nehemiah
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houses, Jaki Walker and NECDC effectively transformed lending policies in Inner
North/Northeast Portland, neighborhoods where homeowners had been denied
mortgages for decades, so that there was access to credit (Kafoury, 1992; Lane, 1992c;
Frater interview: 4).
The Middle Years (1996-1998). This time period was the most complex part of the
evolution of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland. A time of tumult and a
greater definition of political and financial boundaries, these years were characterized
by a demand for greater accountability from funders, limited but more complex
development opportunities, early stages of neighborhood gentrification, and new
property management realities. The greatest impact on organizations, though, at this
time was the decision by the City of Portland, the Neighborhood Partnership Fund,
and the Enterprise Foundation to streamline their funding and reporting processes into
one source, the Portland Neighborhood Development Support Collaborative
(PNDSC), in an effort to rationalize CDC funding. In doing so, these three separate
entities exerted greater control over their grantees and created a political bottleneck:
organizations were in an all-or-nothing position now for access to operating funding.
This new roadmap would certainly cause some organizations to die out – the fact that
both federal and philanthropic money were diminishing at that time caused many
entities to rethink their position on the funding of community organizations.100 This
change in policy was seen by the organizations as a rather abrupt change of priorities,
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NCDI and Living Cities funding was diminishing as the large foundations (Ford, MacArthur,
Hewlitt, Casey) were shifting their priorities and interests (Allen & Luckett interview: 13; Hoereth,
2002:22).
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one that changed the power dynamics and generated mistrust between CDCs and their
funders (Farnum, 2003: 16).
A twist in project development funding, too, occurred at this time, as the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit became a greater source of project capital, and as HOME
funds were targeted for lower income project development. In order to make projects
“pencil” with Tax Credits, developers would have to access multiple sources of
funding and develop larger projects (generally 8 units or more). Because of their size,
these projects tended to have higher profiles and greater impacts on their surroundings
– and pushed CDCs into a different position. They were no longer renovating a couple
of houses; they were sophisticated developers (and landlords) with burgeoning
portfolios of rental housing.
In addition to the shift in funding opportunities, development opportunities
were diminishing. The neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland had begun to
improve, and house prices were rising. There were fewer delinquencies and tax
foreclosed properties, and the CDCs were competing with each other and private
developers for a limited number of properties. As a result, NECDC developed a midsize apartment complex on an ill-chosen site; Franciscan Enterprise accessed new
funding by working on special needs housing; HOF partnered with an experienced
developer on a larger senior housing project; Sabin CDC began to shift towards
economic development and youth education work; and PCRI accessed HUD’s
program to integrate in-home childcare with affordable housing development. Each
organization, leery of competition, sought to establish a particular niche for itself.
256

As the organizations developed their niches and became more established, the
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland began to change. While one of the
issues associated with neighborhood revitalization is who benefits from the
development, one should also consider who defines the neighborhood, old or new
residents. In the case of the Albina neighborhoods, long time residents and new
residents did not always have the same priorities (Lane, 1990b). Long time residents
remembered the long history of broken promises, while newer (and often younger)
residents saw many opportunities within the neighborhoods. Long time storeowners
refused PDC money for storefront redevelopment and watched as new businesses
came on to their streets to cater to the area’s new residents (Fondren interview: 18;
Long interview: 9; Pequeño interview: 16). Many of the Albina CDCs had uneasy
relationships with the neighborhoods, as there was a perception that these
organizations had access to money that some neighborhood association members
thought should have been allocated to them (Smock interview: 11; Stewart interview:
35). The CDCs were in a state of limbo – they did not have the history in the
neighborhoods needed to call themselves old-timers, and because of their missions to
house low-income people, newer residents did not often see the neighborhood benefit
of the organizations. HOF and Sabin established trust with their neighborhoods early
on and for a short period of time, but these efforts were quickly erased by
organizational shortcomings and the arrival of new neighbors who did not know about
the good work that these organizations had done. As a result, HOF became an
outsider, and Sabin CDC fell into obscurity.
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Also at this time, the Low Income Housing Preservation and Residential
Homeownership Act (LIHPRHA) was introduced in Portland to preserve a large
number of apartment complexes that had been developed in the 1970s as affordable
housing units whose tax credits were expiring for their owners. The three smaller
organizations (Franciscan Enterprise, HOF, and Sabin CDC) participated in the
LIHPRHA program and added significant numbers of units to their portfolios as a
result.
While much of an organization’s success was based on the number of units that
it developed because it is a quantifiable and tangible asset that serves as both a
financial and political bellwether, there are two problems with this emphasis. The first
problem stems from the fact that, at least in the case of the CDCs that acquired
LIHPRHA properties, the unit counts were hollow and contributed to an expectation
that the organizations were more stable financially than they really were. For HOF,
Franciscan, and Sabin, the LIHPRHA properties were of a different scale than they
had previously developed and caused a slanted view of the overall portfolio. The
second problem stems from the overemphasis on unit counts as a measure of success.
This is in many ways more detrimental to an organization because it does not address,
especially for younger and financially vulnerable organizations, their ability to manage
the units in the longer term, and the broader implications for solid financing. The
PDC, from whom most organizations sought project financing, often focused on the
number of units, rather than the quality of renovation or the need for substantial
reserve accounts to be built in to the financing, because of the nature of its institutional
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practices: loan repayment superceded the ongoing needs of the project and the
organization that sponsored it. (Krause interview: 9; McLennan interview: 11). In
doing so, PDC pressured organizations to develop as many units as possible for as
little money as possible. This model would eventually backfire, as properties required
substantial maintenance capital, and, in some cases, substantial renovation sooner than
either the CDC or PDC had planned on (McLennan interview: 10, Kelley interview:
9).
One of the positive outcomes of PDC’s demands was the formation of a
consortium of CDC construction managers and directors, who came together to share
information, commiserate, and to collectively try to influence PDC’s policies. As the
CDCs began to amass small housing portfolios in the mid 1990s, Executive Directors
and Construction Managers began to meet to discuss some of the common obstacles
that each was encountering. The Rehab Work Group was a collective organization that
groups used to object to policy and funding issues without fear of reprisal (Kraus
interview: 14). This advocacy group expanded its scope and in 1995 became the
Community Development Network, and has taken on the role of statewide advocate
for housing policy and funding. The most visible actions of the CDN are now
associated with asset management and lobbying at the state level for a real estate
transfer tax to create a stable funding source for affordable housing development (Sten
interview: 14).
The Middle Years were also a time of transitions for both the organizations and
politicians. Levels of organizational competency were changing, as new staff were
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required to have skill sets that previous staff did not. Several former staff members
recall that their level of experience was far short of what was required for their
positions, and that “while I was not qualified to do my job when I started, I was when
it came time for me to leave” (Kelley interview: 2). Part of the reason for hiring underqualified staff was financial (salaries were very low, and often VISTA volunteers were
utilized for organizing and outreach positions). The other reason was organizations’
efforts to hire from within the neighborhood: the skill sets of many early
neighborhood residents did not often match those required for the job, but it was more
important for the organizations to incorporate neighborhood residents into the
organization than to have a highly skilled workforce (Dursch interview: 24).
Between 1996 and 1998, each Albina CDC experienced growing pains
associated with their relatively intense expansions. These pains, or adversity, can be
defined as a number of occurrences: a development project that went awry, the
departure of key staff, board indecision or neighborhood resistance. It is not whether
an organization will encounter adversity, but when it will and how it recovers from the
adversity (Guajardo, 2009a, 2009c; McLennan interview: 10). Franciscan, Sabin, and
HOF experienced a change in leadership. On the development side, NECDC
completed its Nehemiah grant, PCRI maxed out its line of credit with Bank of
America that it had used to gradually renovate its housing stock, and HOF developed
the Betty Campbell Building, an unsuccessful project that riled its neighbors and
funders. For Franciscan, Sabin, and HOF, the change in leadership meant a shift in
focus for the organization. Access to resources changed, and, in the case of HOF,
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embezzlement of funds was discovered which compromised the organization’s
credibility with local funders and HUD, who imposed additional restrictions on
existing projects.
For HOF, recovering from the change in leadership and embezzlement was
further complicated by the fact that the poor quality construction of its early
development efforts was coming to light. The Maya Angelou Apartment complex, first
renovated in 1993, was in need of a full renovation by 1997, due to the limited scope
and the cosmetic nature of the first renovation, both magnified by HOF’s ineffective
property management and eviction policies. The cosmetic nature of the renovation can
be traced back to PDC’s refusal to pay for the full replacement of systems and the lack
of replacement reserves set aside to deal with ongoing maintenance issues (Purcell
interview: 6; White interview: 9). As Sabin CDC and Franciscan had initially worked
on smaller projects and did not complete projects of more than 10-14 units, the scale
of their renovation quality issues did not come close to HOF’s.
While Sabin, HOF, and Franciscan were coping with internal and property
management issues, NECDC and PCRI were faced with finding new sources of
funding for project development. NECDC’s completion of its Nehemiah grant meant
that it would have to explore other development opportunities – at a time when
competition for projects was fierce, and homeownership programs had taken a back
seat to rental projects because of the cost of and funding for developing individual
units. As a result, Jaki Walker had to shift the focus of the organization to pursue
different kinds of projects. The 55-unit Gladys McCoy Terrace was family housing
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located on a major thoroughfare. From the start, the project was problematic; cost
over-runs, high vacancy rates, and poor quality construction plagued the complex and
further soured NECDC’s relationships with city leaders and, in hindsight, assured the
organization’s demise. Historic Riverpointe, the up-market single family house
development in NE Portland that was supposed to make money for the organization,
lost money due to an extended development timeline; this was the first of NECDC’s
increasingly far fetched ideas to sustain the organization.
PCRI’s line of credit with Bank of America had been its mainstay of funding
to renovate many of the nearly uninhabitable houses that it inherited from Dominion
Capital. By 1997, the credit line had been “maxed out”, and 80 housing units had
undergone either moderate or major renovations so that building code violations were
remedied and the organization was not in a “triage” mode where every week tenants
would report new problems with plumbing, electrical, heating, etc (Kelley interview:
4). Shifting from triage mode to longer-term management mode forced Maxine
Fitzpatrick to pursue new types of funds to renovate the remaining housing stock.
PCRI would now be competing directly with the other organizations for dwindling
HOME and CDBG funds – an added pressure for both PCRI and other CDCs because
of PCRI’s size and political support.
At this point, too, the composition of Portland’s City Council began to shift.
City Commissioner Gretchen Kafoury, champion of affordable housing and CDCs,
resigned after 6 years in office. Her former aide Erik Sten, who had been a driving
force in the creation of PCRI and had been elected to the Council in 1996, took over
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the leadership of BHCD. His efforts to continue Kafoury’s focus on affordable
housing development were sidetracked by debacles with other bureaus that he
headed.101 As a result, CDCs lost their affordable housing champion on City Council
and some of the clout that they had previously enjoyed.
While organizations were undergoing their individual growing pains, the
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland were experiencing some dramatic
changes as well. Property values had increased on average 25% since 1994, and the
area was undergoing the social and economic changes that accompany gentrification
(Barnett and Suo, 1996). A small artistic community had established itself on Alberta
Street and Mississippi Avenue to take advantage of cheap rents. Soon, consistent with
artistic gentrification models, a couple of small galleries established themselves:
TidBit and RIGGA Studio on Mississippi and the Onda and Guardino Galleries on
Alberta (Fondren interview: 21). In addition, gallery owners on Alberta Street
established a Last Thursday Art Walk to showcase their wares and assumed part of the
responsibility for organizing the yearly street fair.102 These actions left Sabin CDC, the
group originally responsible for the events, with a much less significant role, as the
celebrations, like much of the development that surrounded them, took on lives of
their own. This is consistent with Zielenbach’s assertion that while community
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Sten’s distractions included a billing debacle with the Water Bureau, where a new computer system
failed to bill customers for 6-8 months and caused a strain on cash flow for the agency, his efforts to
block Enron’s purchase of local utility Portland General Electric, and his effort “to force AT&T to open
its local broadband cable networks to competing ISPs” (Gubbins, 2003).
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Last Thursday is a play on the more established First Thursday art exhibits in Portland’s Pearl
District located near downtown.
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organizations cannot single-handedly revitalize their neighborhood, they can influence
the outcome.
The Merger Years (1999-2001). This time period was characterized by
organizational internal focus, as each group struggled with its role in the PNDSCinitiated merger discussions. At this stage, organization priorities and those of the
neighborhoods in which they operated truly diverged, as the organizations had become
synonymous with affordable housing and little else. It had been ten years since the
Vacant and Abandoned Housing Task Force (1988) noted the concentration of derelict
buildings in the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland, and Portland’s
housing market was heating up, like many others in the country. With the internal
focus, many of the tenuous relationships with neighbors were neglected, and the
necessary balance of organizational priorities was skewed.
The most dramatic example of this divergence, and subsequent imbalance,
occurred in the Boise Neighborhood, as HOF contributed to activation of the political
voice of neighborhood residents. When drug dealing and violence associated with
HOF’s properties became the focus of a neighborhood organization that was coming
together, HOF became the lightning rod around which the neighborhood organized. A
stronger neighborhood association resulted. The Boise Neighborhood Association
(BNA) had ongoing disputes with HOF regarding drug deals at its properties. HOF did
not acknowledge the BNA’s grievances; while the BNA did not understand the
constraints that HOF was under as managers of low-income housing developed with
public dollars (Bauer interview: 12: Cross interview: 18). This mutual mistrust was
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rooted in the absence of institutional memory on the neighborhood’s side and the
feeling of helplessness on HOF’s side that paralyzed the staff, and prohibited the
organization from overcoming their differences with BNA. Organizing against a
perceived threat is a particularly effective way of galvanizing a group that would not
otherwise come together. In this case, neighbors have continued to participate in the
Boise Neighborhood Association since being brought together by HOF’s troubles, and
they continue to cite this relationship many years later (BNA, 2007).
The timing of PNDSC’s initiation of discussions for organizational
streamlining in 1998 could not have been worse in terms of CDC/neighborhood
relationships. CDCs’ priorities were diverging from goals of (newer) neighborhood
residents, and by forcing the organizations to focus on themselves and the merger
discussions, PNDSC effectively marginalized them from fully participating in the
revitalized neighborhoods. Each organization responded differently to this pressure to
work together: HOF and Franciscan, both financially vulnerable organizations, entered
the discussions as a result of PNDSC’s pressure, while PCRI, NECDC, and Sabin
withdrew from the merger discussions at different stages. PCRI withdrew early on
because it was not reliant on PNDSC for operating funds, and had a stable housing
portfolio and cash flow. NECDC had begun to pursue the development of a sawmill
in Africa and had exhausted all of the proceeds from the sales of the Nehemiah
houses, so that it was forced to withdraw from the merger to close down their
operations. Sabin’s withdrawal, though, was controversial. According to some
residents and staff, it reflected the organization’s connection to its membership and its
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desire to continue its organizing work (Fondren interview; Loving, 2001b). On the
other hand, PNDSC members felt that it was a direct challenge to their authority, one
that was countered with a cessation of all operating money (Fondren interview: 7;
McLennan interview: 10; White interview: 9). Regardless of whether the organizations
joined the streamlining process that evolved into the merger process, their individual
relationships with their surrounding neighborhoods were altered by the rationalization
demanded by the funders. The divergence with neighborhood goals included larger
scale development and the emphasis on housing for very low-income individuals and
families, two types of development that assured cries of NIMBY in areas where
property values were skyrocketing.
The other point about the merger is that it exhausted both time and money
resources when support for public investment in affordable housing and programs that
benefited low-income individuals and families in the neighborhood was waning. It had
been eclipsed by support for and concern with private investment in upscale housing
and retail opportunities that were occurring. As a result, the organization that emerged
from the other end of the merger process (Albina Community Development
Corporation) was doomed to fail. All of the interviewees who had been connected to
the merger process noted, in hindsight, that it was both ill conceived and poorly
executed.
Mature Years/Attrition (2002-2006). In 2001, with the completion of the merger of
Franciscan Enterprise and Housing Our Families and the closure of NECDC, the three
organizations operating in Inner North/Northeast Portland, PCRI, Sabin CDC, and
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Albina CDC were faced not only with the effects of gentrification, but also a depletion
of funds from the various sources they had enjoyed. Labeled Mature Years/Attrition,
this time period was characterized by little new development, smaller organizational
staffs, and a focus on tenant services and efficient property management (PAMWG,
2007).103 With smaller staffs and with fewer office hours and open doors, the
organizations’ visibility in their neighborhoods was reduced; the socio-economic
distance between the organizations and their thriving neighborhoods grew.
The depletion of public and philanthropic financial resources that contributed
to the need for a merger was both the result of timing and a shift in focus away from
neighborhood revitalization (Andrews interview: 8). The unfortunate timing piece was
associated with federal policy shifts. As a result of the events of 9/11, housing funding
was shifted to military efforts in Afghanistan and then Iraq, and, by 2002, HUD’s
budget authority had decreased by 40% relative to where it had been in 1976 (Powell,
2004). This depletion of federal resources was concurrent with the decline of
philanthropic funding. Living Cities, a collaborative of 20 foundations whose
allocations were managed by Enterprise and LISC, was diminishing its funding of
CDCs and housing development (Hecht, 2008; Andrews interview: 1). What had been
an allotment of $800,000/ year for several years dropped by half as the individual
contributors to the fund developed their own specific interests and projects (Allen and
Luckett interview: 13, Walker, 2002: 32).

103

The Housing Development Center’s Property and Asset Management Working Group (PAMWG)
was created in 2001. It was an effort to share information among CDCs regarding property management
challenges, reporting requirements, and ongoing relationships with funders.
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At this time, too, local public policy changed with the implementation of the
10 Year Plan to End Homelessness in 2004. While public funding had been
increasingly more competitive since the mid 1990s, it was the City Council’s
prioritization of the 10 Year Plan that ensured that new housing development would
serve formerly homeless, and very low-income individuals and families, in areas other
than the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland. This shift in focus away
from North/Northeast Portland further increased the competition among CDCs and
required that they adapt their development models to acquire that funding (Walsh
interview: 5).
Concurrently, property values rose dramatically in the Albina neighborhoods,
and the main sources of project finance were the Low Income Housing Tax Credit
(LIHTC) and commercial loans, as credit became easier to access (Walker, 2002: 25).
When using the LIHTC, a minimum of eight units was necessary in order to make a
project feasible. Sites that large simply were no longer available in Inner
North/Northeast, and development shifted further east where populations were now
poorer, property values were lower and more land was available. As a result, the
combined housing production numbers for the Albina CDCs dropped from 187 units
in 1998 to 23 units in 1999 (Appendix G).
The result of the contraction of funding and development opportunities was a
contraction of the visibility of the organizations within their neighborhoods.
Construction and development projects created organizational visibility within their
neighborhoods and contributed to their networking capacity both positively and
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negatively. In earlier years, the organizations had been able to parlay the good
publicity into additional opportunities. Negative publicity surrounded the
organizations in the middle and later years. As the construction projects waned,
though, the CDCs have tended to fade into the background of their neighborhoods.
Whether or not a CDC was a grassroots community organization and had
positive connections to its neighborhood had little bearing on whether it was able to
survive, because the neighborhoods in which they operated changed so dramatically in
the period studied. Of the two surviving organizations, PCRI and Sabin CDC, one was
created for the expressed purpose of managing a troubled housing portfolio and one
was community based. Hence, the attrition rate of the more community based
organizations was higher in the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland (two
“community based” organizations no longer exist, and one “outsider” organization no
longer exists), and the role of community roots in the longevity of an organization
diminished over time as a factor in defining the success and/or longevity of an
organization as the surrounding neighborhood demographics changed. Because “new
residents were not necessarily supportive of a community development agenda aimed
at lower income households”, a different kind of networking would be necessary in
order to garner the kind of support previously enjoyed (Rohe, Bratt, & Biswas,
2003b). This new approach was not part of the agenda of NECDC or Franciscan
Enterprise, and, in the case of HOF, contributed directly to its weakness (Swart &
Wolf, 2002). On the other hand, Sabin CDC prides itself on its ongoing community
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relations, while PCRI’s well-tended properties are its most visible effort to maintain
positive broader community ties.
In part because of the contraction of funding for construction activities, the
organizations were effectively marginalized from participating in their neighborhoods’
physical revitalization dialogues as private sector investment overtook public and nonprofit investment. While all of the groups developed housing and renovated existing
houses and apartments, they generally directly served a lower income population so
that their contribution to neighborhood revitalization was limited to low and moderate
income housing development.104 This lack of breadth was often due to constraints on
funding (that it was focused on housing that served lower-income residents),
something that assured that these organizations would not be embedded in a wealthier
neighborhood as conditions changed. Nevertheless, as the organizations matured, they
were not perceived as holistic neighborhood development organizations (Fondren
interview: 4; Morgan interview: 12; Walsh interview: 5).
The amount of time that CDCs have intervened in the neighborhoods of
Inner North/Northeast Portland and the amount of impact that they have had is very
small compared to the duration of decline and the amount of private capital that has
been invested (and lost). A study completed by The Oregonian stated, “In five
years, a booming real estate market has done for Albina what 50 years of
government and social programs alone could not” (Barnett and Suo, 1996). The
maps in Appendix I show the locations of CDC developed affordable housing units
104

Sabin CDC was an exception to this rule, given their organizing and economic development efforts
associated with the Alberta Street Corridor Plan.
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against a background of neighborhood property value increases. The increased
property values can be seen with the transition of the background from brown to
yellow with an encroachment of blue that represents even higher property
Figure 10-1
CDC Housing Development and Portland Metro Median Home
Prices 1987-2006

Sources: RMLS, 1993-2006; Franciscan Enterprise of Oregon, 1994, 1995, 1997-2000; McGee, 2005;
Merrick and Al-Hamid; 1998, Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2002a and 2006a; Sohl,
1995; Sabin CDC 1995-1997; Sabin Community Development Corporation, 1997-2006; Tupper, 2007

valuations. What is clear from these maps and Figure 10-1 is that property values
increased in the neighborhoods as CDC housing production declined, so that the
overall impact of CDC housing did not mitigate the property value increases
dramatically. In many cases, the efforts of CDCs have failed to preserve housing
for long time residents: the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland produced a
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total of 1,139 units of housing that is designated “affordable” and constitutes less
than 10% of the total housing units in the Albina Neighborhood (Office of
Neighborhood Involvement, 1991).
While housing development is only one part of a CDCs mission to “reshape
distressed communities”, it is also its most visible component (Glickman & Servon,
1998; Vidal, 1996). As organizations grow and develop capacity, they strike a
balance between resources and the components of capacity. The bulk of the
resources available were for housing development: “it was a place based impetus, it
was about physical revitalization” (Andrews interview: 5); hence, these CDCs were
susceptible to the market conditions of their locale. As a result, as the market
conditions became more competitive and housing prices increased, the
organizations that were dependent on the development of new properties to support
their operations on an ongoing basis were priced out of the market in their
immediate neighborhoods. In the late 1990s, Construction Managers for PCRI who
had worked with neighborhood contractors to help them build capacity and
business skills now found that they were competing with private developers and
homeowners for the services of those contractors (Kelley interview: 4; Loving,
2001a).
Each organization had lost what made them distinctive (DelSavio interview:
4; McLennan interview: 9). In the case of Portland’s CDCs, there was little
flexibility that would allow “CDCs to change focus and direction in response to
shifts in the environment in which they work” (Glickman and Servon, 1998); hence,
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as their options grew more limited, the organizations lost both their uniqueness and
their ability to adapt to a changing neighborhood. The organizations responded to
the funding limitations by focusing their resources on their particular tenantry, and
not as much on the neighborhood as a whole. In doing so, the organizations either
alienated the neighborhood as HOF did, or became relatively invisible to the
broader neighborhood as Sabin and PCRI did. This was a key point in the evolution
of the Albina CDCs. Because they could not control the neighborhood change, how
and where they posited themselves in response to it would be crucial to their
longevity and ongoing contributions to neighborhood vitality. There are two
possible approaches to self-preservation in these circumstances: they needed either
to develop new ideas and new programs to fund themselves that addressed micro
rather than macro issues, as Sabin CDC and PCRI did, or to broaden their
geographic boundaries – an impossibility as their service areas were already
overlapping to a great extent.
By 1998, the Boise Neighborhood Association and the group Art on
Alberta enjoyed powerful voices and thriving commercial areas. It is ironic that the
revitalization of both the Mississippi Avenue and the Alberta Street commercial
strips were helped by CDCs that were eventually pushed aside: Housing Our
Families (Mississippi Target Area project) and Sabin CDC (Alberta St Corridor)
respectively. While Sabin maintained a small presence in the creation of the Alberta
St Corridor Plan and in subsequent groups, Art on Alberta and the Alberta Street
Fair, by 1997, the organization ceded its role in the Alberta Street Fair. On the other
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hand, HOF, and later Albina CDC, had little if any role in the Mississippi Target
Area Plan and the Boise Neighborhood events after 1997 (Bauer interview: 5).
Each street developed into a thriving center for creative retail endeavors, art
galleries, and restaurants, the “boutiquefication” or commercial gentrification that
often accompanies the residential gentrification (Lees, Wyly, Slater, 2008: 131).
While many CDC staff and neighborhood activists had voiced their fears about
gentrification as far back as the early 1990s, their cries fell on deaf ears until it was
clear that the neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland were no longer
affordable and were experiencing a transition from poorer, mostly black,
neighborhoods to wealthier, whiter neighborhoods (Dursch interview: 18; Fondren
interview: 2; Lane, 1990b; Morgan interview: 10; Schleiger interview: 7). In Inner
North/Northeast Portland early transformations (that included larger new construction
projects) were associated with non-profits that focused on services for lower income
neighborhood residents: the construction of the Boys and Girls Club in 1994 adjacent
to the new NE Police Precinct and NECDC’s Nehemiah housing on NE Roselawn and
the construction of a new building for Self Enhancement Inc, a local non-profit aimed
at “helping at-risk African American urban youth” on the western half of Unthank
Park in 1997 (www.selfenhancement.org). Later developments were private and
catered to higher income groups: the renovation of the abandoned Kennedy School on
NE 33rd in 1997 into a brew pub and hotel, the relocation of the Rebuilding Center to
N. Mississippi Avenue in 2000, and the opening of a high end grocery store in the
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abandoned Sentry Market location on NE 33rd in 2001.105 Each of these developments
served a new population and both signified neighborhood transformation and
contributed to its further gentrifying by attracting people who would not otherwise
have moved to the neighborhoods.
In the early 1990s, the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland took on the
role of keepers of institutional memory, as the displacement of older residents and
neighborhood based African American institutions was occurring. Several churches
relocated further east to follow their congregations, jazz clubs that had once lined
Williams Avenue were shuttered, and small shops and restaurants that had weathered
the neighborhood’s decline were not able to compete during its ascendance (Long
interview: 21; Sharpe interview: 5; Simmons interview: 1). PCRI completed its new
offices in 2005, the renovation of a large historic home on Martin Luther King Jr.
Boulevard, in its effort to preserve both its mission and a part of neighborhood history
(Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2005a). Sabin CDC staff has
preserved many of the photographs and documentation of the events that made the
neighborhood what it is today. This role as keeper of institutional memories, though,
has transitioned, too. The Boise Neighborhood Association has undertaken projects
like the Boise Voices Oral History project. Neighborhood children conducted
interviews with older residents and compiled their stories on a CD in order to “connect
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There was one full service grocery store, a Safeway, in between I-5 and NE 33rd and NE Knott and
NE Columbia Boulevard since the Sentry Market had closed in 1990. The Rebuilding Center of Our
United Villages is a nonprofit that specializes in re-using cast off building materials from cabinetry to
windows, doors and trim, plumbing fixtures and tile. It supports the gentle deconstruction and re-use of
older homes and is a tremendous resource for those remodeling older homes
(www.rebuildingcenter.org) .
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young people with their history in a way that is both vivid and memorable” (Yanke,
2009). In doing so, the history of the CDCs did not appear in the transcript.
Neighborhood demographics had shifted. In 1990, neighborhood incomes
hovered around the poverty line, while the proportion of those with higher education
degrees was between 10% and 20% in the census tracts noted (Appendix D). In 2000,
incomes in those same census tracts were between 50% to 80% higher and much
closer to the City of Portland median. Educational attainment generally more than
doubled as well. Poverty rates that had increased between 1980 and 1990 significantly
declined. The racial transition of the neighborhood was also obvious: census tracts that
had been between 30% and 75% black in 1980 had become increasingly white. While
initially the gentrification of the Albina neighborhoods was signified by the
displacement of the poor and primarily black populations, its subsequent stages have
more closely reflected the displacement associated with class, as many of the earlier
gentrifiers have become concerned with their own displacement (Morgan interview:
12). This is consistent with Clay’s stages of gentrification.
In 2004, it became clear to the Board of Directors of Albina CDC that the
organization was no longer viable and had little opportunity to contribute to the
revitalized neighborhoods. Albina CDC was not solvent, it did not have a positive
relationship with the neighborhoods in which it operated, and it had one staff
person. At this point, the Board of Directors entered into negotiations with Maxine
Fitzpatrick and the Board Members of PCRI for the transfer of Albina’s assets to
PCRI. When this transaction was completed on March 31, 2006, Fitzpatrick and her
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staff were consumed by the fiscal and structural challenges of incorporating
Albina’s portfolio into PCRI’s.
Within the context of neighborhood gentrification and depleted resources,
the surviving CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland struggled to preserve their
role as advocates for the remaining low-income residents. By 2005, both Sabin
CDC and PCRI had cut their staff sizes: PCRI went from 18 in 2000 to 10 in 2006,
and Sabin went from 8 in 2000 to 3 in 2006 (Portland Community Reinvestment
Initiatives, 2000; Portland Community Reinvestment Initiatives, 2006 Sabin
Community Development Corporation, 2000; Personal Observation, 2006). With
smaller staffs, narrower community participation, and, for PCRI, large logistical
problems, the visibility of the CDCs in their neighborhoods was almost nil.

Explication of the Theoretical Model
According to the model set out in Chapter 2, each organization had a certain
initial level of “embeddedness”, or relevance, with the neighborhoods in which they
operated. This model, whose resolution is a potential topic for future research, seeks to
establish a clearer understanding of the relationship between CDC and surrounding
neighborhoods. The neighborhood lifecycle literature tells us that neighborhoods are
not static entities and can change dramatically over time, in this case from decline to
revitalization. This transformation takes on both social and economic characteristics
and shifts the relationship the neighborhood has with local CDCs, whose priorities are
often rooted in an era of neighborhood decline. A neighborhood’s lifecycle can be
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graphed according to the levels of investment that are associated with each stage of
development. From the words that describe the stages of development, one can infer
its graph looks like a trough plotted along the axes of time and money (Figure 10-2).
To determine the level of CDC “embeddedness”, it is necessary to overlay the activity
level of the CDC and its connectivity to the surrounding neighborhood, based on its
housing production, levels of income, levels of service, etc, on the neighborhood
lifecycle. The Albina area CDCs first established relationships with their surrounding
neighborhoods when they were at or near their nadir (depressed property values, high
rates of crime and derelict buildings). Hence, their organizational models, when there
Figure 10-2
Model of Neighborhood Lifecycle and CDC Changes in the Albina
Neighborhoods
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was very little if any private investment, addressed issues of blight to meet the needs
of the low-income residents. Organizational priorities and neighborhood priorities
were in sync, as residents were eager for investment that would stabilize their
neighborhoods.
In the early 1990s, poverty levels in the Albina neighborhoods exceeded 30%
(see Appendix D). The work of the Albina area CDCs was relevant to the
neighborhood residents, many of whom benefited directly from these activities in the
form of jobs and housing, so that there was a symbiotic relationship between
organization and neighborhood. The factors most closely associated with the idea of
embeddedness, in addition to economic capital, included the number of board and staff
drawn from the immediate community, efforts made to utilize local businesses, and
levels of outreach that included organizing activities and efforts to foster selfimprovement in the neighborhoods and the relationships that resulted from these
endeavors; in short, the amount of social capital organizations had inherently or built
up within their communities. Organizational transformation takes on both social and
economic characteristics and shifts the relationship of the organization, and its fixed
assets and development processes, with its surroundings. Each organization had a
different trajectory of development, and that trajectory dictated the relationship, and
relevance, of the organization to the neighborhood at a particular point in time,
whether it was converging, parallel, or diverging.
The Albina area CDCs built up very little social capital because of the speed at
which the organizations grew, and the subsequent speed at which the neighborhood
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changed around them. NECDC had the most social capital initially, but that
diminished as the neighborhood changed, and the organization branched out beyond
its Nehemiah development model, where it developed very low-income rental
apartments and market rate single-family houses in a neighborhood located further
north from its initial service area. Its volunteer model and its ties to churches outside
of the neighborhood limited Franciscan Enterprise’s social capital. HOF was plagued
by the neighborhood perception that it was an organization of white women initially,
and then by its failure to listen to neighborhood concerns. Sabin CDC initially
represented a segment of the neighborhood, but lost its relevance when its activity
level diminished due to reduced funding after the merger withdrawal. PCRI never had
a significant amount of neighborhood involvement, or social capital, because the
nature and size of its portfolio did not require it to.
Some of the organizational trajectories indicate greater resiliency in the face of
increased competition, higher development and operational costs, shifts in funding and
financing, while others show downward trends. Because of the gentrifying
neighborhoods, any organizational setback was more costly, especially when
associated with housing development. Because of the housing-centric nature of the
organizations, new development was the only readily available solution to any
problems incurred. The organizations that experienced setbacks due to housing
development projects that went awry and cost the organization money were not able to
recover from these setbacks for different reasons. HOF, Franciscan, and NECDC all
experienced development projects that drained the organization of energy, social
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capital and working capital. Because there was not an opportunity to recapture some
of that capital with an impending development project, the organizations’ reputations
inside and outside of the neighborhoods were tarnished, and they were not able to
recover.
The trajectory lines of the organizations crossed the neighborhood lifecycle
trajectory when the goals of the neighborhood residents no longer complemented the
missions and actions of the individual organizations. Concurrent with Guajuardo’s
(2009) model of CDC organizational development, it is not whether the organization
will no longer be in sync with its neighborhood priorities, but when it will be and how
it reacts to this event. In the case of the CDCs of Inner North/Northeast Portland, some
organizations floundered (NECDC and Albina CDC), while others contracted (Sabin
CDC) or became more introverted (PCRI). In the early 2000s, when gentrification was
taking hold, and the voices of neighborhood residents had grown stronger, the Albina
area CDCs did not have enough housing units to have attained “scale” and relied on
neighborhood political support for their efforts. Once an organization experienced a
setback in these circumstances, it was not able to recover. NECDC, Franciscan, and
HOF all experienced these setbacks. Albina CDC never had the chance to reverse the
cumulative downward trajectory of HOF and Franciscan – it had inherited too many
internal and external obstacles to surmount. Sabin CDC has contracted their services
to such an extent that the organization is barely visible. PCRI’s trajectory, on the other
hand, was bolstered by the acquisition of a large apartment complex and Albina CDCs
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portfolio, so that it has attained the scale necessary to operate independently of
neighborhood residents’ goals and priorities.

Conclusions
Existing models of CDC growth, change, and decline have considered a host of
organizational factors including board and staff participation, organizational mission,
community involvement, network, and funding issues; contextual issues of federal
policy, the role of national intermediaries and local support systems, and the impact of
local market conditions have also been a critical part of the analysis of CDCs (Rohe,
Bratt, and Biswas, 2003a). CDC evolution in the context of gentrification is a more
recent and less thoroughly documented avenue of the literature (Newman and Wyly,
2010: 566). In the case of the Albina CDCs, the critical points of the existing literature
that this study contributes to are the Role of CDC as Neighborhood Revitalizer,
Developer and Organizer, Organization Capacity Building, and Measures of Success.
In their role as neighborhood revitalizers, developers, and organizers, the
Albina CDCs were closely tied to housing development efforts. Their main role was as
developers of affordable housing, it waned as neighborhoods improved, and
development opportunities dropped off. Zielenbach (2000) doubts the ability of CDCs
to single handedly revitalize neighborhoods, but, in this case, the saturation of CDCs
at the very least laid the groundwork for gentrification. The focus on housing
development, too, limited other potential interventions that may have had a more
lasting impact on issues of poverty. The role of organizing for the Albina CDCs was
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rarely at the forefront of the organizations; there was little money for the endeavor,
and when it was available, it was in conjunction with a housing development effort.
The Components of Organizational Capacity as defined by Glickman and
Servon look beyond housing production to analyze the concurrent relationships that
CDCs build. According to this model, few of the Albina CDCs were or are balanced
and sustainable organizations. The housing-centric nature of most organizations has
separated them from their neighborhoods and made them too reliant on their
relationships with policy makers and funders.
The Measures of Success is the aspect of the literature where this study
contributed most. Gittell and Wilder define success as improvement in the lives of
neighborhood residents, while Twelvetrees defines organizational success as survival
and the ability to meet its own goals. Under strong market conditions with constrained
funding sources, success is defined somewhat differently. What defines success for the
Albina area CDCs and in the Albina neighborhoods is very different and represents the
distinction between people-based development and place-based development. The
Albina area CDCs had been led to believe, according to NPF’s initial goals, that their
role in the neighborhoods was more or less permanent (NPF, 1994); however, the
implementation of the NPF goals introduced a set of measures that was not consistent
with these initial goals. The politics surrounding the initial goals emphasized
neighborhood improvement (and the stimulation of outside investment) rather than
organizational longevity, so that the balance sheets of the organizations were
tantamount to the work that they were doing. This difference in perspectives and
283

values was one reason why the merger process failed so miserably. In addition, city
policies at this time shifted to serve lower income populations, a niche that was not
possible for smaller CDCs to achieve readily. Because of this shift, funding for
projects that were of a familiar type and scale (single family house and small
apartment complex renovation and/or development), if they still existed in the
neighborhoods, was basically eliminated. Hence, the organizations that survived (and
could be considered successful) were the ones that did not depend on new
development projects for revenue.
The City of Portland as a political entity was the biggest winner in the
revitalization of the Albina neighborhoods with a realization of increased property
values, new businesses, and private development activity. For its relatively modest
investment in the organizations, their community activities, and property development,
the City of Portland’s return was unexpectedly prompt and prodigious. The
revitalization efforts became a national model as we began to understand the positive
and negative effects of gentrification.
Were the neighborhoods successful? While the lives of neighborhood residents
may have been improved with stable, affordable housing, only those who were lucky
enough to be living in a CDC-owned dwelling were directly affected. Other lowincome residents, though, can no longer afford to live in the Albina neighborhoods and
have relocated. The version of success defined by improvement in residents’ lives in a
gentrified neighborhood is a limited one. This polarization reflects the national trend
of the growing gap between rich and poor
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Most of the organizations that contributed to the revitalization of the Albina
neighborhoods have failed, but they did develop housing, organize neighbors, and
open doors to more equitable lending practices. The assets of the failed organizations
have been protected, so that their most visible community development contributions
continue. The victory of organizations in a gentrified neighborhood can be seen as
pyrrhic.
The roles of local government and foundation funders both catalyzed and
constrained the organizational growth of the Albina CDCs. The speed at which the
Albina CDCs developed housing was an indicator of organizational growth in both
size and breadth of responsibility. The Albina CDCs acquired and developed almost
70% of their housing units prior to 1997, when most of the organizations were not
more than five years old (Appendix G). This catalyzed growth had mixed results. The
benefit to the low-income community was clear: more than 1100 units of affordable
housing have been retained, while much of the rest of the housing stock was improved
and the neighborhood gentrified. In hindsight, policy makers longed for greater
housing production, as low-income residents bore the costs of gentrification and were
displaced. Two pitfalls associated with this haste were that organizations, in some
cases, did not have the capacity to manage the properties that they developed, and that
the sophistication required to develop and manage multiple properties separated
organizations from their original missions and intent.
The goals of funders limited the autonomy of the organizations – and limited
needed flexibility, given the changing goals of neighborhood residents. Given the fact
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that CDC supporters had the express goal of neighborhood revitalization and strong
housing development agendas that precluded organizational flexibility in achieving
that goal, the fact that the organizations that failed lasted as long as they did is
testament to their fortitude. From inception to merger to closure, each phase of
organizational development was defined by associated housing development. This
lack of diversification ensured that not all organizations would survive, a finding
consistent with Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas’ (2003a) recommendations that resulted from
their research. This lack of diversification concurs, too, with Rusk’s (1999) description
of CDC efforts to help poor families run up the down escalator. CDC efforts did little
to resolve overarching issues of poverty in Inner North/Northeast Portland.
While revitalization has been a welcome phenomenon in the Albina
neighborhoods, it has come at a cost to low-income residents who were forced to
relocate. In response to Rohe, Bratt, and Biswas’ (2003a: 69) question about the
impact of strong market conditions on CDCs, the answer in the case of Inner
North/Northeast Portland is that strong market conditions prevented CDCs from
continuing their housing development activities and reduced their visibility within the
neighborhood. By 2006, physical blight had been remediated. Remediation of poverty,
though, was much less clear, as long-standing arguments of people-based v. placebased development recalls the Bratt-Stoecker (1997) debate about the purpose of
CDCs. While the original intent of some of the organizations was to alleviate poverty
and promote empowerment, this intent changed as the organizations matured and were
held to a level of accountability by both neighbors and funders that did not allow them
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to address these issues. The mistakes and setbacks that organizations encountered in
housing development cost them both financial and political capital, and set them on a
downward, or at least divergent, trajectory. Consequently, the organizations chose to
focus on sustaining themselves; at this point, CDCs began acting more like small
businesses than community organizations, as balance sheets and revenue superceded
engagement activities (Galster, et al, 2005). This lack of balance, necessary to
maintain equilibrium between the components of organizational capacity, resulted in
the isolation of the organizations from neighborhood activities (Glickman and Servon,
1998). While they were preservers of affordable housing, tenant services and
empowerment, they had become disconnected from the rest of the neighborhood.
Key stakeholders, with the benefit of hindsight, have called for planning efforts
to address gentrification proactively. In order to do so, it is necessary for community
organizations to manage conflict between existing and emerging neighborhood
institutions (Van Meter, 2007). Therefore, organizations need access to flexible
funding to provide a balance of services, especially those that stress inclusion of
residents old and new.

Future Research
There are several opportunities to further delineate and expand upon this
research. The opportunities for delineation include the incorporation of 2010 census
data information to determine what stage of gentrification the neighborhood is
currently in, and how CDCs can best operate, whether to effect change or empower
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their tenantry. This research would entail an examination of demographic data and
housing data, within the context of current housing policies and opportunities.
A second opportunity for additional research addresses the role of CDCs in the
neighborhood gentrification process. Because CDCs act as both catalysts for
neighborhood revitalization, yet buffers against wholesale gentrification and the
displacement of poor residents, they have a dual political role as advocates for lowincome residents and mediators between the gentrifiers and lower-income, often long
term, residents. Their dilemma calls into play the debate of whether these
organizations are intended to serve people in a certain geography, or those of a certain
socio-economic condition, the debate of investment in people or in place. This
dilemma could be more precisely explicated by an elaboration of the conceptual model
of the relationship between neighborhood change and CDC evolution. Solidifying the
model would entail the creation of measures of neighborhood evolution based on
investment and real and perceived viability (based on Clay’s descriptions). Then,
organizational growth and change based on capacity, development success, and
measures of neighborhood integration would be overlaid to help identify the relevance
of the organization to the surrounding geographic area, and where its current and
future emphasis should lay. This study would be most effective as a comparative case
study of organizations in different cities because of the potentially different policies,
public priorities, and specific economic conditions.
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Postscript
Long after gentrification had changed the faces in the Albina
neighborhoods, the City of Portland sponsored a series of public meetings
beginning in 2007 to discuss neighborhood gentrification. These meetings evolved
into the Restorative Listening Project, now under the auspices of the City’s Office
of Neighborhood Involvement. The first session at the AME Baptist Church was
led by former City Gang Enforcement Staff Member John Canda and facilitated by
Judith Mowry. The vast majority of the attendees appeared to be white, middle
class people, while several small groups of black people sat on the periphery – a
metaphor for what had happened in the neighborhoods. As the meeting progressed,
it appeared to be a way for new residents to assuage their guilt, until an African
American woman stood up and spoke about “the gentrification” – and how white
people were the problem. Her disgust was unmistakable, as her voice, growing
more robust with each word, silenced all of those in attendance. Perhaps it was the
first time that new residents were called out as being “the problem”, rather than
contributing to the solution. No one said a word for several minutes after she
finished talking. Whether this woman’s words had a lasting effect on those in
attendance is unknown; the project continues, but the only tangible policies
currently in effect to mediate the tide of gentrification are associated with minority
homeownership opportunities (Housing and Community Development
Commission, 2004).
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Appendix A
List of Acronyms
Initials
ACDC
AOCDO
BHCD
BNA
BSRC
CDBG
CDC
CDN
CHDO

Full Term
Albina Community Development
Corporation
Association of Oregon Community
Development Organizations
Bureau of Housing and Community
Development
Boise Neighborhood Association
Bedford Stuyvesant Restoration
Corporation
Community Development Block Grant

FE

Community Development Corporation
Community Development Network
Community Housing Development
Organization
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977
Enterprise Social Investment
Corporation
Franciscan Enterprise

HAP

Housing Authority of Portland

HDC
HMDA
HOPE

Housing Development Center
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975
Home Ownership and Opportunity for
People Everywhere
Housing Our Families

CRA
ESIC

HOF
HOME
HUD
LIHTC
LISC
NAHA

Home Investment Partnerships. Funding
category from the Department of
Housing and Urban Development.
US Department of Housing and Urban
Development
Low-Income Housing Tax Credit
Local Incentives Support Corporation
National Affordable Housing Act of
1992, otherwise known for the names of
its sponsors, Cranston Gonzalez Act
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NCDI
NCNW
NECDC
NIMBY
NNC
NOAH
NPF
OCF
PAMWG
PCRI
PDC
PNDSC
REACH CDC
ROSE CDC
SAE
TACS
UDAG
VISTA

National Community Development
Initiative
National Congress of Neighborhood
Women
Northeast Community Development
Corporation
Not in My Back Yard
Neighborhood Network Center
Network of Affordable Housing
Neighborhood Partnership Fund
Oregon Community Foundation
Property and Asset Management
Working Group
Portland Community Reinvestment
Initiatives
Portland Development Commission
Portland Neighborhood Development
Support Collaborative
Recreation, Education, Access,
Commerce and Housing
Rebuilding Outer South East
Single Asset Entity
Technical Assistance for Community
Service
Urban Development Action Grant
Volunteers in Service to America
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Appendix B
List of Interviewees
Name

Position

Kate Allen

Director

Mike Andrews

Director

Janet Bauer

Project Manager

Tom Benjamin

Board Member

Sam Chase

Director

Chris Cross

Construction
Manager
Executive
Director
Executive
Director
Project Manager,
Board Member,
Executive
Director
Chair

Tom Del Savio
Gretchen Dursch
Jane Ediger

Susan Emmons

Maxine
Fitzpatrick
Craig Fondren
Janice Frater

Sheila Holden

Executive
Director
Program
Manager
Community
Reinvestment
Officer, Member

President

Organization

Date of
Interview
Enterprise Community August 10, 2007
Partners
The Enterprise
August 4, 2008
Foundation, Housing
Authority of Portland
Housing Our Families, September 19,
Mississippi Target
2007
Area Project
PCRI
September 7,
2007
The Community
October 7, 2007
Development Network
Housing Our Families March 2, 2009
Franciscan Enterprise
Housing Our Families

March 12, and
March 17, 2009
October 16, 2007

PCRI, Housing Our
Families, Sabin CDC

October 16, 2007

Housing and
Community
Development
Commission
PCRI

July 20, 2010

Sabin CDC
First Interstate Bank,
Wells Fargo Bank,
Housing and
Community
Development
Commission
N/NE Economic
Development Alliance
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September 28,
2007
September 21,
2007
October 9, 2007

September 22,
2009

Appendix B
List of Interviewees (continued)
Name
Gretchen Kafoury
Craig Kelley

Bill Kowalczyk
Kevin Kraus
Keith Lokan
Linda Grear Long

Cynthia Luckett

Position
City
Commissioner
Construction
Manager,
Program
Manager
Construction
Manager
Construction
Manager
Housing
Construction
Review Staff
Founder, Staff
Member,
Neighborhood
Resident
Staff Member

Peg Malloy

Executive
Director,
Member

Martha McLennan

Program
Manager,
Executive
Director
Executive
Director

Ed McNamara
Diane
Meisenhelter
Gloria Lupin
Morgan

Executive
Director,
Neighborhood
Resident
Neighborhood
Activist

Organization
City of Portland
PCRI, Housing
Development Center
Franciscan
Enterprise, Portland
Youth Builders
REACH CDC
Portland
Development
Commission
Housing Our
Families, Sabin
CDC, Boise
Neighborhood
NECDC, Enterprise
Community Partners
Portland Housing
Center, Housing and
Community
Development
Commission
Bureau of Housing
and Community
Development, NW
Housing Alternatives
REACH CDC, The
Neighborhood
Partnership Fund
Sabin CDC, Sabin
Neighborhood
Boise Neighborhood
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Date of Interview
September 20,
2007
October 5, 2007

September 6,
2007
September 25,
2007
August 13, 2007
August 21, 2007

August 10, 2007
September 12,
2007

September 11,
2007
September 14,
2007
January 21, 2008

December 16,
2007

Appendix B
List of Interviewees (continued)
Name

Position

Organization

Kathleen
Pequeño

Community
Organizer,
Neighborhood
Resident
Founding Board
Member

Housing Our
Families, Eliot
Neighborhood

Mike Purcell
Betsy Radigan
Steve Rudman
Nick Sauvie
Carmen
Schleiger
Sumner Sharpe
Alberta
Simmons
Kristina Smock
Kay Sohl
Erik Sten
Fred Stewart
David Sweet
Carl Talton

Franciscan
Enterprise, Albina
CDC
Neighborhood
Piedmont
Activist
Neighborhood
Association
Director
Bureau of Housing
and Community
Development
Executive Director ROSE CDC
Founding Board
Member,
Construction
Manager
Neighborhood
Resident, Planner
Neighborhood
Resident, Board
Member
Community
Organizer
CDC Consultant
City
Commissioner
Neighborhood
Activist
Derelict Building
Inspection
Supervisor
Founding Board
Member

Housing Our
Families

Date of
Interview
August 23, 2007

September 11,
2007
August 16, 2007
September 10,
2007
September 4,
2007
September 11,
2007

Alberta Street
Corridor Project
Franciscan
Enterprise, Housing
Our Families
Housing Our
Families
Technical Assistance
for Community
Services (TACS)
City of Portland

November 26,
2008
September 7,
2007

King Neighborhood
Association
Bureau of Buildings,
City of Portland

October 25, 2007

NECDC

September 9,
2009
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August 16, 2007
November 29,
2007
August 8, 2007

September 13,
2007

Appendix B
List of Interviewees (continued)
Name
HC Tupper

Position
Program Manager

Dee Walsh

September 7,
2007
Program Manager Franciscan Enterprise July 10, 2009
Executive Director Housing
September 11,
Development Center 2007
Director
Housing Department, September 20,
Portland
2007
Development
Commission
Executive Director Portland Community August 15, 2007
Design
Founding Board
Housing Our
August 28, 2007
Member, Interim
Families
Executive Director

Dorene Warner
Will White
Andy Wilch

Peter Wilcox
Barbara Willer

Organization
Affordable Housing
Development
Program, Multnomah
County
Executive Director REACH CDC
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Date of Interview
October 11, 2007

Appendix C - Sample Interview Questions
For CDC staff/board members:
1. What is your affiliation with (your CDC)?
2. How long were you/have you been in that position?
3. How many staff did the organization have when you arrived? When you left (if
applicable)? Currently (if applicable)?
4. What is the primary purpose of this organization?
5. How does the organization fulfill that purpose?
6. Do you feel that your CDC has adhered to its original purpose? Or has it
branched out to fulfill a larger variety of needs?
7. How many and what kind of housing units were produced during your tenure
at your CDC? For PCRI, when did you start to augment the Dominion Capital
housing stock with other construction projects?
8. Do you consider your CDC to be primarily a housing provider or a community
development corporation? What do you consider to be the differences between
these two monikers?
9. What are the different programs that your CDC sponsors (ed)?
10. Do you feel that the City of Portland has supported your CDC? In what ways?
To what do you owe this particular support/lack of support?
11. What sources of funding did your CDC use for the different programs?
12. How has this changed over time? Are you relying on greater or fewer sources?
More government or philanthropic sources?
13. What are your thoughts on the appropriate development scale for your
organization, given the sources of funding and the constraints of the target
area?
14. How has your CDC adapted to the market changes over the last 10 years?
15. What were/are the inherent strengths of your CDC?
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Appendix C - Sample Interview Questions
For CDC staff/board members (continued)
16. Has your organization faced any of the following “ethical dilemmas” in your
tenure? If so, how?
a. Becoming out of touch with community residents, as development has
become more complex.
b. Conflict between the original objectives of the agency as expressed by
the first board, and the goals of newcomers.
c. Maintaining a community and tenant orientation while functioning as a
developer and landlord. Meeting the “double bottom line”.
d. Developing housing with inadequate budgets, so that it is doomed to
failure.
17. Have there been specific organizational challenges in your tenure with your
CDC?
18. Have there been specific staffing challenges during your tenure with your
CDC?
19. How has the changing neighborhood affected your CDC?
20. What role did your CDC play previously?
21. What role does your CDC play now?
22. What is the neighborhood perception of your CDC?
23. What are the primary programs that you currently administer for your CDC?
24. Has this emphasis changed over time? How and why?
25. What populations does your CDC serve?
26. How has this changed over time?
27. Since 1990, the neighborhoods that you serve have changed racially. Describe
the racial tensions both then and now.
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Appendix C - Sample Interview Questions
For funding and philanthropic institution representatives:
1. What is your affiliation with (your institution)?
2. How long were you/have you been in that position?
3. What is the history of your institution’s funding of low-income housing or
community development corporations?
4. What were your criteria for grant approval?
5. In your opinion, how has the CDC community in Inner North/Northeast
Portland changed over time? Have they become more sophisticated? Has the
attrition of CDCs been helpful to the neighborhoods as a whole? What are
some of the drawbacks?
6. For lending institutions: How many loans had you made 1980-1990? 19901995? 1995-2000? 2000-2005?
7. For lending institutions: How many of these loans were commercial?
Residential? For existing structures? New construction? To minority
applicants?
8. For philanthropic institutions: What was your role with the funding of CDCs in
Inner North/Northeast Portland?
9. For philanthropic institutions: did you offer start-up and/or operating grants?
10. For lending and philanthropic institutions: What are your thoughts on the
gentrification and racial of the neighborhoods?
11. For lending and philanthropic institutions: Did the work of the CDCs in the
early 1990s help to change your institution’s perspective of the neighborhoods
of Inner North/Northeast Portland?
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Appendix C - Sample Interview Questions
For public officials:
1. What is your affiliation with (your government organization)?
2. How long were you/have you been in that position?
3. What was your role in the initial development of CDCs in Inner
North/Northeast Portland?
4. How would you characterize their evolution?
5. What was your role in the initial funding of CDCs? Ongoing funding?
6. What was your role in the creation of the Portland Neighborhood Development
Collaborative? Do you think that this was a reasonable response to the issue of
overlap and competition between CDCs?
7. What was your role in encouraging the merger of several CDCs?
8. Do you think that the merger process had the best outcome?
9. How did Sabin CDC survive without Collaborative funding?
10. What has been the reason for PCRI’s stability?
11. What are your thoughts on the gentrification of the neighborhood? Was it
inevitable?
12. What role do you think that race has played in the gentrification of the
neighborhoods of Inner North/Northeast Portland?
13. Do you think that neighborhood support/disdain for CDCs has changed?
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Appendix D – Selected Census Data
Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 1980
1980 Census Data
Census Tracts

33.01

33.02

34.01

34.02

36.01

37.02

$10,900

$8,962

$8,800

$8,355

$12,346

$17,437

25.10%

33.50%

32.70%

42.20%

17.30%

11.30%

57.00%
8.60%

55.00%
6.60%

56.90%
10.90%

52.60%
5.90%

59.60%
10.10%

77.70%
20.80%

810
1802
68

814
1883
30

849
2300
28

374
2167
29

1814
2063
96

1644
842
72

2872

2939

3334

2957

4246

2643

28.20%
62.74%
2.37%

27.70%
64.07%
1.02%

25.46%
68.99%
0.84%

12.65%
73.28%
0.98%

42.72%
48.59%
2.26%

62.20%
31.86%
2.72%

1145
280
732
454
261

1148
255
760
456
320

1190
342
822
595
385

1254
249
703
460
291

1554
343
1191
678
480

898
178
837
419
311

Population Characteristics
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Median Income
PDX Median: $14,782
Poverty Rates
Education
HS Grad or Higher
Bachelor's +
Race
White
Black
Asian
Total Populations
Percentages
White
Black
Asian
Age
0-19 years
20-24 years
25-44 years
45-64 years
65+ years

Age Brackets as a Percentage of Total Population of Census Tracts 33.01,
33.02, 34.01, 34.02, 36.01, 37.02 Aggregated
0-19 years
37.8%
20-24 years
8.6%
25-44 years
26.5%
45-64 years
16.1%
65+ years
10.7%

Appendix D – Selected Census Data
Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 1980 (continued)
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1980 Census Data
Housing Characteristics
Census Tracts
Homeownership Rates
Owner-Occupied Units
% of total units
Ownership of units by Race
White Homeowners
Black Homeowners
Asian Homeowners
Percentage of Homeownership by
Race
White Homeowners
Black Homeowners
Asian Homeowners
Property Values
PDX Median: $56,200
Median Rents
PDX Median: $358

33.01

33.02

34.01

34.02

36.01

37.02

495
50.10%

523
52.60%

568
45.00%

400
40.90%

961
63.10%

572
63.98%

199
279
5

187
321
6

169
389
1

73
319
3

540
386
12

482
163
11

40.20%
56.40%
1.00%

35.80%
61.40%
1.10%

29.80%
68.50%
0.20%

18.30%
79.80%
0.80%

56.20%
40.20%
1.20%

72.70%
24.60%
1.70%

$34,400

$32,800

$38,000

$31,600

$36,900

$48,500

$182

$175

$158

$167

$197

$156

Appendix D – Selected Census Data
Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 1990
1990 Census Data
Census Tracts
Population Characteristics

33.01
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33.02

34.01

34.02

36.01

37.02

Median Income
$16,766
$18,464
PDX Median: $25,592
Poverty Rates
40.10%
34.90%
Education
HS Grad or Higher
69.70%
67.30%
Bachelor's +
6.90%
10.40%
Race
White
786
939
Black
1601
1472
Asian
45
27
Total Populations
2538
2545
Percentages of Total Population
White
30.97%
36.90%
Black
63.08%
57.84%
Asian
1.77%
1.06%
Age
0-17 years
879
839
18-24 years
263
295
25-39 years
615
677
40-64 years
541
491
65+ years
240
243
Age Brackets as a Percentage of Total Population of Census Tracts 33.01,
33.02, 34.01, 34.02, 36.01, 37.02 Aggregated
0-17 years
32.0%
18-24 years
11.0%
25-39 years
24.5%
40-64 years
21.5%
65+ years
11.0%

$15,054

$14,625

$20,771

$30,273

43.10%

43.90%

33.90%

16.40%

66.40%
9.40%

62.10%
7.30%

72.10%
10.10%

75.10%
18.80%

719
1952
47
2832

561
1693
38
2411

1357
2556
107
4148

1297
999
23
2443

25.39%
68.93%
1.66%

23.27%
70.22%
1.58%

32.71%
61.62%
2.58%

53.09%
40.89%
0.94%

861
328
688
603
352

816
282
573
440
300

1349
436
1017
901
445

664
265
582
653
279

Appendix D – Selected Census Data
Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 1990 (continued)
1990 Census Data
Housing Characteristics
Census Tracts
Homeownership Rates
Owner-Occ Units
% of total units
Ownership of units by Race
White Homeowners
Black Homeowners
Asian Homeowners
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Percentage of Homeownership by
Race
White Homeowners
Black Homeowners
Asian Homeowners
Property Values
PDX Median: $72,300
Median Rents
PDX Median: $375

33.01

33.02

34.01

34.02

36.01

37.02

354
42.50%

419
47.67%

418
38.70%

327
39.45%

752
49.15%

572
63.98%

109
242
22

152
245
0

84
309
5

186
225
6

531
417
6

399
189
11

28.90%
64.30%
5.80%

38.20%
61.70%
0.00%

41.30%
47.10%
3.10%

42.20%
51.00%
1.40%

51.90%
40.70%
0.60%

63.10%
29.90%
1.70%

$33,300

$32,400

$37,100

$33,200

$37,100

$48,900

$275

$287

$242

$258

$325

$368

Appendix D – Selected Census Data
Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 2000

325

2000 Census Data
Census Tracts
33.01
33.02
Population Characteristics
Median Income
$24,915
$29,191
PDX Median: $40,146
Poverty Rates
32.79%
20.18%
Education
HS Grad or Higher
70.20%
82.80%
Bachelor's +
18.60%
30.60%
Race
White
986
1142
Black
1586
937
Asian
41
37
Total Populations
3233
2494
Percentages
White
30.50%
45.79%
Black
49.06%
37.57%
Asian
1.27%
1.48%
Age
0-17 years
998
630
18-24 years
336
265
25-39 years
952
832
40-64 years
741
597
65+ years
196
170
Age Brackets as a Percentage of Total Population of Census Tracts 33.01,
33.02, 34.01, 34.02, 36.01, 37.02 Aggregated
0-17 years
27.7%
18-24 years
9.9%
25-39 years
29.1%
40-64 years
25.4%
65+ years
7.8%

34.01

34.02

36.01

37.02

$35,774

$25,598

$38,313

$47,772

23.73%

31.09%

22.14%

16.68%

72.60%
16.90%

72.20%
25.20%

76.20%
19.20%

85.50%
33.70%

1154
1592
48
3309

950
1282
51
2770

1757
2298
107
4537

1292
740
60
2285

34.87%
48.11%
1.45%

34.30%
46.28%
1.84%

38.73%
50.65%
2.36%

56.54%
32.39%
2.63%

926
324
940
817
302

758
339
820
608
245

1346
415
1269
1154
353

504
173
599
821
188

Appendix D – Selected Census Data
Population and Housing Characteristics of the Central Census Tracts of the Albina Neighborhoods 2000 (continued)

326

2000 Census Data
Housing Characteristics
Census Tracts
Homeownership Rates
Owner-Occ Units
% of total units
Ownership of units by Race
White Homeowners
Black Homeowners
Asian Homeowners
Percentage of Homeownership by
Race
White Homeowners
Black Homeowners
Asian Homeowners
Property Values
PDX Median: $166,000
Median Rents
PDX Median: $562

33.01

33.02

34.01

34.02

36.01

37.02

526
46.38%

575
57.85%

578
47.07%

441
42.86%

1024
61.35%

632
69.60%

213
246
17

366
184
8

239
272
18

186
225
6

531
417
6

399
189
11

40.50%
46.80%
3.20%

63.70%
32.00%
1.40%

41.30%
47.10%
3.10%

42.20%
51.00%
1.40%

51.90%
40.70%
0.60%

63.10%
29.90%
1.70%

$121,800

$130,700

$127,800

$112,800

$114,900

$151,300

$579

$657

$494

$540

$613

$552

Source: United States Census, calculations by author

Appendix E
Matrix of Organizations (Summary of Points of Comparison)
NECDC
1986-2000

Franciscan
Enterprises (Later
Albina CDC)
1987-2001

Housing Our
Families (Later
Albina CDC)
1993-2001

Sabin CDC
1992- present

PCRI
1993-present

Board Structure

Founding Board: skill
based, neighborhood
based.

Founding Board: skill
based.

Founding Board:
All women. Some
neighborhood
representation.

Founding Board:
neighborhood based,
and organization was
membership based.

Founding Board: Skill
based, some tenant
representation later.

Board
Membership

Founding Board:
Black professionals

Founding Board:
Professional, no
neighborhood
representation

Founding Board:
All women
50% neighborhood
based

Founding Board:
All neighborhood
representation

Founding Board:
Professional, no
neighborhood
representation

Later Boards:
Black professionals

Later Boards:
Some neighborhood
representation, few
tenants

Later Boards:
Mostly women
Of color

Later Boards: fewer
neighborhood
representatives, more
professionals

Later Boards:
Professionals, 1 tenant
max

Don Neureuther:
1988-1991
Jaki Walker: 19911999
Sondra Price: 19992000

Fr. Matt Tumulty:
1987-1993
Jerry Lindsay & Tom
DelSavio: 1993-1996
Karen Voiss: 19972000
Fran Ayaribil, 20002001
Shelley Earley 20012003
Nanita McIlhatten2003-2006

Gretchen Dursch:
1993-1997
Barbara Willer: 19971998
Joan Miggins: 19982001

Diane Meisenhelter,
1992- 1997
Jane Ediger: 19931998
Topaz Faulkner:
1997-1998
Felicia AllenderBrant: 1998-2006
Pasquale Jenkins:
2007- present

Maxine Fitzpatrick,
1994- present
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Name of
Organization

Executive
Director Tenure

Shelley Earley 20012003
Nanita McIlhatten2003-2006

Appendix E
Matrix of Organizations (Summary of Points of Comparison)
Mission
Statement

Northeast CDC
NECDC’s mission is
to improve the quality
of life for the
culturally diverse
population of Inner
North/Northeast
Portland through
community
development
activities.
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Franciscan Enterprise
Franciscan Enterprise of
Oregon, Inc. is committed
to building community in
the spirit of St. Francis.
To this purpose,
Franciscan enterprise:
Engages volunteers to
assist in renovating
vacant and abandoned
properties in inner
North/Northeast Portland.
Works to ensure
availability of quality
affordable housing for
inner North/Northeast
Portland households.
Manages Franciscan
Enterprise properties to
assist tenants and their
neighbors in maintaining
vital, stable, and secure
communities. Fosters
partnerships with
individuals, churches, and
other community groups
in order to support
resident initiatives and
economic development
activities in
North/Northeast Portland.

HOF, Albina CDC
Empowering
women. Developing
partnerships.
Providing housing.

Sabin CDC
To stabilize and
improve the livability
of culturally diverse
Portland
neighborhoods by
assuring the
availability of longterm affordable
housing for its low
and moderate income
residents, and by
encouraging
community
partnerships for local
economic
development, selfhelp projects, and
youth and senior
programs

PCRI
Preserve, expand
and manage
affordable housing
in the City of
Portland and
provide access to
and advocacy for
services for our
residents. PCRI
will preserve and
manage affordable,
high quality,
scattered site,
single family
homes; expand and
manage our
portfolio of small
multiplexes; and
acquire/develop
multi-family
housing to preserve
affordable housing
choices in our
community.

Appendix E
Matrix of Organizations (Summary of Points of Comparison)
NECDC
Initial: 200 properties
from City of Portland,
Federal Nehemiah
Grant 1989

Franciscan Enterprise
Initial: Donated Houses
Renovated by Weekend
Volunteer Work Parties
Later: 14 Vacant houses
donated by Fred Meyer,

HOF, Albina CDC
Initial: 0 units
Later: 360 housing
units, assets
transferred to PCRI

Sabin CDC
Initial: 0 housing
units
At present: 128
rental units and
land trust houses

Type of
Organization
Target Market

Board Run

Church Based

Membership

Membership

50-80% of median inc.
homebuyers, especially
those living in
neighborhood already

Very low income renters

Low & very low
income renters, focus
on single women
with families

Low and ModerateIncome Homebuyers,
Low-Income Renters

Housing Units
Developed per
CDN
Funding Sources

Rental: 55
For Sale: 206 units

Rental: 120
For Sale: 0

Rental: 268
For Sale: 20

Low and moderate
income renters, for
sale housing
through a Land
Trust
Rental: 128
For Sale: 25

Operating Support:
City of Portland, Meyer
Memorial Trust
Development Support:
Nehemiah Grant

Operating Support: City
and Grant funded
Development Support:
PDC, grants, loans, Nun
money

Operating Support:
City and Grant
funded
Development
Support: PDC, grants,
loans

Operating Support:
City and Grant
funded
Development
Support: PDC,
grants, loans

Operating Support:
Grant funded
Development Support:
US Bank Line of
Credit

Timetables for
housing
production/
acquisition
Relationship to
Neighborhood
Organizations

See Appendix G

Positives: Affiliation
with St Andrews Church
Negatives: Slow
development processes
hampered image

Positives: 50% of board
was neighborhood based
Negatives: Trust never
solidified; poor
management soured
relationships

Assets
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Positives: Cleared
blight
Negatives: Not
communicative

PCRI
Initial: 354 houses
from City of Portland
and Dominion Capital
At present:+ 350
housing units from
Albina CDC
Politically created

Rental: 282
For Sale: 70 initially

Positives: initially
neighborhood based
Negatives: invisibility to
neighbors as
organization shrank in
size

Positives:
Improvement
of Housing
Stock
Negatives:
Perception of
being City
Agency

Appendix E
Matrix of Organizations (Summary of Points of Comparison)
NECDC
Positives:
Negatives: other orgs.
thought NECDC got
preferential treatment

Franciscan Enterprise
Positives: worked with
HOF and Sabin on joint
programs
Negatives: ED badmouthed HOF in public

HOF, Albina CDC
Positives: worked with
Sabin and Franciscan on
joint programs
Negatives: poor unit
management made org a
lightening rod for NA

Sabin CDC
Positives: worked well
with HOF and
Franciscan on joint
programs
Negatives: withdrew
from merger at 11th hour

Relationship to
Enterprise
Foundation

Not a major funding
concern

Not a major funding
concern

Withdrawal from merger
soured relationship

Relationship to
BHCD

Walker at odds with
Bureau. Kafoury
mediated solution. Very
reluctant relationship.
Section 8 at Gladys
McCoy

Good relationship until
Maggie Gibson project
stalled.

Good initial relationship;
property management
concerns pushed merger
talks
Very good relationship
until merger talks
intiated.

Very lax – caused
problems with unit
turnover

Forewent police and
background checks – led
to tenant problems

Relationship to
other CDCs
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Rental Policies

Good relationship until
shift away from housing
development and
withdrawal from merger
Outsourced most
property management

PCRI
Positives: worked well
with larger CDCs
Negatives: was so
much bigger than
other CDCs that there
was not much
interaction
Proponent of childcare
programs, green
construction
Respect for ED’s
ability to manage
scattered site portfolio.
All property
management in house.
Very stringent.

Appendix F

Literature Matrix (Summary of Current Literature Regarding CDC success and failure)
Matrix of Contextual and Organizational Factors that contribute to CDC success or failure
Gittell & Wilder
Glickman &
Rohe, Bratt, &
Rohe, Cowan, &
Author
Servon
Biswas
Baku
Programmatic
Components of
Challenging
Factors
and
Capacity
factors influencing
Organizational
Contextual and
performance Research
Attributes &
Organizational
measures of
Topics
Factors that
efficiency (total
Influence Success
resources divided
by staff
compensation)
Resources
Staff
compensation

331
Organizational
Factors

Twelvetrees

Vidal (1996)

3 levels of
success

Factors for
success for
Mature CDCs

Stay in business

Size (budget &
staff), expansion
rate
Prioritization of
activities, scale
of housing
development
Programmatic
and project
experience
Leadership
stability - Board
and ED

Average cost of
activities

Attain objectives
efficiently

Tenure of ED &
staff,
Age of
Organization,
Trainings offered

Stable leadership

Programmatic
Capacity
Organizational
Competency

Organizational
strengths- Staff &
Board

Lack of board or
staff capacity
Internal
management
problems

Appendix F

Literature Matrix (Summary of Current Literature Regarding CDC success and failure)
Gittell & Wilder
Organizational
Factors

Glickman &
Servon

Mission

Breadth of
mission
Over-reliance on
single source of
funding

332
Contextual
Factors

Political Capital,
Funding

Rohe, Bratt, &
Biswas

Political
Strengths

Networking
abilities

Communication
problems
Lack of
community
support
Changes in local
housing
market/neigh.
Growth in the #
of CDCs
Intermediaries
and funders
have pressured
CDCs to make
certain choices,
federal policies
& programs
Lack of local
support groups
& systems
Level of trust
among actors

Rohe, Cowan, &
Baku

Twelvetrees

Vidal (1996)

Appendix G
CDC Housing Development Data
Name of
CDC
NECDC
Franciscan
Enterprise
Housing
Our
Families
Sabin CDC
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PCRI
Albina
CDC

Total Housing Unit Development

Emerging Years
(497 units)
1990 1991

Middle Years
(394 units)

1992

1993 1994

1995

1996 1997

1998

Merger Years
(213 units)
1999 2000

Mature Years
(54 units)

2001

2002 2003

2004

Total
Units

1987

1988

1989

2005 2006

3

1

1

0

1

9

14

31

40

66

80

12

6

6

270

1

2

0

2

2

8

2

13

28

43

0

5

0

0

106

4

44

0

12

106

4

14

72

15

2

3

10

21

39

28

10

10

2

1

2

0

1

0

1

128

244

1

0

0

0

0

99

0

0

0

0

0

2

24

370

273

4

4
1151

87

Year
06

20

05

20

04

20

03

20

02

20

01

20

00

20

99

19

98

19

97

19

96

19

95

19

94

19

93

19

92

19

91

19

90

19

89

19

88

19

19

334
Number of Units Acquired/Developed

Housing Development Totals

300

250

200

150
NECDC
Franciscan Enterprise
Housing Our Families
Sabin CDC
PCRI

100

50

0

NECDC Housing Unit Acquisition/Development
90

80

70
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Number of Units

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year

Franciscan Enterprise Housing Unit Acquisition/Development
50
45
40
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Number of Units

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year

Year
06

20

05

20

04

20

03

20

02

20

01

20

00

20

99

19

98

19

97

19

96

19

95

19

94

19

93

19

92

19

91

19

90

19

89

19

88

19

87

19

337
Number of Units

Housing Our Families Housing Unit Acquisition/Development

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Sabin CDC Housing Unit Acquisition/Development
45

40

35

338

Number of Units

30

25

20

15

10

5

0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year

PCRI Housing Unit Acquisition/Development
300

250

339

Number of Units

200

150

100

50

0
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year

Appendix H RMLS Data
Area Home Prices (in dollars), 1993-2006
North
PDX

NE PDX

SE PDX

Hillsb’ro
Forest
Grove

Gresh’m
Trout

Milwauk
Clack.

Oregon
City/
Canby

Lake
Oswego/
West Linn

West
Portland

Beavert’n
Aloha

Tigard/
Wilsnv’lle

NW
Wash
County

Portland
Median

340

‘93

59,000

84,000

79,900

97,900

110,000

116,000

109,000

170,000

138,900

111,000

137,000

150,000

107,000

‘94

68,000

92,000

87,500

112,500

121,500

122,500

125,000

189,500

152,500

120,000

147,500

165,000

117,000

‘95

80,000

107,000

99,500

125,000

128,500

134,500

136,500

208,100

170,500

132,000

130,000

175,000

128,000

‘96

89,200

119,000

112,500

139,900

139,500

149,100

145,000

220,000

185,000

142,500

165,000

192,000

139,900

‘97

102,000

130,000

123,000

149,500

146,500

156,300

153,900

235,000

205,000

150,000

171,300

215,000

150,000

‘98

113,000

139,000

129,900

152,500

153,000

168,500

167,900

240,000

212,800

156,000

175,000

212,100

156,900

‘99

117,000

144,000

135,000

153,000

158,000

167,300

173,000

249,900

211,200

159,000

188,300

227,300

160,200

‘00

119,900

149,000

140,000

159,400

160,500

170,900

171,900

260,000

229,900

163,000

189,600

230,000

166,000

‘01

129,200

157,500

146,000

165,000

161,000

173,100

175,200

252,000

227,000

167,000

190,500

232,500

169,900

‘02

138,000

168,800

153,400

174,900

164,500

180,200

185,000

265,000

247,800

172,500

204,000

244,000

176,900

‘03

150,600

182,000

162,500

178,800

170,000

189,900

199,900

287,300

262,500

176,300

224,000

259,900

185,500

‘04

165,000

198,400

175,000

189,000

185,000

214,900

215,000

333,000

289,900

191,000

240,000

285,900

204,500

‘05

197,000

231,000

200,000

223,500

214,500

255,000

255,000

370,700

339,000

220,000

290,000

334,600

237,500

‘06

235,500

265,000

234,500

260,000

248,000

307,200

286,000

443,800

378,100

251,000

322,000

359,000

270,500

Comparison	
  of	
  Portland	
  Metro	
  Area	
  Median	
  Home	
  Sale	
  Prices
$500,000
North	
  Portland

$450,000

NE	
  Portland
$400,000

SE	
  Portland
Gresham	
  Troutdale
Milwaukie/	
  Clackamas

$300,000

Oregon	
  City/	
  Canby
Lake	
  Oswego/	
  West	
  Linn

$250,000

West	
  Portland

$200,000

Beaverton	
  Aloha
$150,000

Tigard	
  Wilsonville
NW	
  Washington	
  County

$100,000

Hillsboro/	
  Forest	
  Grove
$50,000

Portland	
  Median	
  Home
Prices

Year

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

$0
1993

341

Median	
  Home	
  Sales	
  Prices

$350,000

Appendix H RMLS Data
Home Prices as a Percentage of Median, 1993-2006

Year

342

‘93
‘94
‘95
‘96
‘97
‘98
‘99
‘00
‘01
‘02
‘03
‘04
‘05
‘06

North
Portland
55.1%
58.1%
62.5%
63.8%
68.0%
72.0%
73.0%
72.2%
76.0%
78.0%
81.2%
80.7%
82.9%
87.1%

SE
Portland
74.7%
74.8%
77.7%
80.4%
82.0%
82.8%
84.3%
84.3%
85.9%
86.7%
87.6%
85.6%
84.2%
86.7%

NE
Portland
78.5%
78.6%
83.6%
85.1%
86.7%
88.6%
89.9%
89.8%
92.7%
95.4%
98.1%
97.0%
97.3%
98.0%

Hillsboro/
Forest
Grove

Gresham
Troutdale

91.5%
96.2%
97.7%
100.0%
99.7%
97.2%
95.5%
96.0%
97.1%
98.9%
96.4%
92.4%
94.1%
96.1%

102.8%
103.8%
100.4%
99.7%
97.7%
97.5%
98.6%
96.7%
94.8%
93.0%
91.6%
90.5%
90.3%
91.7%

Beavert’n
Aloha
103.7%
102.6%
103.1%
101.9%
100.0%
99.4%
99.3%
98.2%
98.3%
97.5%
95.0%
93.4%
92.6%
92.8%

Oregon
City/
Canby
101.9%
106.8%
106.6%
103.6%
102.6%
107.0%
108.0%
103.6%
103.1%
104.6%
107.8%
105.1%
107.4%
105.7%

Milwaukie
Clackamas

Tigard
Wilsonville

108.4%
104.7%
105.1%
106.6%
104.2%
107.4%
104.4%
103.0%
101.9%
101.9%
102.4%
105.1%
107.4%
113.6%

128.0%
126.1%
101.6%
117.9%
114.2%
111.5%
117.5%
114.2%
112.1%
115.3%
120.8%
117.4%
122.1%
119.0%

West
Portland
129.8%
130.3%
133.2%
132.2%
136.7%
135.6%
131.8%
138.5%
133.6%
140.1%
141.5%
141.8%
142.7%
139.8%

NW
Wash
County
140.2%
141.0%
136.7%
137.2%
143.3%
135.2%
141.9%
138.6%
136.8%
137.9%
140.1%
139.8%
140.9%
132.7%

Lake
Oswego/
West Linn
158.9%
162.0%
162.6%
157.3%
156.7%
153.0%
156.0%
156.6%
148.3%
149.8%
154.9%
162.8%
156.1%
164.1%

Portland Area Home Sales as a Percentage of Median
180.0%

160.0%

Lake Oswego/ West Linn

140.0%

NW Washington County
West Portland
Tigard Wilsonville

100.0%

Oregon City/ Canby

343

Percentage of Median

120.0%

Milwaukie/ Clackamas

80.0%

Beaverton Aloha
60.0%

Gresham Troutdale

40.0%

NE Portland
SE Portland

20.0%

North Portland
0.0%
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Year

Neighborhood Map with
Census Tracts and CDC
Office Locations
Map Key
F- Franciscan Enterprise Office

37.02

H1- Housing Our Families 1st Office
H2- Housing Our Families 2nd Office
N- Northeast CDC Office

344

P1- PCRI

Office

P2- PCRI

2nd

Office

P3- PCRI 3rd Office

34.01

H3

34.02

E

Census Tract Boundary
N

P
Large Institutional
Development Areas
E -Emmanuel Hospital URA
P -Portland Public Schools
M - Memorial Coliseum

Source: City of Portland, Office of
Neighborhood Involvement, US Census
Bureau

P1
H1

M

36.01

F

H2

H3- Housing Our Families 3rd Office
1st

P3

P2

S
33.01

33.02

Appendix I
Maps
Housing Development
Allocated by Neighborhood
NECDC

345

Boise
Eliot
Humboldt
King
Vernon
Sabin
Piedmont

36
2
32
162
29
1
0

Housing
Franciscan Our
Enterprise Families
7
14
7
63
3
0
0

Sabin
CDC
90
79
13
14
3
0
74

PCRI
2
0
0
19
50
16
0

Totals
10
31
119
52
25
17
24

145
126
171
310
110
34
98

1995 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation

346

< -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
> 1.5 Std. Dev.
CDCs (1986-1995)

Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown

PIEDMONT

ARBOR LODGE

WOODLAWN

PIEDMONT
CONCORDIA
VERNON

OVERLOOK

HUMBOLDT

2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k

KING

Assessed Value by Standard Deviation

347

< -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.

SABIN

BOISE

0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
ALAMEDA

> 1.5 Std. Dev.
All CDCs

SABIN-IRVINGTON
ELIOT
IRVINGTON

Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown
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2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
< -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
> 1.5 Std. Dev.
NECDC

Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown
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2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
< -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
> 1.5 Std. Dev.
Franciscan CDC

Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown

350

2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
< -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
> 1.5 Std. Dev.
Housing Our Families CDC

Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown
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2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
< -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
> 1.5 Std. Dev.
Sabin CDC

Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown
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2006 SFR Tax Lots Less Than $550k
Assessed Value by Standard Deviation
< -1.5 Std. Dev.
-1.5 - -0.50 Std. Dev.
-0.50 - 0.50 Std. Dev.
0.50 - 1.5 Std. Dev.
> 1.5 Std. Dev.
PCRI

Sources: Metro's RLIS; L. Brown

Appendix J – Timeline of Events
Emerging Years – Industry Formation
Well funded, Ample Development Opportunities, Neighborhoods still blighted, accepting of CDCs, Growth Phase for Organizations
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
Federal
Leadership

Clinton elected President,
Cisneros Secretary of HUD

Welfare Reform: TANF
Introduced w/ 5 year limits on
benefits. Parts of CRA curbed.
CDBG diminishes. Section 8
zeroed out for next 5 years.

HOPE VI approved by
Congress

Federal Policy

Local Public
Policy

Shift in Congress to Republican
majority: Gingrich's Class of '94

Albina Community Plan
Adopted

Kafoury Aide Sten comes up
with idea to buy Dominion
Capital properties and form
CDC

Kafoury introduces idea of creating
Housing Trust Fund with $30 million
from General Fund moneys
Portland Rehab Network
becomes Community
Development Network of
Multnomah County and is
granted non-profit status
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Local Public
Leadership

Katz elected mayor, Kafoury,
defeating Bogle, is elected to
City Council, leads BHCD,
Hales elected to City Council

Philanthropic
Policy

1st round of NPF-led training
sessions for CDCs

2nd round of NPF-led training
sessions for CDCs

McNamara leaves, Neureuther hired
as Director, Meyer Trust funds CDC
operating support

Enterprise Foundation
establishes an office in Portland,
Mike Andrews hired to lead

Neil Kelly Showroom
opens at N. Alberta and
N. Albina

Neil Kelly donates building to
N/NE Community Mental
Health

Body found under FE Fred
Meyer house

1st Boise Neighborhood Cleanup,
Boys and Girls Club opens at NE
Police Precinct

Housing prices in Portland rise
by 25%

Jaki Walker hired to
implement Nehemiah
Grant, 1st extension
granted

Multnomah County balks at 130
property donations, redlining
issues stall financing packages

NECDC completes 1st
Nehemiah house

FE participates in NPF trainings

FE acquires 14 houses from
Fred Meyer

DelSavio and Lindsey hired as codirectors, Kowalczyk hired as const.
manager

Sabin CDC formed from
Sabin Community Assoc

Sabin completes 1st rehab

Sabin gains 501C3 status,
participates in NPF trainings,
Meisenhelter hired as ED

Ediger hired as co-ED to develop
housing, Beene hired to run Alberta
St organizing effort

Fondren hired as Economic
Development Director, Sabin
initiates Alberta St Corridor
Project

HOF acquires 501C3
status

HOF completes first rehab

HOF completes NPF training,
hires Dursch as ED, Smock as
Community Organizer

HOF acquires Colonial Park, starts
Maya Angelou rehab

HOF wins Rudy Bruner Award,
beats out NECDC

Neighborhood
Issues
Northeast
Community
Development
Corporation
(NECDC)
Franciscan
Enterprise
(FE)
Sabin CDC
Housing our
Families
(HOF)
Portland
Community
Reinvestment
Initiatives
(PCRI)

PCRI created to assume 354
Dominion Capital Properties,
entire year's worth of tax credits
set aside to facilitate

Interim Director Alverson,
assisted by Ediger, seek to
straighten out 70+ land sale
contracts

2nd extension on Nehemiah
Grant granted

Fitzpatrick hired as ED, land sale
contracts cleared, renovation of
properties begins, Kelley hired for
construction

Appendix J – Timeline of Events
Middle Years – Industry Growth and Complexity

Greater Accountability from Funders, Limited and More Complex Development Opportunities, Gentrification Happening, CDCs become Stewards of
Multiple Housing Units and Advocates for Poorer Residents
Federal
Leadership
Federal Policy
Local Public
Policy
Local Public
Leadership
Philanthropic
Policy

1996
Bill Clinton re-elected President, Andrew
Cuomo Secretary of HUD
Welfare Reform Act
PNDSC formed - single source of funding for
CDCs from City and Local Foundations
Vera Katz re-elected mayor, Mike Lindberg
and Earl Blumenauer resign, Erik Sten elected
City Commissioner
BHCD, NPF, & Enterprise form PNDSC
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Neighborhood
Issues
NECDC

1997

Tax Credits becoming main source of project
equity for low-income housing
1st Alberta Street Fair, McMenamin Brothers
renovate Kennedy School into Brew Pub and
Hotel, Self Enhancement Inc moves to Unthank
Park
NECDC completes final Nehemiah house, 167
units completed

Franciscan
Enterprise

FE acquires 3 LIHPRHA properties, Lindsey
and DelSavio leave, Karen Voiss hired as
Director, Maggie Gibson development begins

Sabin CDC

Sabin acquires 3 LIHPRHA properties

Sabin completes Otesha Place

Housing our
Families

Alberta Simmons Plaza developed, HOF
acquires 4 LIHPRHA properties, Smock
leaves

Betty Campbell Building built on N. Mississippi

PCRI

1998

Kafoury resigns as City Commissioner, Sten takes over
leadership of BHCD, Jim Francesconi elected
Commissioner
NCDI money runs out
Art on Alberta takes over street fair, Last Thursday art
walk created
NECDC enters into agreement with The One Company
to develop the Gladys McCoy apartments
Entire FE staff quits, citing Voiss’ lack of leadership

Line of Credit max'd out, Construction Manager
Kelley leaves, childcare programs initiated

Diane Meisenhelter and Jane Ediger leave, Felicia
Allender-Brant hired as Director
Dursch, after returning from maternity leave, asked to
leave for good, Willer finds embezzlement, Bauer hired
to work on MTA

Appendix J – Timeline of Events
Merger Years – Industry Accountability

Little or No New Development, Gentrification Process fully in Place, CDCs become Synonymous with Low Income Housing, Sabin gets out of the Housing
Business, Franciscan and HOF Merge, NECDC closes its doors
1999
Federal
Leadership
Federal Policy

2000

2001

George W Bush elected President, Mel Martinez
Secretary of HUD
9/11 Attacks. Invasion of Afghanistan. Housing Funds
cut more.

Dow Jones tops 10,000

Local Public
Policy
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Local Public
Leadership

Dan Saltzman elected City Commissioner

Philanthropic
Policy

PNDSC suggests that N/NE groups discuss
overlapping services/service areas

PNDSC demands that groups (NECDC, PCRI,
HOF, FE, and Sabin) merge - or lose funding

Neighborhood
Issues

BNA torpedoes HOF rental project with Tom
Walsh,Battle of Boise in Willamette Week

NE Passage documents BNA strife with HOF,
Rebuilding Center opens on N. Mississippi Ave

NECDC

NECDC forms Geo Development, a for-profit
venture, explores idea of saw mills in Zambia,
Jaki Walker resigns

NECDC withdraws from merger talks, closes its
doors, and turns 12 unsold houses back to bank

Mississippi Ave St Fair begins, New Seasons Market
opens on NE 33rd Ave

Franciscan
Enterprise

Maggie Gibson completed, Karen Voiss resigns in
August after sending letter regarding HOF. Fran
Ayaribil hired as interim Director. FE withdraws
from merger talks for 3 months.

FE merges with HOF to become ACDC July 1. New
Board led by FE members

Sabin CDC

8 Land Trust houses completed and sold

Sabin withdraws from merger in June and forgoes
funding
HOF mergers with FE to become ACDC, Shelley
Earley hired as Director, new staff found to be under
qualified, finances

Housing our
Families

HUD scrutinizes finances, Miggins hired as
Director, BNA torpedoes rental housing
development with Tom Walsh

HUD scrutiny continues, no audit completed. HOF
in talks with FE and Sabin.

PCRI

Park Terrace (88 units) acquired

PCRI declines entry into merger talks, forgoes
funding

Appendix J – Timeline of Events
Mature Years/Attrition – Industry Contraction

Little or no New Development, N/NE Portland becomes so expensive, even the Original Gentrifiers can no longer afford it, Alberta and Mississippi
become the new Commercial Districts, Sabin goes Dormant, ACDC decides to close its doors, PCRI attempts Minority Homeownership Programs
2002

2003

HUD budget authority
decreased by 40% since
1976 (Powell, 2004).

10 Year Plan to End
Homelessness enacted - priority
for housing for 0-30% of MFI

HIF budget $12 million.

Tom Potter, defeating Jim
Francesconi, elected mayor,
Sam Adams elected City
Commissioner

Randy Leonard elected City
Commissioner

356

Enterprise Foundation revamps
into Enterprise Community
Partners

Philanthropic
Policy

Neighborhood
Issues

2006

Interest Rates drop to new lows.
Homeownership rates increase.

Local Public
Policy

Local Public
Leadership

2005

George W Bush re-elected
President, Alphonso Jackson
Secretary of HUD

Federal
Leadership

Federal Policy

2004

Renovation of PCC Cascade
Campus

No Alberta St Fair

BNA torpedoes MAL due to
design issues, cites BC
building as poor example

NECDC
Franciscan
Enterprise
Sabin CDC

Sabin completes a land trust
house

Housing our
Families/ Albina
Community
Development

ACDC completes new
const. project on NE 10th,
CFO fired for incompetance

PCRI

Sabin's 15th Anniversary
Party, Allender-Brant goes on
indefinite leave.

Sabin completes a land trust
house
Earley leaves after 20
months, McIlhatten hired
as turn-around director

ACDC enters into discussions
with PCRI for dissolution

ACDC refinances all
properties

ACDC properties transferred
to PCRI March 31

PCRI enters into discussions
with ACDC

Minority Homeownership
Programs initiated, OC
Trotter Office Building
completed

ACDC properties transferred
to PCRI March 31

